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South-Eastern Europe

*The Main Problem of the
Present World Struggle*

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Serbian Soldier and Father in Retreat Through Albania

South-Eastern Europe

*The Main Problem of the
Present World Struggle*

BY

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INTRODUCTION BY

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INTRODUCTION

THE steps necessary to establish a durable peace after the present war include a serious effort to settle, on the basis of justice, what European diplomacy has long known as the Eastern question. That question arises, first, out of the presence of the Turk in Europe, and second, out of the strangely mixed complex of races, religions and languages which inhabits the Balkan Peninsula. There can be no world peace while the Eastern question is permitted to remain open and to offer temptation to the ambitions or to the greed of other nations.

That the Turk must leave Europe will now probably go without saying. Confined to Asia Minor, with ancient Brusa as his capital, the Turk may be given full opportunity to live his own life and to develop his good qualities without at the same time offering invitation to constant friction and disturbance by his presence in Europe. With the Turk gone and with the just claims of Greece recognized, the main problem is to give civil and political liberty to the Southern Slavs and to assure them opportunity to work out their own destiny. There is no need to traverse here any of the ground so thoroughly gone over by M. Savić in the following pages. He makes it plain both how the Southern Slavs came to be in the Balkans, what their fate

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there has been, and in what forms their problem of to-morrow presents itself to the statesmen of to-day. Political prophecy is always dangerous, and never more so than at a time like this when the world is in ferment; yet there are not wanting signs that the principle of federation is to be still farther extended and is perhaps to include what has been the Russian Empire in its sphere of influence and control. This same principle of federation may also be found to contain the best solution of the Eastern question. It may perhaps provide a way by which the Southern Slavs, without surrendering their local traditions, may be brought into a single powerful and independent State. It is but a few months ago that the Serbian Government, temporarily established on the Island of Corfu, issued the official statement which is known as the Declaration of Corfu. It seems worth while to insert that Declaration here in full as an illustration of that to which M. Savić's argument may lead:

DECLARATION OF CORFU

1. The State of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, who are also known by the name of Southern Slavs or Jugoslavs, will be a free and independent Kingdom, with an indivisible territory and unity of power. This State will be a constitutional, democratic, and Parliamentary monarchy, with the Karageorgevitch dynasty, which has always shared the ideals and feelings of the nation in placing above everything else the national liberty and will at its head.
2. The name of this State will be the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and the title of the sovereign will be King of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
3. This State will only have one coat of arms, one flag, and one crown.

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4. The four different flags of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will have equal rights, and may be hoisted freely on all occasions. The same will obtain for the four different coats of arms.

5. The three national denominations, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, are equal before the law in all the territory of the kingdom, and each may freely use it on all occasions in public life and before all authorities.

6. The two Cyrillic and Latin alphabets also have the same rights and every one may freely use them in all the territory of the kingdom. The royal and local self-governing authorities have the right and ought to employ the two alphabets according to the desire of the citizens.

7. All religions are recognized, and may be free and publicly practiced. The Orthodox Roman Catholic and Mussulman religions, which are most professed in our country, will be equal, and will enjoy the same rights in relation to the State. In view of these principles, the Legislature will be careful to preserve the religious peace in conformity with the spirit and tradition of our entire nation.

8. The Gregorian calendar will be adopted as soon as possible.

9. The territory of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will comprise all the territory where our nation lives in compact masses and without discontinuity, and where it could not be mutilated without injuring the vital interests of the community. Our nation does not ask for anything which belongs to others, and only claims that which belongs to it. It desires to free itself and establish its unity. That is why it conscientiously and firmly rejects every partial solution of the problem of its freedom from the Austro-Hungarian domination.

10. The Adriatic Sea, in the interests of liberty and equal rights of all nations, is to be free and open to all and each.

11. All citizens throughout the territory of the kingdom are equal and enjoy the same rights in regard to the State and the law.

12. The election of Deputies to the national representation will take place under universal suffrage, which is to be equal, direct, and secret. The same will apply to the elections in the communes and other administrative institutions. A vote will be taken in each commune.

13. The Constitution to be established after the conclusion of peace by the Constituent Assembly elected by universal, direct, and secret suffrage will serve as a basis for the life of the State. It will be the origin and ultimate end of all the powers and all rights by which the whole national life will be regulated. The Constitu-

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tion will give the people the opportunity of exercising its particular energies in local autonomies, regulated by natural, social, and economic conditions. The Constitution must be adopted in its entirety by a numerical majority of the Constituent Assembly, and all other laws passed by the Constituent Assembly will not come into force until they have been sanctioned by the King.

Thus the united nation of Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenes will form a State of twelve million inhabitants. This State will be a guarantee of their national independence and of their general national progress and civilization, and a powerful rampart against the pressure of the Germans, and an inseparable ally of all civilized peoples and States. Having proclaimed the principle of right and liberty and of international justice, it will form a worthy part of the new society of nations.

Signed at Corfu, July 20, 1917, by the President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Serbia, Nikola Pashitch, and the President of the Yugoslav Committee, Dr. Anto Trumbic.

It will not be forgotten that the first gun of the present war was fired on the banks of the Danube. It marked the attack by the Austrians on the old fortress of Belgrade. It was also at Belgrade, in 1876, that those hostilities began which became the Russo-Turkish War and which led to the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Although these two events are some forty years apart, they are nevertheless two scenes in one and the same world drama, the theme of which is the struggle of Southeastern Europe for civil and political liberty. In 1876 it was the Turk who disputed the right of the peoples of Southeastern Europe to establish and maintain their own governments. To-day it is the Teuton, with the aid of the Turk, who is endeavoring to uphold the same despotic position. Everyone can now see that the Treaty of Berlin was one of the most colossal blunders in modern political history.

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It so shuffled the cards of diplomacy as to mislead the people concerning the game which was being played, and instead of settling the grave questions with which it dealt, that Treaty simply glossed them over and opened the way for a new military struggle for which the Teuton was far-sighted enough to make immediate preparation. All the world sees to-day, what Great Britain and much of the world did not see in 1878, that the formation of a strong South Slavonic State in the Balkan Peninsula is an indispensable condition of the future peace of the world.

This book by M. Savić is not, therefore, a book for the specialist alone or for him only who is interested in the minute details of the Eastern question. It is rather a book which makes appeal to every intelligent reader who wishes to have the knowledge necessary to form an independent opinion as to the conditions on which durable peace shall rest.

M. Savić is a native Serb who, through service as correspondent of the English press, has been brought in close touch with British public opinion. That his name and knowledge are respected in Great Britain is amply testified to by the cordial reception which the English edition of his book has received. The American edition should be welcomed with equal eagerness. M. Savić is by birth and training a true representative of the Serbian democracy, and both his mental attitude and his forms of thinking make strong appeal to the Anglo-Saxon reader. The Serbians have in this war revealed themselves anew as true heroes and as worthy in high degree of the

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confidence and support of other nations. The erection of the South Slavonic State will not only bring a noble and long-suffering people under the rule of free institutions, but it will put an end forever to that Teutonic dream of a Mittel-Europa which has played so large a part in the planning and in the carrying on of the present war.

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In Southern Slav names:

a is always to be pronounced as a in father

e	"	"	"	e	"	hell
i	"	"	"	i	"	kill
o	"	"	"	o	"	doll
u	"	"	"	u	"	full
e	"	"	"	ts	"	Tsar
č, é	"	"	"	ch	"	church
j	"	"	"	y	"	yoke; yes
š	"	"	"	sh	"	shade
ž	"	"	"	j	"	jour in French

There are no diphthongs in the Serbo-Croatian language;
each vowel is pronounced separately.

THE COMING OF AMERICA

THE United States has entered the war; with this event an era of human history has been closed, and a new and brighter one has begun. Just as the discovery of America is a great date in human history, so the entrance of the United States into the present war will make another such date with far-reaching moral consequences. The discovery of America played a most important part in the material organization of the world, and until now the influence of America has been mainly in that field. During the last century the Monroe doctrine enabled America to grow up and to prepare for the present struggle, by keeping Europe off during her infancy. The value of the Monroe doctrine was in its limitation. Very wisely the American statesmen of a century ago put it forward as a screen from European turmoil and greediness, so long as America was growing up and gathering her forces. The present attitude makes a new departure. It is the assertion of America's full vigor and a new and larger conception of her role and destiny. America has attained her maturity and is extending the Monroe doctrine to the whole world. She is taking part in the struggle in order to "make the world safe for democracy." This means the application

of a new principle to the international relations. The United States has proclaimed by her action that humanity is a large family, that no nation can live in itself, by itself, and for itself. The spirit of Machiavellism is to be replaced by the spirit of Franklinism. The happiness and greatness of a nation is to be sought, not like heretofore in the ruin and misery of its neighbors, in the plotting against their peace and prosperity, as was taught by Machiavelli and applied so thoroughly by Germany, but in solicitude for their welfare and in harmonious cooperation among all the nations of the earth.

We insist that it is the entrance of the United States into the present struggle that has opened a new chapter of human history. True, the present war had lasted for nearly three years before the United States entered it. It has been conducted on such a big scale, it has already caused such enormous losses in lives and property, that the entrance of the United States will mean very little in that respect. The havoc done upon land and sea has been so terrible that nothing more appalling can scarcely be imagined. There have been prolonged and terrible wars before, in Europe and elsewhere, bringing great changes in the political map of the world, as well as very important changes in the distribution of power, so that this war will bring nothing quite new in this regard. Even the principles for which Germany is fighting are obviously different from and opposed to the principles which the Allies, before the entrance

of America, proclaimed to fight for. The Allies declared solemnly that they are fighting for the freedom and independence of small nations in Europe.

But here the entrance of the United States has brought a great and fundamental change. The Allies fighting German militarism, have been obliged by events to take an attitude opposed to Germany's sheer contempt of the right of other peoples. They entered the war, not so much to fight the German conceptions of the State and Government, as to protect their own special interests; in Democracy they found a mighty ally, and resolved, some of them, the Russian autocracy for instance, half-heartedly to fight under its flag. Solemnly proclaimed principles were, in a way, subordinated to special aims and in many instances limited by special secret conventions and treaties. Although now opposing with all their might the pernicious principles of Prussian Junkerism, the Allies have not been quite innocent of the spirit that animates the German Imperial Government. But the United States entered the struggle quite differently. She brought a new spirit, that marked the new era of humanity. From the outset the United States pursued no material interests. She pondered a long time and entered the struggle fully conscious of the enormous sacrifices she was incurring and of the great moral responsibility she was assuming before God and humanity.

Happy America! It was thy privilege to enter

this struggle like a true hero *sans peur et sans reproche* and fight for the loftiest ideals of humanity. These ideals have been so clearly formulated by thy President and have been so heartily indorsed by this great Commonwealth, that it makes one of the brightest spectacles of the whole human history. Indeed, since the time of Marcus Aurelius, has there been any other man invested with such a tremendous power, who has acted in such a spirit of Christian humility as a true *servus servorum* as President Wilson? But more than that; can humanity show any other instance of a great and powerful community so willingly sacrificing its lives and property for the attainment of no selfish end, no material gain; a nation of a hundred million people like a single man walking in the path of godliness, bringing modestly all their goods and lives in the service of a high ideal, kneeling reverently before the mysterious sources whence emanates all life, all justice, and everything that is worth living for in this life of ours?

Poor Germany! Has thy spirit sunk so low that thou canst no more distinguish the brightest light from hellish clouds; the plainest truth from the basest calumnies? Canst thou for a moment believe the vile slandering of thy imperial government that the United States has entered this struggle prompted by selfish ends and cunning calculation? Is there anything in this world the German government is fighting for that Germany would not have offered to the United States to

win her to her side? Is there anything concerning the increase of territory or material power that the United States could not have obtained by merely blackmailing one or the other coalition of belligerent powers, if such were her methods and aims? Has the canker of insane ambition so deeply depraved the reasoning power of the German people, that they can no longer distinguish the good from the evil? But this is not the first, and surely will not be the last, calumny spread by the German government.

In courting victory the German militarists were obliged to deceive and persuade the German nation that its very existence was threatened by the wiles of British diplomacy, by the aggressive spirit of Russian barbarism. The German militarists professed to make a defensive war and even tried to persuade the small nations remaining neutral that Germany is fighting for liberty and civilization in Europe, expecting their sympathies to be ranged on her side.

De la Rochefoucauld has said, in his "Maxims," that hypocrisy is the best homage to virtue. The hypocrisy of the German military party is the best proof that no large part of humanity to-day can be induced or expected to fight enthusiastically for purely economic or materialistic causes instead of a high ideal.

The German militarists, in so far as they have not themselves been deceived, obviously sought to prolong and fortify the power of their caste, to justify their dominion over the obedient masses

of the German people; and by adding to Germany some new provinces of the Empire—as Alsace-Lorraine was added some forty-six years ago—they hoped to prolong the influence and the policy of their own party, under the pretext that the Fatherland was menaced by the revengefulness of France or some other nation.

In spite of the pessimists, humanity has become more idealistic and moral, and upon that can be fairly founded the hopes of a brighter era which must dawn upon the world as a return for the enormous and costly sacrifices made by all belligerent countries of to-day. The Allied Powers fighting German militarism can assure complete victory for their cause only by remaining faithful to the principle of the equality of every nation of Europe, however small or great it may be. Humanity would be no better off if, on the morrow of the victory of the Allies, German imperialism is to be replaced by Russian, Italian or British imperialism. Europe, scarcely emerged from a terrible and exhausting strife, would have to prepare for a new and more bloody struggle, in which the old passions and prejudices would remain, and wherein the deadly weapons of mutual extermination would be new, perfected and made more effective. Indeed, it would be a pity for millions of the brave and valiant hearts which ceased to beat on the many battlefields of Europe, and the sacrifices of the greatest holocaust humanity has ever seen would be in vain, if the greediness of some should provoke and arm the

hatred of others; if the oppression of the weak should be a perpetuated trait of European political life. Europe is to find her peace not in strategical frontiers, but in the respect of the rights of the smaller and neglected nations. The entrance of the United States into the war is a sure guarantee for this.

The human consciousness has outgrown the morality underlying the conduct of many of the European States. It was a rare privilege of President Wilson to be the spokesman of the new morality of mankind. And it is still a greater privilege of this country to be a sincere champion of this higher morality among the nations. Instead of cabinet plots and court intrigues, the policy of all governments is henceforth to be purified by the sense of responsibility and the bright rays of publicity. In opposition to the baleful German doctrine of an irresponsible state pursuing its own abstract ends, the nations are to be governed by recognized moral principles; the single states are to conduct themselves and to be judged by the same standards of responsibility as the individual citizens of civilized societies. The era is closing, to use the fit expression of President Wilson, "when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or little groups of ambitious men," when nations were handed over to alien rulers like so much human chattel. At last the long-neglected rights of the smaller nations are to be recognized and the world is going

to be based, not on the temporary equipoise of might, but on the solid basis of the equality of rights.

These principles were formulated by no one more clearly than by President Wilson, and there is no other nation in the world better prepared, morally and materially, to fight for them and to see them realized, than the United States. As the trustees of the highest ideals of humanity, the people of the United States have the right and duty to secure their complete victory in the world; and the government of this country, being responsible for its sacrifices in blood and money has the right and duty to impose them upon slackening or reluctant governments of Europe.

This cannot be attained unless the political map of Europe undergoes many changes, and nowhere must those changes be so fundamental and important as in South-Eastern Europe. The unsettled conditions which have prevailed there for centuries, tempted the military nations of the East and the West to try to conquer all those lands. After Rome and Byzantium, the Huns and Avars, Franks and Turks all in turn attempted to succeed where the others had failed; to impose their dominion upon all the countries between Constantinople and Vienna. At last the Germans, who were better prepared and scientifically organized, let loose the storm in order to realize their dream of a German Central Europe, as a preliminary and a necessary step towards their "World Empire."

It was by no fortuitous chance that the World War began by the Austrian attack on Serbia. There must have been deep causes and historico-political reasons, why the present storm broke out just in that storm-center of Europe. It was because the Serbian or the Southern Slav question is the central problem of South-Eastern Europe, and at the same time it indicates clearly that the future European peace cannot be thought of without a just and radical solution of the Serbian question in all its magnitude. If in the present volume we speak mainly about Serbia and the Southern Slavs it is because that question is the pivotal point in the sound reconstruction of South-Eastern Europe. When the Southern Slav problem is tackled and rationally solved, all other questions correlative to it will be automatically solved also.

A glance at the ethnographic map of the nationalities in South-Eastern Europe will yet more strongly illustrate the above truth. The reader will see that from the Italian frontier south of the Drave to the Ægean lives a nation, one in blood, language and traditions which, besides Serbia and Montenegro, inhabits also Bosnia, Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Istria, Goritzia, southern Carinthia and Styria, Carniola, Croatia, Slavonia, Medjumurje, the western Banat of Temesvar, Bačka and Baranya in South Hungary. This nation, separated in so many provinces for obvious political reasons, is known under the name of Serbo-Croats and Slovenes. Between the Serbs

and the Croats there is no other difference than the difference of religion. The Slovenes speak a dialect of the Serbo-Croat language, but in view of their small numbers (only approximately 1,300,000) they recognize the whole danger menacing their existence, should they be separated from their kinsmen, and therefore since the beginning of the last century they have become the most fervent apostles of the national union of all the Southern Slavs in one state, whose political constitution shall be determined later on by legal representatives of the people, based upon the real interests, wishes and free will of the whole nation.

The reader may gather why Germany, in pushing on her dream of world dominion, was obliged by necessity first to crush Serbia, in order to establish firmly her dominion in the Balkans, and to break up once and for all the national resistance of the Southern Slavs. It is now obvious that it does not suffice that the Allies should beat Germany, but they must erect a strong barrier against her ambition by forming a living wall of free independent states on the basis of democracy and nationality. The Serbo-Croats and Slovenes present the best opportunity of attaining this object, which is in accordance with justice and solemnly proclaimed principles.

The last peace proposals were a snare cunningly laid to secure for Germany by diplomatic means what she is unable to obtain by force. Fortunately, the Allies were not to be entrapped. Their spontaneous unanimity in refusing to treat at

present with Germany, the entrance of America into the struggle and her grim determination to continue the fight for democracy, are the sure guarantees that the war aims of the Allies will be attained, and the world will be ruled by loftier principles.

But the value of the loftiest principle will be tested by practical achievements. America cannot but be victorious in the battlefield, but if her government should fail to secure a peace which will be the embodiment of her principles, she will be defeated, notwithstanding her victories in beating the German army. Therefore, American government and opinion must be armed with full knowledge of the political and racial conditions of Europe and especially concerning the lands from Vienna to Constantinople, soaked with blood of centuries. The eternal goal of all conquerors, they are also the main ambition of Kaiser William II, and at the end of this war they will be the hotly disputed ground of all the cabinet intrigues, and many veiled selfish calculations.

The present work has been undertaken with the pious desire to contribute, however modestly, to the American knowledge of European problems as necessary means for the final victory of America's principles. The writer's idea is to supply her public in one single volume with historical and political material concerning those questions of South-Eastern Europe, without the thorough solution of which the security of European peace and victory of democracy cannot be realized.

II

THE CASE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

THE present ordeal is a fearful crucible out of which a new world will arise. Europe will be changed and new political groupings will take place. Of course, no reconstruction of South-Eastern Europe can be thought of before we get a clear answer to the question, can Austria-Hungary be spared? can the principles for which America is fighting, be applied to her? To be able to answer the question, how far will Austria-Hungary be affected by the changes in Europe and whether she can be maintained, we must make an impartial survey of the forces governing the Habsburg monarchy.

Until quite recently the general trend of European affairs was very much in favor of the Habsburg monarchy. Both groups of European powers, those who feared Russia as well as those who dreaded Germany, favored the maintenance and the strengthening of Austria-Hungary. To both of them, deceived by outward appearances, the Danubian empire appeared as the most desirable factor of the European equipoise. Both the Pan-German and the Pan-Slav dangers worked for it. Some feared the chaos and confusion which would follow the disruption of

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Austria, unable to conceive it other than as a formation of feeble little states which must all be drawn into the orbit of Russia, if not actually incorporated with the mighty Slav empire. Others, especially France, dreaded the dismemberment of Austria for fear that Germany might increase her strength by incorporating Austria's German provinces. No wonder that many a writer in Western Europe eagerly repeated the words of the Czech historian Palacky, "If Austria-Hungary did not exist, it ought to be created."

But, independently of the observers interested in the maintenance of Austria-Hungary from national, political or other motives, there was something more about Austria-Hungary, which induced the most impartial student of European relations to desire, or at least to tolerate, a new lease of life to the Habsburg monarchy. At first glance, it was a country which united in itself many various, but most precious, elements necessary for the prosperity of a state and the welfare of its people. In Austria-Hungary met together all European races represented by so many gifted nations, Latins, Slavs, Teutons and Magyars, who, with their recognized brilliant qualities, if harmoniously welded and wisely encouraged, could contribute to the prosperity of the empire, and to the superiority and brilliancy of its civilization, which might easily surpass everything attained until now in Europe. Materially and geographically the Danubian monarchy was in a position

to be envied by many other states. In variety and beauty of its scenery, in richness of its soil, in the extent of its frontiers, in space for the increase of its population, in the navigability of its rivers, in the safety, size and beauty of its seaports, in the wealth of its mines and forests, the Habsburg empire was better provided than any other European country. It was difficult to discover anything lacking for its strength and prosperity. And quite naturally, many logically thinking people hoped that Austria-Hungary would reform herself and become what she ought to be, thanks to the marvelous resources of her soil and gifts of the nations so lavishly bestowed upon the empire by nature and history. They looked upon Austria-Hungary through the eyes of their dreams and wishes as a peaceful, conservative, non-aggressive state, where were met together in an amicable and willing union all the European races. Such a Danubian monarchy was destined to become the model and forerunner of the future United States of Europe, when all her nations would be bound together in peace, love and mutual respect, for the realization of a higher and loftier ideal and the creation of a true christian civilization in spirit and unsurpassing beauty.

However, Austria-Hungary, far from tending to realize such a lofty idea, did not prosper, or at least did not develop her economic and commercial resources at the rate of the neighboring countries. Even little Serbia, assailed by so many

evils, hampered by so many obstacles, could fairly compare her progress to that of Bosnia, Hercegovina and Dalmatia since they had passed into Austrian occupation. Austria's population, not only from the rocky Dalmatian coast, but even from the rich Hungarian and Galician plains, emigrated to America and Australia. Her ports remained idle, her large navigable rivers carried a very limited traffic, her inhabitants throughout the empire were wasted by poverty, and dissatisfaction was general. There was no province, no nation and no class in this vast empire where people felt happy or contented.

There is a strange and incurable disease in the body politic of the Danubian monarchy. The most degrading oppression, the least justifiable exaction, sheer injustice, the cynical denial of any right of citizenship are always cloaked by a form of legality and law-prescribed procedure. Every student of it may see how there is a state endowed with every modern institution warranting the freedom of the citizens and yet governed by police which disposes of the liberty and honor of every subject of the empire. There are parliaments, obviously for the purpose of safeguarding the constitutional rights of citizens and of controlling the acts of government, but there is no spirit of liberty and independence in them. They have never protected anybody, and have always been hoodwinked and controlled by the government. Thanks to the miserable conditions prevailing throughout the empire and the artifi-

cially fostered animosity among its different nationalities, there exists no spirit of public control, and nobody expects or hopes anything valuable from its parliaments. In Austria the absolutism is very veiled by frequent application of Article XIV of the Constitution, which provides the government with constitutional means to govern without a parliament and against the spirit of the Constitution, whilst, owing to the employment of brutal force and unheard of corruption, the parliamentary elections in Hungary have always returned a large majority to the government in power.

To every keen and independent observer Austria-Hungary was in a state of permanent decay and her maintenance necessitated not only a vigilant bureaucratic machinery and powerful military organization inside the empire, but also a close alliance with Germany. This last factor proved fatal for Austria-Hungary and surely will be instrumental in her utter ruin and final disruption. In its feebleness the Habsburg dynasty, relying upon the tremendous strength of Germany and feeling protected in the shade of Germany's shining armor, could continue the pursuance of its cherished ideas of territorial aggrandizement and rule over the nations in the good old way of centralization and absolutism.

The predominant factor was her dynasty, which, secluded in the summit of its exalted position, wrapped as in an impenetrable cloud in the belief in its divine right, never stooped to the reality

of modern exigencies nor tried to act in harmony with the spirit of the time or the wants and needs of its peoples. The advent of democracy meant for it the loss of its prerogatives, and, like one of his predecessors, Ferdinand the Catholic, who preferred to rule over a desert than to govern an empire of heretics, Francis Joseph preferred not to rule at all than to rule according to some new and by him detested principle.

There was no soul in Austria-Hungary, she was always lacking an ideal, as Napoleon used to say of her. The ideal that could save Austria and spare Europe the awful slaughter of our days, was the complete enfranchisement of her nations and the reconstruction of the empire on a broad and sincere democratic basis. But that which seems most natural and easy for a citizen of this country was a most difficult thing to accomplish in Austria-Hungary. It meant really the advent of a new world; it meant a complete change in the ruling psychology, it would be abandonment of deeply rooted prejudices, the forsaking of most cherished dreams and ambitions, and the sacrificing of selfish interests enhanced by an unjustly conquered position. All the forces that governed Austria-Hungary were opposed to such a change, which could be brought about only by their utter defeat. The revolutions in Great Britain and France effected more than the disposition of a king or the change of a dynasty. They abolished the principle of government by divine right and prepared the advent of a modern democracy. In

Austria all the revolutionary outbreaks merely rippled the surface, without being able to effect any change in the depth of her life.

Austria-Hungary, ruled by a bigot dynasty allied to an intolerable aristocracy, was a living anachronism in Europe and, like Turkey, was assailed from every side by the growing forces of her nationalities endowed with ever-increasing centrifugal motion. In order to maintain its rule, her dynasty divided the power with the Germans and the Magyars, leaving to their tender mercy and greedy exploitation all other nationalities in the monarchy. But even such a combination was too weak to resist the pressure from without and to subdue the centrifugal motions of the different nationalities, therefore all three dominant factors—the dynasty, the Germans, and the Magyars—allied themselves with Germany. Austria-Hungary became the advance-guard of the Pan-German onrush to the East, to stand or perish with German victory or defeat.

To Bismarck is attributed the cynical saying: "Austria-Hungary is a cow to be grazed on the Balkan fields; when she has grazed enough she must be killed for the profit of Germany." And Germany acted accordingly. The present war has proved beyond any doubt the truth of the words above quoted. Since 1866 Austria has lost complete freedom of action and has been allowed only such policy as directly or indirectly serves German plans or increases German power and influence. Austria-Hungary and her dynasty were

always highly honored and praised by Berlin and its satellites, but twice or thrice during the last fifty years they were unpleasantly warned and practically coerced by Berlin to abandon the path which might possibly injure German interests or open for them a way of escape from the German control, until at last the German victory over Austria-Hungary was so complete, that Germany in a would-be Austrian cause was able to lead Austria-Hungary submissively to bleed to exhaustion for the realization of the German dream of world dominion. The Magyars would always have opposed as strongly as Germans the reconstruction of Austria-Hungary on the basis of democracy and federation, as it would entail the loss of their position and the abandonment of their cherished means of forcible magyarization. The Magyar oligarchy, which allied to, and supported by, Germany, ruled by force and corruption over so large a number of alien nations, was not prepared to make any concession, and preferred to rule over an impoverished Hungary enslaved to Germany rather than to share their power with any of the subjugated races.

These three predominant factors in Austria-Hungary, the Germans, the Habsburg dynasty and the Magyars, were so closely united in a fatal concordance of ambitions and interests that it is difficult to say which among them was more responsible and a more willing party to the criminal conspiracy against peace and European liberties. Germany coerced the Habsburg dynasty

to her subservience by the ever-present menace of dismembering its monarchy and incorporating its German provinces. They coerced the Magyars to the same effect by menacing them with the enfranchisement of the other nationalities in Hungary. The Habsburg dynasty, by its willingness to assist Germany in her schemes of world dominion, exacted in payment for her services the upholding of its divine right over the peoples in the monarchy, and her diplomatic and military assistance for the realization of its own ambitions and plans of conquest in the Balkans. The Magyars, also, in turn the masters and the slaves, obtained the approval and support of the Habsburg dynasty and of the Germans for the maintenance of their privileged position and continuation of their short-sighted policy of magyarization and oppression, as reward for their support of the ambitions of the Hapsburg dynasty as well as of those of Germany.

It was a chain so interwoven that if one link in it had been missing the conspiracy against peace and democracy would have failed and the whole plot against Europe would have exploded at once. Had the Habsburg dynasty stooped from its exalted position of divine right, and studied its interests more in accordance with the happiness and wants of its peoples, it would never have had need for German support or Magyar bribery. The Danubian monarchy might indeed have tended to develop on the lines of those dreamers and over-logical thinkers, who liked to see in her

a forerunner of the future United States of a happier Europe, cured of the racial animosities and crazy ambitions for conquest and dominion by force. Then Germany would perhaps never have formed her plan of world dominion nor have embarked upon that perilous enterprise, armed with her vast arsenal of destructive weapons and frightfulness. Had Germany withheld her assistance to the Habsburg dynasty the latter would never have formed her plan of the conquest of the Balkans and would either have reformed herself, or given place to new forces of peace and progress. Had not the Magyars, in their blind contempt of other nationalities, or in their foolish as well as criminal wish to dominate them as vassals of the Germans and of the Hapsburg dynasty, accepted the bribes, and had they refused their support, it is very doubtful whether Europe would ever have undergone such a fearful crisis as the present one.

Germany, having made of the Magyars and the Hapsburg dynasty her obedient tools, pushed Austria-Hungary into her fatal onrush to the East. She was perfectly aware that the Austrian advance would arouse less suspicion in Europe and therefore could be more easily achieved. But she was also thoroughly convinced that every new conquest of Austria-Hungary on her way to the East would make the latter weaker, more in need of German protection, and consequently a more subservient weapon in the hand of Germany. She knew very well the military and economic impor-

tance of the position occupied by Serbia; Serbia was the key to her whole edifice of a grandiose plan for the domination of the world. All the German efforts in Constantinople and the brilliant situation she had created in Turkey could be made fruitful, or, as German scientists would say, could be "organized to yield a maximum output" in the interest of Germany, if she could obtain undisputed command over Serbia and access to Salonica. Proceeding methodically, Germany wished to begin, and to be satisfied for a short time, with the occupation of Serbia. Only after she had organized and fortified central Europe both economically and militarily could she, with far greater chance of success, throw down her challenge to the world.¹

The Magyars, too, considering Serbia as a standing obstacle and as a "memento-mori" of their policy of oppression and magyarization, supported wholeheartedly the plan of Germany and the ambitions of the Habsburgs. Regardless of the consequences and remorseless for the awful crime they plotted against European civilization, they were ready to sacrifice ten millions of brave hearts, merely in order that a clique in a small nation, which is by no means a very important member in the European community, could uphold its sway over millions of other races alien in thought and sentiment. Better to make a hell of Hungary than to deprive the Magyars of their unjustly kept dominant position.

¹ F. Naumann, *Mitteleuropa*, Berlin, 1915.

In the service of Germany, Austria-Hungary was able to draw upon thirty-two millions of Slavs and Latins to fight German battles against their own consent and interest. With such resources Austria-Hungary could not win: her forces were routed in Serbia, beaten in Russia and Italy, and subsequently were put under the complete command of Germany.

As we cannot for a moment imagine that the Central Empires might come out victorious, we are to ask what will become of Austria in case of a drawn battle or a partial victory of the allies? During this war Germany's hold upon her has been tightened. The Czechs, a highly civilized nation, have been mercilessly persecuted, their members of the Vienna Reichsrath imprisoned with thousands of other suspected citizens. Gallows are erected all over their country and are taking hundreds of victims. The Czechs pray for our victory and contribute to it greatly. The Czech regiments surrendered to the Russians and the Serbs, and were ruthlessly butchered by brutal German officers.

The Italians, Roumanians, and the Southern Slavs did and do the same and suffer equally. The latter are looking for deliverance to Serbia, and, after having surrendered, take an active part in fighting on the side of the Allies. No wonder that Austria-Hungary is exhausted, and sacrifices as a last resource to the unsatiable Moloch of dominion children of sixteen and old men of sixty-five years of age.

Will the Slavs and Latins, returning, meekly endure the Germano-Magyar yoke? Can Austria-Hungary, impoverished and exhausted, manage after this war to control all centrifugal forces which menaced her with dismemberment before it? Italy, Serbia, Roumania will continue to exercise their attraction upon their kinsmen, and those centrifugal tendencies will become greater than ever, taking into account that the dynasty, the Germans, and the Magyars have done everything to embitter the feelings and to provoke resistance.

After a drawn battle the weakness of Austria-Hungary, bankrupt morally and financially, will become only more obvious. She will be less able than heretofore by herself to resist the pressure, and must sink to absolute dependence on Germany. The existence of Austria-Hungary will mean the prolongation of the unsettled conditions in central Europe, a permanent danger to peace, and as long as she continues, the scheme of the Pan-German conquest of Europe will not be abandoned. A new and terrible conflagration will follow, and, who knows, perhaps with greater chances for Germany.

The same can be said in case of a partial victory of the Allies and of a partial satisfaction of the national claims of the Italians, Serbs, or Roumanians. With renewed fury the Germans and the Magyars will fall upon the unhappy nationalities in order totally to break their resistance and to extirpate the spirit of brooding revolt among them. Even the slightest increase in the terri-

tories of Serbia and Roumania will so stimulate the aspirations of their kinsmen in Austria-Hungary that the Habsburg monarchy will not leave a stone unturned in order to harm, ruin, or conquer them. Plot, intrigue, immoral treaties, instigation of wars in the Balkans are her beloved weapons, and Europe will not cease to be menaced by new storms from that ever stormy quarter.

Of course, owing to her inborn weakness, she must again be subservient to Germany, or she may change the direction and choose another mighty protector, and try a new combination, always in pursuit of the old aim of oppression. The victims may be changed: instead of the Slavs, the Germans, the Magyars, and the Latins may now be oppressed, but peace and liberties would gain nothing by it. Germany, and reactionists in Europe may desire Austria to be spared as offering them the best opportunity for armed intervention and conquest; but can the maintenance of Austria-Hungary be in the interest of democratic Great Britain, France, and the United States?

There is no fear that Germany will increase her strength by incorporating the purely German provinces in Austria. According to official statistics for 1910 the German-speaking population in Austria numbered 9,171,614, but of this Germany cannot incorporate more than 7,000,000 inhabiting Lower and Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, and Tyrol; as strong German minorities must be incorporated with Italy, free Bohemia, and Poland. More than two million Germans living

in Hungary would remain in the Magyar national State or go to Roumania. The military power of each of these national independent states would more than balance such an increase of Germany. But the greatest loss for Germany would consist in her losing the command of 32,000,000 Slavs and Latins, who are fighting her battles to-day. Still there are many simple-minded people who believe that an Austria-Hungary might be used in a combination of powers against Germany. These people overlook a simple and obvious truth. The German element in Austria-Hungary enjoys to-day a predominant position. The Germans outnumber any other nationality in the empire, they occupy the leading place socially, economically, and politically. They are Germans to the very core of their hearts and no combination in Austria-Hungary against the interests and the ambitions of the "Vaterland" is possible. The Germans will remain in Austria-Hungary as long as they are able to exploit her in the interests of Germanism. The day when the Germans will no longer have interests in the maintenance of Austria-Hungary the Habsburg empire will cease to exist.

Peace in central Europe can be secured in two different ways: by German conquest—and it would be a peace of graveyards—or by setting free the trodden-down nationalities in Austria and uniting them with their kinsmen in Italy, Serbia and Roumania. Such a peace would be the peace of democracy, of progress and liberty. The

Allies have pledged their word to obtain such a peace and the United States entered the war for nothing less nor more than "to make the world safe for democracy," and have given solemn assurances that the rights of the smaller nations shall be recognized. But such a peace cannot be achieved without the complete deliverance of different nationalities in Austria-Hungary, which must have for natural consequence the dismemberment of this ramshackle empire, preserved in unity by force and intrigue merely in the interest of a dynasty. By it, the United States would not only redeem her word and do justice to her Allies, Italy, Serbia, and Roumania, but would do justice to her own interests, as the creation of free independent national states will form a strong living wall against any scheme for conquest and dominion.

Now, every citizen in this country expects that Bohemia will be resuscitated, that Italy will achieve her national unity, that the Hungarian provinces inhabited by the Roumanians will be incorporated with Roumania, but few are acquainted with the position which the Southern Slavs occupy in the Danubian monarchy. With the exception of a few eager and independent minds, who have studied the conditions of the Southern Slavs on the spot, Vienna and Budapest contrived to keep the world in ignorance concerning them. The erroneous view was generally spread that so many provinces in which they live contain as many different little nation-

alities, quarreling among themselves, for whom no sort of civilized life could be thought of without the Pax Germanica being imposed upon them. In the following chapters we intend to expose the fallacy of this contention and to show that the Southern Slavs, by their past and present, are fully entitled to freedom and unity, in full conformity with the principles for whose realization throughout the world this great country is committed to the war.¹

¹ For a further illustration of our arguments in this chapter we think that the following racial statistics of Austria-Hungary may be useful.

Races.	Austria.	Hungary.	Bosnia- Hercegovina.	
Germans.....	9,950,266	2,037,435	
Magyars.....	10,974	10,050,575	
Slavs {	Czecho-Slovaks..	6,435,983	1,967,970
	Poles.....	4,967,984
	Ruthenians.....	3,518,854	472,587
	Serbo-Croats....	783,344	2,939,633	1,898,044
Latins {	Slovenes.....	1,252,940
	Italians.....	768,422
	Roumanians....	275,115	2,949,032
Others.....	608,052	469,255	
<hr/>				
Total population.....	28,571,934	20,886,487	1,898,044	

According to Statesman Year Book 1917, census of 1910. But we must remember that the official statistics favor the ruling nations—the Germans and the Magyars; as of 1,300,000 Jews in Austria, mostly in Vienna, nearly all of them are given as Germans, and in Hungary not only all the Jews, numbering 960,000, but every other person able to talk a little Magyar, is given as Magyar.

III

THE EARLIER HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS

THE history of the Serbo-Croat nation and its states is a long uninterrupted tragedy, as stirring and sincere as all the true and great tragedies of life. The tragedy of the Serbo-Croat nation consisted in the fact that they were placed by historical circumstances in conditions adverse to their inborn character, and they are obliged, in spite of their pacific dispositions, to become a warlike people in order to assure their existence and to accomplish their historic mission of defending European civilization against barbarous invaders. Thus, since the very first appearance of the Serbo-Croat nation upon the scene of the world's history, its name has always been connected with wars and military deeds, which throughout centuries have reëchoed from the Balkan countries which for the past thirteen centuries have been the home of the Southern Slav people. No wonder that the idea is deeply rooted that the Serbo-Croat race is warlike in character and that war and military achievements are its favorite activity. This idea is only partly true, as the Serbo-Croat nation has been obliged

to spend centuries of their existence in fighting Avars and Bulgars and, later on, their cousins the Turks and Magyars, and last, but most dangerous of all, the modern Huns of Germany. In this incessant warfare the Serbo-Croat race has acquired a warlike character and displayed fighting qualities which have found their best application in the last successful resistance to, and complete rout of, the overwhelming Austro-Hungarian forces.

The Serbian army has won a reputation that fears no comparison, yet, in spite of the true fighting qualities amply displayed by the Serbo-Croat soldiers, the writer, who has been intimately acquainted with them, having followed them through the many vicissitudes of the Balkan wars, sharing their life and their difficulties, can say that by nature the Serbian peasant-soldier is not warlike; he cherishes no dreams of conquest or aggression. From time to time he would sing some of those official war-songs learned in barracks, but ever as he marched rapidly through the fertile fields of Old Serbia and Macedonia, as he climbed the steep, snow-clad crests of Albanian mountains, or pushed on through narrow gorges of rushing rivers, his heart was with his parents and children at home, he dreamed only of his orchards on the hills of Šumadia, of his maize fields in the valley of the Morava. And when his heart was filled with homesick longing, he would give expression to it by singing his simple village song: "Oh, Moravo—dear village of the plains."

In the thousands of letters they sent home, these soldiers who beat the armies of three military states, never mentioned their military achievements, but were always interested in the health of their dear ones at home, in the prospects of the forthcoming harvest, in the condition of their cattle, dwelling with special tenderness upon questions concerning the cows and young calves left at their farms. These letters, perhaps more than their victories, bore testimony to the pure simplicity of their minds, to the unconscious bravery of their hearts, to the noble pity and tenderness that was in their souls. This warlike race seems always to have fought against its will. This nation, which during long centuries has sung all the events of its history, has made no song to celebrate the fortunate wars of king Milutin and king Zvonimir, or to glorify the victories of the tzar Dušan. They have sung the heroes of Kosovo because they were martyrs; they have glorified the "Uskoks" because they were the avengers of their race against Turkish and Venetian oppressors. They have never understood a war of conquest, as all their wars have been wars of strict self-defense, to stem the tide of foreign invasion.

Like all Slav peoples, the Serbo-Croats are peaceful and confiding; they look upon war as a terrible calamity and are very glad if they can escape it; and this is easily understood. The soul and character of the Serbo-Croat nation were formed during long centuries of prehistoric life.

The old prehistoric home of the Southern Slavs was in the woodlands of the Carpathian mountains and the vast plains of Russia stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Mingling with other Slav tribes, they dwelt there peacefully during long centuries. They had no history, and therefore we may presume that they were happy and content, ignorant of war and without any ambition for conquest.

The Carpathian woods supplied them with rich hunting-grounds; the rivers running north and south abounded in fish, and the vast steppes of southern Russia, with their rich black soil, were a splendid granary then, as they are to-day. They lived without history, but it does not imply that they lived like savages, without any material civilization. Far from that, they had long since passed from the state of nomadic tribes to the civilization of settled agricultural peoples. They lived in large families—Zadruga—just as they live to-day; and the Russian Mir—the parish land commune—probably dates back from those prehistoric days. They possessed a developed religious system based upon the worship of natural forces and the cult of ancestors. They had formed no state, but lived in a friendly alliance of tribes, governed by elders, having no slaves nor bondmen among them.

The old Slavic language, with all its richness and beauty, which gave birth to the modern Russian, Polish, Czech and Serbo-Croat languages, was already so highly developed that even to-day,

after many centuries of separate political and national life, the Slavic languages represent a strong and beautiful bond of union among the different Slav nations. The gospels were translated into the old Slavic language as early as the ninth century; also the beautiful hymns of the Orthodox Church, which have been so highly appreciated by so great an artist as Tolstoy, were written in the first days of their christianity. The best proof of the intense love of the Slavs for their language can be seen in the fact that they accepted christianity only when the gospel was preached to them in their own language, and as early as the tenth century a fierce fight raged among the Roman catholic Serbo-Croats of the Dalmatian coast against the introduction of the Latin language in their churches. The Slav language is used even to-day in the Roman catholic parishes on the islands of the Dalmatian archipelago, although many over-zealous bishops have endeavored to banish it and to replace it by Latin. The Slavs were so proud of their language that they called every foreigner "nemetz," a mute man, which even to-day is the name of Germans among all the Slav nations.

It was these thousands of years of peaceful life that molded the Serbo-Croat character. The Serbo-Croat is sincere, peaceable, easily roused, but also very easily appeased, never gloomy, having always something childlike about him. These traits are the same even to-day, notwithstanding the long centuries of struggle and

foreign oppression. The prehistoric home of the Serbo-Croat people is always mentioned in national folklore with love, and a dim feeling of longing, as all of us remember the happy days of childhood in our father's house. Neither did the Serbo-Croats abandon their old home because they were moved by warlike ambitions or by desire for conquest.

Some fifteen centuries ago the old European civilization, represented by the Roman empire, was passing through a terrible crisis. The Mongolian tribes, Huns and Avars, bursting forth from central Asia like a devastating whirlwind, overran Europe and drove before them other races and tribes. After the Huns had overrun the Slav territories and uprooted the Slav tribes from their native soil, the Serbo-Croatian tribes, avoiding a new Mongolian hurricane, abandoned the Galician plains and wooded Carpathian ranges and appeared on the borders of the Eastern Roman empire. At their first appearance on the scene of the world's history, destiny assigned to the Southern Slavs a part which they have played faithfully until now. Their part was a noble one. The frontiers of the Byzantine empire were no longer respected. Provinces were devastated and the panic-stricken inhabitants, fearing death and extermination, flocked to the coasts of the Mediterranean. The Balkan peninsula was overrun by Goths and Avars; the Roman settlements were nearly annihilated, and the Byzantine emperors were anxiously looking for help and assistance

from any quarter. Encouraged by previous experiences with the Slavic tribes, and convinced of their loyal and non-aggressive character, they arrived at an agreement with the Southern Slav tribes and invited them to settle down peacefully in the devastated northern and central provinces of the Balkan peninsula, on condition that they would protect the northern frontier of Byzantium from the further devastation and repeated attacks of the other less civilized tribes. This happened in the seventh century of our era, under the emperor Herákleios, according to the account given by the emperor Constantine Porphyrogennetos. To that part assigned to them—namely, to be the guardians and protectors of European civilization, the Serbo-Croat nation has remained faithful until now.

The Slavic tribes, all speaking one language, all having one and the same standard of life, one religion and the same customs, repeopled all the western and northern provinces of the Balkan peninsula now inhabited by them from the Isonzo (Soča) river to the Ægean. They acknowledged for centuries the suzerainty of the Roman emperors, and adopted the christian religion, which, together with Greek civilization, spread among them. By degrees they formed little national states, which, as was the case in the whole of Europe at that time, were founded on the feudal system. That very system, together with the civilization of mediæval ages, was in itself a source of weakness. But the weakness coming

from the feudal system was increased when, in the eleventh century, the Christian Church split in two. The western tribes fell under the influence of Rome and became Roman catholic; the eastern tribes remained under the influence of Byzantium and embraced Greek orthodoxy. The western Roman catholics were subsequently grouped together under the name of Croats, and the eastern orthodox at the same time formed one or more national states under the name of Serbs. In the first quarter of the ninth century the South Slav tribes for the first time passed from loose tribal federation to the higher organization of a state. In the beginning of the ninth century the Frankish state, penetrating into the basin of the Middle Danube, had subjugated Southern Slav tribes also. At the hands of the German lords, who in the name of Charlemagne ruled the eastern parts of the Frankish empire, the Southern Slavs suffered every kind of humiliation and exaction. The chronicles say that the Slavs were permitted to eat only that which remained after the dogs of the Frankish lords had fed. They revolted under the leadership of the Slavonian prince Ludevit Posavski, who formed a mighty Southern Slav state which, extending from the upper reaches of the Save to the Lower Danube and as far as Ljubljana (Laibach) beyond the river Timok, united in itself for a short time all the Southern Slav tribes, which later on were differentiated under the names of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Thus their first state was the only pre-

cursor of that state which they now hope to form after eleven centuries of struggle, partial liberty and foreign subjugation. But this first Southern Slav state (818-823) soon succumbed to foreign foes. The new beginning of their independent state life was on the shores of the Adriatic, and since the ninth century the growth of the Serbo-Croat states has proceeded on normal lines. With every advance to the north and east, the Serbo-Croat rulers incorporated more people of their own race into their national states, liberating them from the foreign Byzantine, Frankish, Magyar or Bulgarian yoke, and, far from being aggressors or conquerors of alien peoples, they were only the upholders of the right of each nation to govern itself, and the liberators of their own kinsmen from an alien domination. The peaceful sentiments and lofty ideals of the Serbo-Croat nation have been finely expressed in one of the many beautiful epic songs of the Serbian people. This song refers to Stephen Nemanja, the founder of the dynasty of Nemanja, who is known in Serbian history as the ruler who in the twelfth century succeeded in uniting many different Serbian provinces under his sway; but this union was not accomplished without a series of campaigns against minor feudatory princes or against the Byzantine empire. In his old days, according to the prevailing custom of that age of intense religious feeling, he abdicated and retired to a monastery under the spiritual guidance of his son St. Sava, subsequently the first archbishop of

the Serbian national church. What the ideals of the Serbian people are can fairly be judged from the above-mentioned ballad, which the writer has translated as follows:

“Counsel held the mighty christian princes,
Near the white-walled church of Gračanica
State they thus, the mighty christian princes
God, what strange event! What wondrous marvel!
Where have vanished all the vast possessions
Towers seven filled with gold and silver,
Of the great and wealthy tsar Nemanja?
By chance, Nemanja Sava stood there with them.
Spake thus to the right christian princes.
Speak not words like these, oh noble princes.
Sooth 'twere a sin to speak such words, Sirs.
Never did my father spend his treasures
Buying arms and chargers bold for battle,
Buying lances forged of steel and maces.
No, my father spent his vast possessions
Building white abodes for God's high presence.
Where God's hymns be sung through all the ages,
Bringing healing to my father's spirit.
Up then spake the mighty christian princes,
Blessed be thy holy father's memory.
Blessed be thy soul, Nemanja Sava.”

But besides the songs and ballads in which the Serbo-Croats have expressed their ideals and their general outlook on life, we have the witness of foreigners who have depicted the character of the Balkan Slavs. Thus the greatest contemporary historian of the seventh century, Theophylactes Simocates, the historian of Byzantium during the reign of the emperor Mavricius (582-602), says that during a raid against the Slavs already established on the banks of the Lower Danube the patrols of the emperor returned bringing in

some Slav prisoners. They were tall, broad-shouldered men, armed only with pipes, and in appearance quite harmless and good-natured. Being asked who they were, they answered: "We are Slavs coming from the far-off sea. We do not know steel or arms, we graze our herds, make music with our pipes and do not harm any one." Another historical writer of the eighth century, the well-known Paulus Diaconus, relates how his grandfather was made prisoner by the Avars in Pannonia, but managed to escape and fled through Slavonia to Italy. On his journey through the forest he found no food and fell exhausted to the ground. Fortunately a Slav woman from a neighboring village found him, and although he, being a Longobard, was considered an enemy, she, pitying his state, took him to her house and kept him many days. And when he had recovered his strength she led him through the forest and showed him his way. It is not without interest to note that this Slav village woman had some sound knowledge of medicine, as during the first days, when he lay utterly exhausted, she gave him no solid food but only milk and soups. This was more than was known to a contemporary Byzantine general, who on arriving in Italy gave his starving troops solid food, which caused wholesale death in their ranks. Many other races,—Ostrogoths, Longobards and Visigoths,—who about the same period penetrated into the Roman empire, were half-nomadic militarily organized tribes, who moved from place to place with their

women and children, never showing any willingness to settle peacefully upon the territory that they had conquered. Unlike them, the Slavic tribes, who penetrated into the Balkans, had already an agricultural, communal organization of their own. Being used to the cultivation of the soil and the rearing of cattle, they quickly took deep root in the newly conquered territories. They did not only occupy towns and villages like the Longobards in northern and central Italy, but they took possession as well of the plains, woody hills and high mountains.

The strength of the Southern Slavs consists in the fact that they are so deeply rooted to the soil. All foreign invasions and all the misery of long centuries of Turkish rule could not dispossess them of their hold. For that reason their occupation of the Balkan countries is more like colonization than military conquest. But the disadvantages of their new situation were many. The vastness of the occupied territories; the sparseness of the population, together with the division of the country by large tracts of forest and by high mountain ranges, hindered them through centuries from forming stronger bonds of political unity. The peaceful character of these agricultural settlers, who possessed no supreme administrative or military organization, contributed also to endangering their independence. Fate placed them in a most exposed position: on the high road connecting the east with the west, or rather on the boundary between two worlds, the

East and the West, in the countries coveted by all conquerors from the Romans to William II. Therefore it is little wonder that the Southern Slavs had a very stormy history, and were the prey of many foreign invaders.

Unfortunately their fight against intruders was not always a successful one. Thus the most exposed northwestern tribes inhabiting the valley of the Isonzo (Soča) and the upper reaches of the Drave very soon lost their independence and remained until now incorporated in Austria. The more central tribes, under the name of Croats, had from the ninth century a national state whose frontiers were formed by the Drave in the north, the coast of the Adriatic in the south-west and the rivers Narenta and Bosnia in the east. But this Croatian state under king Zvonimir (1076-1089) became involved in the great European wars of the Normans against Byzantium and Venice and also in the struggle of pope Gregory VII against the German emperor Henry IV, out of which it came weakened and impoverished. After the death of Zvonimir the feudal knights were in open revolt against his heir and national dynasty; this state of things afforded an opportunity to the Magyar king Vladislav to proclaim his right to the Croatian throne and by intrigue and force to occupy Slavonia (1091); his successor Koloman, in 1102, exploiting internal strife, imposed himself as the king of Croatia and so brought her in copartnership with Hungary. His successors tried to exploit this personal union as a conquest and to

treat Croatia like a mere province of Hungary. The whole relations of Croatia towards Hungary were characterized through centuries by the resistance of the Croats against such Magyar tendencies.

Though Serbia and Croatia did not always co-operate, they nevertheless never fought against each other, therefore the incorporation of Croatia with Hungary was a heavy blow to the Serbian states, as now they had to fight a new and powerful enemy. By incorporating Croatia, Hungary not only increased her own strength, but was fortified in a position whence the invasion of Serbia and Bosnia was most easy, and consequently the encroachments and invasions of Hungary in Bosnia and Serbia, became more frequent and vigorous after that date.

In spite of all this the Serbian states progressed with every year. They acquired and developed within their nation all the institutions of contemporary civilization. Little by little, welded in the hard school of warfare and resistance, they acquired fighting qualities which enabled them to stem the tide of foreign invasion and conquest. From the twelfth century onwards we find Serbian rulers married to Byzantine, French, or Hungarian princesses, and the Serbian state rose high in the esteem and respect of the nations. The high standard of their civilization can be judged by remaining monuments, churches and monasteries scattered all over their territories. Of their mediæval social institutions let us only men-

tion that in the first decades of the fourteenth century, in the reign of king Milutin, the system of trial by jury was already introduced into Serbian tribunals, and was later, in 1349, codified by his grandson the emperor Stephen Dušan. In the fourteenth century the Serbo-Croatian republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) prohibited the slave trade and proclaimed that every slave found on its territory would be set at liberty and treated like a free man.

This position of the Southern Slav lands on the road between the East and the West exercised during the days of the Nemanja dynasty a beneficent influence upon the economic and commercial as well as upon the spiritual and social development of the Serbian states. We see that in all these countries, which through centuries formed the dividing line between the East and the West, both influences, always contending, made strong impression upon their political and religious life, and sometimes, as in the arts, were most happily blended together. Thus Serbian religious architecture, still preserved in many beautiful churches, represents a variety of the Byzantine art often showing the strong influence of the Romanesque. Dečani and the patriarchal church of Ipek, both dating from the first half of the fourteenth century, are the finest specimens of those artistic influences blended together in a whole *ensemble* by an artist of no mean merit. Some of the Southern Slav architects and master-masons were educated in Italy; others perhaps in Constantinople.

The same may be said of the Ragusan building art and poetry. Here the main influence was Italian, but the artist never blindly or slavishly followed his model. He was never anxious to preserve the absolute purity of a style, but leaving room for his own personal inspiration, he produced works such as the Rector's palace, which by their harmony of *ensemble* and the exquisiteness of original detail may rank among the best achievements of the European building art, and of which Professor Freeman has said:

"To our mind this palace really deserves no small place in the history of the Romanesque art. One or two capitals show that the Ragusan architect knew of the actual Renaissance. But it was only in that one detail that he went astray. In everything else he started from sound principles, and from them vigorously developed for himself. And the fruit of his work was a building which thoroughly satisfies every requirement of criticism, and on which the eye gazes with ever-increasing delight, as one of the fairest triumphs of human skill within the range of the builder's art.

"But the palace must not be spoken of as if it stood altogether alone among the buildings. . . ."¹

And the reader must bear in mind that many of the finest works of Serbian architecture have been ruined by the Turks, and many of the most

¹ Edward A. Freeman, *Sketches from the Subject and Neighbour Lands of Venice*. Macmillan & Co. 1881.

famous Ragusan churches and palaces were destroyed by the great earthquake in 1667; but the remains still testify to the high standard of culture attained by the Southern Slavs before the arrival of the Turks.

"Such buildings as these, now so few, make us sigh over the effects of the great earthquake and over the treasures of art which it must have swallowed up. If Ragusa in her earlier days contained a series of churches to match her civic arcades, she might claim in justly artistic interest to stand alongside of Rome, Ravenna, Pisa and Lucca. Her churches of the fifteenth century must have been worthy to rank with anything from the fourth century to the twelfth. . . .

"In any case the Dalmatian coast may hold its head high among the artistic regions of the world."¹

The Serbian state before Kossovo had not only grown in size and political influence, but developed internally in a steady and harmonious way. Pachyméres, a Greek writer who visited Serbia about the end of the thirteenth century, praises the simplicity and healthy atmosphere of the Serbian court life. He was received by queen Hélène, an Angevin princess, surrounded by her court ladies—all of them, as well as the queen, engaged in some useful work. Near her court queen Hélène founded and controlled a monastery

¹ Freeman's *Sketches from the Subject and Neighbour Lands of Venice*, p. 258.

where were educated the daughters of the Serbian noble houses.

The code of the emperor Dušan proclaimed at Skoplje and Seres in 1349-53—one of the finest written monuments of mediæval Europe—is a proof that already in the first half of the fourteenth century Serbia was socially and politically a well-organized community; and what was more important, the seed was good, the blossom was fine and promised the best harvest.

Their social development could be fairly compared with the most civilized countries in Europe. In that respect Pouqueville, who was at Ragusa in 1805, describes the social conditions of the people as follows:

“The peasants were serfs and attached to the land and sold with it. But their master could not kill them, and if he ill-treated them they could go to another.

“The peasants did not complain of their lot, and the men being much better than the laws, the state was flourishing. . . . The peasants were splendid fellows, but absolutely obedient to their masters. It was the ancient respect for a caste, which being unmilitary was peaceful and debonair. There was no secret police, no gendarmes. In 1805 the first capital sentence in twenty-five years was pronounced; the city went into mourning and an executioner had to be sent from Turkey.”

An English author, Thomas Watkins, in 1789 spoke of Ragusa: “They have more learning and

less ostentation than any people I know, more politeness to each other and less envy. Their hospitality to the stranger cannot possibly be exceeded; in short, their general character has in it so few defects that I do not hesitate to pronounce them (as far as my experience of other people will permit me) the wisest, best and happiest of states."

Comparing with Ragusa the Dalmatian coast subjugated by Venice he wrote:

"I discovered that the wretched government of Venice had, by sending out their Bernadotti or famished nobility to prey upon the inhabitants, rendered ineffectual the benefits of nature. What a contrast between them and the citizens of Ragusa!"¹

But just when Serbia was rising to the zenith of her power a new danger for her and for all christendom emerged from the east. Invited by the weak Byzantine emperors the Turks make their first appearance in Europe. The emperor Dušan of Serbia, with the insight of a great statesman, recognized the menace at once, and tried by all means at his disposal to stave off the danger. He appealed to the pope to nominate him commander of all the christian armies against the mussulmans. Although he failed to obtain the coalition of the other christian states against the Turks, he pursued the idea of replacing the enfeebled Byzantine empire by a younger, more

¹ Thomas Watkins, *Travels Through Switzerland to Constantinople*, vol. ii. letter xlii. p. 331.

powerful organism, and if he had succeeded in doing this he would have proceeded to organize the defense of christian Europe against the approaching mahomedan tide. Unfortunately tsar Dušan died in 1355 before he had time to carry out his plans.

After the death of tsar Dušan Serbia passed through a heavy crisis. The shortcomings and deficiencies of the feudal system had produced the same results in Serbia as in many other states in that stage of their social and political development. But whilst the kings of France succeeded in subjugating the feudal aristocracy, thanks to their alliance with the burghers, the crisis provoked by the feudal system in Serbia proved fatal to her existence, as it occurred simultaneously with the appearance of a source of new danger from without. Tsar Uroš Dušan's young son and heir possessed no authority or power to curb the mighty feudal princes, who ruled independently in their respective provinces without unity or mutual coöperation. King Vukašin of Macedonia and his brother Ugleša were the first to receive the Turkish blow. They met the invaders on the Maritza in the year 1371, but their army was defeated, both perished, and their sons and heirs became vassals to the sultan. Soon after this the Byzantine empire was reduced to Constantinople and its environs, and the Turkish tide approached the very heart of the Serbian empire. The decisive battle was at hand. The Turks, who found the Serbs a most stubborn enemy, made

overtures, begging them on their side to open them the gate of central Europe. The Serbian nation and its rulers were sorely tempted. They knew that their forces were too small to resist the swollen Turkish flood. No help was forthcoming from any other quarter. Europe, divided and terrified, looked mute and motionless upon the unequal struggle. Should the Serbs betray their noble mission as the champions of christendom? Should they side with the enemy of their race and religion? No and never! But better than by any words of mine the description of that supreme hour of temptation is given in one of the Serbian national songs. There we are told how the Serbian tsar Lazar received a letter from the Virgin Mother asking him which kingdom he preferred, the Kingdom of Heaven or the Kingdom of the Earth. Tsar Lazar and all his nation chose the Heavenly Kingdom. Better to perish than to lose their honor and to betray the cause for which they had stood until then. Then tsar Lazar made a supreme effort. He appealed to all the Serbian princes to join him at Kossovo in a decisive battle against the overbearing Turk. They responded to the call, among them being Tvrtko, king of Bosnia, and fought one of the most bloody battles ever chronicled in human history. Yes, the flower of the Serbian aristocracy and manhood perished in that fatal battle of Kossovo. All of them, the beautiful, brave and bold, went grimly to their gory graves. But the Turks sustained a grievous blow. How fierce and how important was that

fatal engagement may be judged by the fact that the leaders of both armies, the Serbian tsar Lazar and the Turkish sultan Murat, were both slain in the battle. The Western European nations, realizing the Turkish danger and recognizing the Southern Slav nation as its principal opponent, anxiously awaited the news of the issue of the battle. A false rumor of victory reached Paris and a solemn *Te Deum* was sung in Notre Dame, as we know from the records of that church, to celebrate the victory of the Serbians over the mussulmans.

Notwithstanding the disaster of Kossovo on the 28th of June, 1389, the Serbian nation and its states continued their resistance and lingered on for more than a century, although they could never regain their former strength. The capital of Serbia proper had since the death of the emperor Dušan been removed from Skoplje in Macedonia to the north, and with it was also shifted the center of the Serbian state. Tsar Lazar had his capital and held his diminished court at Kruševac. After 1389 his son, who assumed the title of despot, transferred his capital to Belgrade, and his nephew and heir, the despot George Branković, chose for his capital Smederevo, which was fortified according to the best rules of contemporary military science. But nothing availed. Bulgaria succumbed silently in 1393, and after the fall of Constantinople, in 1453, the Turks prepared a fresh and terrible onslaught on Serbia. After a prolonged siege, during which the all-powerful

cannons of Soliman the Magnificent wrought havoc in the walls and ranks of the defenders, Smederevo was taken in 1459, and Serbia ceased to exist. Other Serbian states continued a precarious life for awhile. Bosnia was conquered in 1463, Hercegovina 1476, and Zeta in 1499.

Thus in the second half of the fifteenth century, one by one the Serbian states were conquered and their independence completely extinguished. Only a small part of Zeta, impregnable Montenegro, like a fortress on the rocks through centuries braved the Turkish onslaughts and resisted them successfully. Montenegro remained the stronghold of Serbian liberty and the guardian of the ever-living tradition of the ancient glory of the Serbian empire.

But besides Montenegro there was also the Serbo-Croat republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), which with Montenegro through centuries shared the glory of keeping alive the memory of Serbo-Croat independence and civilization. If Montenegro was specially guarding the tradition of bravery and prowess, Dubrovnik never ceased to be a place of the muses, cultivating science, art and literature. Professor E. A. Freeman, who so highly appreciated the achievements of Ragusa in this respect, said of her: "But there is Ragusa, there is one spot along the whole coast from the Croatian border to cape Tainaros itself which never came under the dominion either of the Venetian or of the Turk. In this Ragusa stands alone among the cities of the whole coast, Dalmatian,

Albanian and Greek. Among all the endless confusions and fluctuations of power in those regions, Ragusa stands alone as having ever kept its place, always as separate, commonly as an independent commonwealth. It lived on those coasts till the day when the elder Bonaparte in mere caprice of tyranny without provocation of any kind declared one day that the republic of Ragusa had ceased to exist.”¹

The Turks inflicted all manner of oppression and wrong upon the Serbo-Croat nation. They annihilated their states, they devastated their territories, eradicating many noble efforts for a higher spiritual culture and civilization. The Serbo-Croat aristocracy fell on the battlefields or took refuge in foreign countries. Their young men were led away as janissaries, and their sisters were sold in the slave markets of the East; their mothers were trampled upon by the conquerors' horses and the men slain by thousands and tens of thousands. They burnt their castles and churches; but they could not kill the national soul nor force them to forget the glorious memories of the past. Some good sprang out of all this evil. The Serbo-Croat refugees from the different provinces were rolled like pebbles before the onrush of the Turkish tide. They intermingled and consequently were welded into strong national unity. The sharing of hardships and common miseries did more for their moral unity and for

¹ E. A. Freeman, *Sketches from Subject and Neighbour Lands of Venice*. Macmillan & Co. 1881.

the formation of a single national consciousness than centuries of easy and prosperous life could have done. In annihilating the Serbian states and aristocracy the Turks annihilated also the existing social classes and their privileges, and made at least an equality of subjugation.

Notwithstanding all this, the Serbo-Croat nation continued its resistance. First in alliance with the Magyars and later on with the Austrians or Venetians, Poles or Russians, they availed themselves of every opportunity of inflicting losses on the Turks or of driving them out of their country.

IV

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE SOUTHERN SLAVS

WE have seen in the preceding chapter that when the independence of the Serbian states was completely extinguished, owing to the advance of the all-conquering Turk, a considerable number of the Southern Slavs were already living in Austria and Hungary, at that time represented by two separate states. In the west the Slovenes had ever since the tenth century been incorporated with Austria, and from the beginning of the twelfth century Croatia had been united with Hungary. After Kossovo great masses of the Serbian people were emigrating northward, to avoid the new barbarian invasion from the East. Thus already about the end of the fourteenth century, during the reign of king Sigismund, we find Serbs in great numbers inhabiting the county of Arad on the river Maros, which was governed by Dimitrius, son of the Serbian king Vukašin who perished in the battle of Maritza (1371). Dimitrius probably emigrated thither with great numbers of Serbs from Macedonia who mingled with their kinsfolk who had remained in those regions since the great migration of the sixth and seventh centuries.

With the advance of the Turks and the disappearance of the independent Serbian states, the migration of Serbians to South Hungary increased enormously. The last of the Serbian despots—Stephen Lazarević and George Branković—acknowledged the suzerainty of the Hungarian kings in order to resist the Turks more effectively, and became possessed of vast territories in South Hungary. Being in need of laborers for the cultivation of these great possessions they encouraged the immigration of Serbs into these districts, where they exercised quite a sovereign power. During the reign of king Matthew Corvinus in the second half of the fifteenth century, the Serbian population became predominant in Syrmia and South Hungary. In one year alone—in 1480—over 60,000 Serbians emigrated thither, and king Matthew himself stated in a letter addressed to the pope in 1483 that during the last four years about 200,000 Serbians had emigrated to his realm. The Magyars, who had previously inhabited these thinly populated provinces, emigrated northward, fearing an invasion of the Turks or avoiding the neighborhood of the Serbians. Therefore since the middle of the sixteenth century, South Hungary with Syrmia, Croatia and Slavonia possessed a thoroughly Serbo-Croatian character.

Relying upon the Serbs for the protection of his realm, king Matthew in 1471 granted autonomy to the Serbs living in South Hungary and nominated George Branković's little son Serbian

despot. From that time the importance and number of Serbians in Hungary steadily increased, so much so that the military power and obligations of the Serbian despots were greater than those of any other vassal of the Hungarian crown. Whereas the great state magnates (*officiales bandierati*, viz., the duke of Transylvania, the ban of Croatia, etc.), were in the case of war obliged to contribute one *bandierium*, i. e., 400 horsemen, the Serbian despot had to send 1000 horsemen. His *bandierium* was equal to that of the king himself (*bandierium regale*).¹

The importance of the Serbian element in Hungary was specially noticeable after the battle of Mohacz, when after the defeat and death of king Louis II complete anarchy prevailed in the kingdom. Two candidates for the Hungarian throne, John Zapolya, duke of Transylvania, and the archduke Ferdinand of Austria, brother of the emperor Charles V, were contending for the crown. For a while the Serbians hesitated to take part in that conflict, as some of their nobles and leaders thought that they ought to use this opportunity to create an independent Serbian state north of the Danube and the Save. But the Turkish menace, ever present and increasing, together with the promises of the archduke's agents, that they would be given ample guarantees for their national development, induced them to side with Ferdinand, thus contributing greatly to his being

¹ The third decree of king Vladislav (*Corpus Juris Hungarici*, 492, 606).

able to maintain himself in western Hungary against Zapolya. That moment was a somewhat decisive one in the creation of the present Austria-Hungary and the establishment of the Habsburgs upon their Hungarian throne simultaneously with their acquiring the crown of Bohemia.

The position of the Serbian nation was at that time peculiar. When the Hungarian kings Matthew and Vladislav encouraged Serbian immigration they granted the Serbs special extensive privileges and exempted them from paying tithes to the Roman catholic priests; the Serbs settled down in one district (the Banat of Temesvar), and from the fourteenth century formed a separate politico-administrative province; this, together with the imperishable traditions of the past glory and greatness of the Serbian empire, kept alive the idea of Serbian national independence for which the Serbs, notwithstanding many failures, were always ready to shed their very best blood.

But even when the Turkish flood had completely submerged all the provinces inhabited by Serbs, the idea of their national unity and independence was in some ways strengthened. The great vizier Sokolović, who was a Serbian by birth, reestablished the Serbian national church in 1557, and nominated his own brother, the pious monk Makarius, as its patriarch with his seat at Ipek (Peć). This church, looking upon itself as the direct heir of the Serbian kings, tsars and despots, took the entire Serbian population under its spiritual

guidance in the Balkans as well as to the north of the Save and the Danube; whereas all other orthodox churches in Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania came under the jurisdiction of the patriarchate at Constantinople.

No wonder that when Hungary was exhausted in the internecine struggles raging for the possession of the crown, the defense of the realm fell mainly upon the Serbs and Croats. And when the Turks in 1552 succeeded in conquering the Banat of Temesvar and Slavonia, a Serbian insurrection broke out already at the end of the sixteenth century. In order to achieve lasting results the Serbs looked for an alliance with the Magyars and appealed to Sigismund Batory, duke of Transylvania, for assistance, offering him the title of Serbian despot, or king of Rascia—as the mediæval authors called Serbia—on condition that he sent them help.

The Magyars delayed with their assistance, and the rising tide of the Turks not only overcame the Serbian resistance, but conquered almost the whole of Hungary, and occupied Budapest.

The peace of Vasvar, concluded in 1664 between Austria and Turkey, was of short duration. A new storm was at hand, and indeed we see that the energetic grand vizier Kara-Mustafa soon occupied the few Hungarian provinces remaining under Habsburg rule, and in 1683 besieged Vienna. Thanks to the timely assistance of Poland, the Turks were beaten and Austria was

saved. Once more the Austrian emperor, Leopold I, looked to the Serbs for further successes against the Turks. He made use of a Serbian noble, George Branković, the scion of an old princely family, to organize a Serbian insurrection and to supply the imperial armies with as many Serbian volunteers as possible. By a special patent George Branković was granted the title of Hungarian baron and in 1683 acknowledged hereditary prince of Hercegovina, Syrmia and the Banat of Temesvar. Soon afterwards Buda, the old capital of the Hungarian kings, was recovered from the Turks and the Austrian successes were vigorously pursued.

After a brief respite the court of Vienna resumed its preparations for a new and decisive war against Turkey. The exhaustion of the imperial finances notwithstanding, the court circles of Vienna planned an extensive scheme: the conquest of Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Moldavia and Wallachia, and to crown the Hungarian king Joseph I, the son of the emperor Leopold I, as king of Rumania, as all those lands were to be called. Of course the courage, gallantry and natural inclination of the Serbians were taken into first account. Vienna again applied to George Branković. In 1688 the latter submitted to the court of Vienna a scheme for the creation of a semi-independent Serbian principality in the Banat, Syrmia, Slavonia and all other Servian countries in the Balkans beyond the Save and the Danube, together with the demand that Vienna should

acknowledge him as despot and hereditary prince of these provinces. Being in sore straits and pursuing its own aims, Vienna apparently approved and accepted Branković's scheme. The emperor Leopold wished to exploit the over-confidence of Branković, having already made up his mind to rid himself of him at the first opportunity. And this is how it was done. Animated by fresh hopes for the realization of their national idea, the Serbs largely swelled the ranks of the imperial forces, and their insurrection in the rear of the Turkish forces by threatening their communications made the Turkish position untenable. Thanks to this the Austrian army conquered Bosnia and Serbia and penetrated as far as Prizren and Skoplje.

Having temporarily obtained the desired results, the Vienna court circles now turned to their preconceived plan of getting rid of Branković and Serbian autonomy. He was arrested on a charge of high treason at Kladovo in 1689 and transferred first to Vienna and subsequently to Eger in Bohemia, where he languished until 1711, as a state prisoner, never tried nor condemned by any court of the realm. To all the questions of Serbian representatives concerning his imprisonment the Vienna cabinet answered: "*Nihil male fecit, sed ratio rei publicæ expostulavit.*" Such was the gratitude and loyalty of German Habsburg princes.

It seemed that a curse lay upon the new Austrian acquisitions. The Turks were reinforced and began to press hard upon the Austrian

armies. The emperor Leopold fully realized the value of his Serbian provinces. With Bosnia and Serbia in his hands he was able to defend his newly acquired kingdom of Hungary more effectively; therefore once more he appealed to the Serbs and to their patriarch Arsenius Čarnoević to render him effective assistance against the Turks by a new insurrection in arms. This time the emperor promised them the free election of a national duke (Vojvoda), religious liberty and exemption from all taxes and imposts.

The Austrian armies were in retreat, great numbers of Serbs fighting as volunteers on their side. And the Serbian population and dignitaries of the church, greatly compromised in the eyes of the Turks by the assistance given to Austria in the former fighting, were also retreating in great masses before the hostile armies. The emperor's invitation reached them at Belgrade, when already all Serbian provinces in the Balkans were occupied by the Turks. Under the Turkish dominion the Serbian church enjoyed many privileges, and the patriarch, besides the right of appointing new bishops and of judging matrimonial cases, had extended his jurisdiction in all civil and hereditary matters. Thus, under the Turks he was recognized as chief of the whole Serbian people. No wonder that both patriarch and bishops wished to see the rights of the Serbian church better defined and secured before committing themselves to a new policy. Therefore in a national assembly they formulated their condi-

tions and instructed the bishop of the Banat of Temesvar to demand the emperor's recognition of Serbian church autonomy and the jurisdiction of the patriarch in all matters in which it had been hitherto recognized by the Turks, before they would emigrate with their people to Austria.

The emperor Leopold I promptly agreed to all the Serbian demands, put forward by them as a free nation negotiating with the Austrian emperor and the king of Hungary. In proceeding thus the emperor Leopold I was following the procedure of the former Hungarian kings, as when Bela IV granted to Yasigues and Koumans not only privileges, but also a special strip of territory in Hungary with an administrative autonomy and a national leader. The Saxons in Hungary likewise had their own territory with an autonomous administration.

Of course the extended privileges granted to the Serbian church and nation were not much to the taste of the Roman catholic church dignitaries and the Hungarian aristocracy who tried to limit and frustrate them. After some delay and bargaining in the negotiations, the famous privileges forming the legal basis of the Serbian autonomy in Hungary were issued by the Austrian court chancellery on the 21st of August, 1690. However, at the instigation of the Roman catholic cardinal Kolonitch, a clause was inserted that those privileges were in force only as long as the Serbs "collectively and individually remain faithful to us" (*et quantenus et quamdiu nobis*

universi et singuli fideles et devoti erunt). And this last clause has always proved a mighty weapon to suspend or simply to annul all the autonomous privileges of the Serbian people whenever the tortuous ways of Austria's policy demanded that Serbian rights and privileges should be sacrificed for the promotion of some other dynastic, German, or Magyar interests.

The privileges granted were never put in force. In vain the Serbs demanded a special territory in which to settle down, there to be administered by their Vojvoda and national leaders; that demand was never fulfilled. On the contrary, Vienna promoted a scheme for the German colonization of Hungary and Slavonia. The Serbs were used to form the military frontier (the celebrated *granica*) against Turkey in the Banat of Temesvar, Slavonia and Syrmia, without ever having their position towards the Hungarian state and crown regulated. As soon as the war danger was no longer imminent, the Serbian merits were forgotten and all means were employed to break up the compact masses of the Serbian population. Part of the Serbs were put under the direct administration of the Crown War Council and the Court Chancellery in Vienna, while the remaining part was brought under the jurisdiction of the Hungarian magnates.

Owing to the prolonged wars and the despotic régime strictly applied to all Austrian provinces, dissatisfaction became general and an armed revolution broke out in Hungary, just at the moment

when Austria was engaged in a new war with France over the Spanish succession. The Hungarian leader, Rakoczy II, invited the Serbians to side with him. But the old and experienced patriarch Čarnoević remained faithful to the Habsburgs, placing all the Serbian forces at the disposal of the dynasty. With special fury the Magyars turned against the Serbians, who in this revolution lost about 100,000 men, but contributed effectively to the final victory of the imperial army. The Serbian merits were recognized by a fresh confirmation of their privileges in 1706 by the emperor Joseph I, the son and successor of Leopold I.

But all this was quickly forgotten, and in 1713 the emperor Charles VI tried to limit the privileges greatly. But they were again confirmed by him in 1715 on the eve of a fresh war against Turkey which broke out in 1716.

When the Austrian empress Maria Theresa, at the very outset of her reign, encountered the open hostility of Prussia, France and Bavaria, she endeavored to reconcile the Magyars by sacrificing the Serbs and restricting all privileges of the latter in favor of the former. Even that was not all. Instigated by her jesuit advisers she initiated throughout Austria a policy of forcible propaganda of Roman catholicism among the orthodox population. Many Serbs, losing all hope that their position would ever be improved in Austria, having so many times shed their blood in vain in protecting the Habsburg throne and extending

Austria's frontiers, once more went into exile and sought a new home in Russia. Thus in 1751-53 some hundreds of thousands of Serbs left south Hungary, depriving Austria of so many of her best soldiers and workmen. Alarmed by the magnitude of the Serbian exodus, the court circles attempted to stop it by the creation of a special Illyrian Court Commission for the protection of Serbian interests, but only in religious and spiritual matters (in religiosis et spiritualibus). As was to be expected, this new institution—which was abolished in 1777—did little or nothing for the promotion of Serbian interests or for the redress of their grievances, or the removal of wrongs, which were growing in number and intensity. In spite of all, the Serbians remained most faithful and loyal defenders of the Habsburgs, as has been recognized by many Austrian statesmen and historical writers. The Serbo-Croatian "grenzers" (frontier guards) formed nearly the half of the entire Austrian forces engaged in the Seven Years' War (1756-63) against Frederick the Great. This fact shows clearly enough the value of the Serbo-Croats to the Habsburg throne and dynasty.

Not only was Serbo-Croatian blood shed on the battlefields of the Austrians in Europe, but the Viennese court was very clever in exploiting the Serbs in its fight against internal foes.

The reforms of Joseph II, which aimed at the centralization and germanization of all lands included in Austria and Hungary, not only roused

bitter opposition in Hungary, but awakened a strong feeling of nationality among the Magyars, who in their turn tried to make of Hungary a state of *one* language and *one* nation only. The ill-fated Turkish campaign of 1790, which lingered on for some time, and the menace of Prussia, when king Friedrich Wilhelm II began to arm against Austria, greatly encouraged the Magyar opposition, in deference to which the reforms of Joseph II were abolished; but the Hungarian nobles demanded greater guarantees for the independence of Hungary and new privileges for themselves. As the national existence of the Serbians was threatened by exaggerated chauvinistic Magyar demands, the Serbs were greatly agitated and, incited by Vienna, were ready to fight against the Magyars. In order to bring pressure to bear upon the Magyars, the Vienna cabinet opened negotiations with the Serbs concerning their national grievances. The old Serbian demand to have a special territory with a national autonomous administration accorded to them was again put forward, together with the petition that the emperor's youngest son Alexander should be installed as Serbian despot. Of course Vienna agreed to the Serbian demands, and the emperor Leopold II in a special letter promised that the wishes of the Serbians would be soon realized, although he evidently did not for a moment sincerely and seriously think of keeping his word.

The Hungarian parliament, being informed of the dealings of Vienna with the Serbians, showed itself meek and conciliatory. In the ensuing negotiations with the Magyars, Vienna scored an important victory, and Serbian interests were sacrificed to the Magyars. The Serbians were now placed on an equal footing with all other subjects of Hungary by the abolition of all previously granted privileges. But with the secret design of again using the Serbs, against future Magyar opposition, the emperor reserved to himself the right of deciding in all matters touching the Serbian church, religion, education, and such privileges as are not opposed to the fundamental laws of the realm (*quæ fundamentali regni constitutioni non adversantur*).

Thus the Serbians entered upon the nineteenth century full of misgivings lest their desire for national autonomy in Austria would never be realized. Nevertheless that wonderful century which recreated Italy and resuscitated Bohemia worked for them also.

The nineteenth century was characterized by the awakening of national feeling throughout Europe. The principle of nationality was recognized as a new force and a new basis for the politics of the European states. We have seen that, thanks to the imperishable Serbian historical tradition, the Serbs never lacked that feeling and that their whole policy was directed towards the achievement of national autonomy upon a separate territory in Hungary. But the Croats—the

Roman catholic branch of their race—were sunk in apathy and looked indifferently enough upon the Serbian demands for national organization and territory.

But the nineteenth century brought a very remarkable change in the mutual position of the Serbs and the Croats and in their relations to the Magyars. Even as the germanizing policy of Joseph II had awakened the national feelings of the Magyars, so the chauvinistic policy of the Magyars in imposing the Magyar tongue as the official language in Croatia, and striving to magyarize all other nationalities in Hungary by force, awakened the national feeling of the Croats and was instrumental in relegating the religious differences between the Serbs and the Croats into the background and in bringing about coöperation between them for the defense and promotion of their national interests in Hungary.

But yet another event which took place at the beginning of the nineteenth century was destined to exercise a strong influence upon the future.

Napoleon, whose brilliant career wrought so many changes in Europe, also exercised a profound impression upon the future destiny of the Southern Slavs. After having conquered Dalmatia, and deprived Austria of Istria, Goritzia, Carinthia and Carniola, together with part of Croatia, he united all these provinces on the basis of their ethnographic coherence in the one kingdom of Illyria with its capital at Ljubljana. This kingdom of Illyria was the first purely Southern

Slav state since the ninth century in which all three branches of the race—Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—were united under one administration. Notwithstanding its short life this state awoke high hopes for their ultimate unification, and has ever since remained the ideal of the Southern Slav patriots. Later on in the thirties of last century the Croatian patriot Ludevit Gaj, in his desire to give a common form to the new national movement amongst the Southern Slavs, proposed that all Southern Slavs should discard their provincial names of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and adopt the common name of Illyrians, because their country was called Illyria in Roman and Byzantine times and because the Serbs were commonly referred to as “Illyrians” in Vienna. He also advocated the discontinuance of the use of local dialects in literature and the adoption of the idiom spoken by great numbers of the Serbo-Croat people in Dalmatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia and South Hungary, as the official and literary language of the nation. The Croats, without exception, adopted this suggestion and since that time their literary language has been the same as that of the Serbs. Gaj’s task was rendered comparatively easy by the fact that the works of Vuk Karadjíć, the father of the new Serbian literature, had already exemplified all the beauty and richness of this Slav idiom, and that the Serbian national songs and ballads collected and published by Vuk Karadjíć had evoked the admiration of Europe and won a high place beside the greatest

achievements of the literary and artistic genius of the European race.

In the meantime the Serbs in Turkey, utterly disappointed in their hope of seeing their liberation brought about by coöperation with the forces of Austria, and convinced that Austria, whilst using them as catspaw in her wars with Turkey, was quite indifferent to their national welfare and looked only for the aggrandizement of the Hapsburg dominions, resolved to work out their own destiny for themselves. They took the first opportunity that presented itself, and in 1804 began their first successful insurrection under the leadership of Karageorge. During nine years of incessant fighting the Serbs succeeded in clearing out the Turks from a portion of their territory and in organizing a national state to carry on the traditions of the Serbian empire of the Nemanja dynasty. Passing beyond the frontier of the vilayet of Belgrade they penetrated into Old Serbia, pushed energetically forward towards Montenegro and made plans for the liberation of Bosnia. But in 1813 the Turks, having made peace with Russia in 1812, sent all their available forces against Serbia, which was crushed after the most sanguinary fighting and the splendid self-sacrifice of her sons. But the Turkish triumph was only of very short duration. The Serbs proved worthy of their ancestors and nothing could quench their desire for freedom nor subdue them for any length of time. In 1815 they rose again and this time achieved lasting results. The Serbian state

was now recognized as a vassal principality of the Turkish empire.

It must be mentioned that the new Serbian state was not the result of the bravery, self-sacrifice and wisdom of the Serbs dwelling within its frontiers alone. On the contrary, Serbs from all over the world took part in its creation. The ranks of Karageorge's army were swelled by Serbs from Macedonia, Old Serbia, Bosnia, Hercegovina and Austria. The patriotic Serbians of South Hungary at great risk smuggled arms and ammunition to the Serbian insurrectionists and the educated Serbs of other countries hastened to Serbia to assist in her political and economic organization and development. Fortunately Austria, whose entire energy was engaged in the Napoleonic wars and subsequently in suppressing every liberal movement in Europe, was little interested in the creation of a new Serbian state or felt unable to hinder it; she therefore left Serbia alone to make her way—painfully and slowly, but surely—towards progress and recognition.

It was during the period of reaction and strict surveillance of Metternich's rule that the Roman catholic branch of the Serbo-Croat nation was awakened to new national life and consciousness.

But although the national feelings of the Croats had slumbered, it cannot be said that they were ever extinguished. Though united with Hungary, Croatia enjoyed a special status and considered herself always as a separate commu-

nity linked only by a personal union with Hungary. And whenever Austria or Hungary attempted to denationalize Croatia or to reduce her to the level of a mere province of Austria, the national feelings proved very much alive and prompted the Croats to resist. Several attempts had even been made at various times by Croatian nobles and patriots to render Croatia completely independent. Thus when Vienna in the middle of the seventeenth century attempted the forcible centralization of Austria, the universal dissatisfaction in Croatia found expression in a plot of the Croatian nobles, Zrinski and Frankopan, who schemed the complete independence of Croatia. Their plan, however, was frustrated by the vigilance of Vienna, and both were beheaded in Vienna in 1671. Henceforward Croatia was ruled directly from Vienna as a mere Austrian crown-land. But the memory of Zrinski and Frankopan lived for ever in the hearts of their compatriots, who venerated them as heroes and martyrs for national freedom and independence.

As long as the Latin tongue was the official language of the whole kingdom of Hungary the Croats, being faithful children of the Roman catholic church, had little reason to complain. But the germanizing tendency of the emperor Joseph II, which awakened the national feelings of the Magyars, also exercised a strong influence upon the slumbering feelings of the Croats. The Magyars were always of the opinion that the right

to national independence and development, which they claimed so strongly themselves, could never be shared by the other races of Hungary. The first acts of their independence have always been the forcible magyarization of the Serbo-Croats, Roumanians and Slovaks, and the refusal of their national demands. This spirit of national intolerance of the Magyars towards other races is greatly and directly responsible for the terrible crisis into which Europe has been plunged in our own day.

Thus at the time of the Magyar assembly, held at Pressburg in 1825 under the influence of young Kossuth and count Széchényi, when the Magyars insistently demanded the introduction of their native tongue as the official language in Hungary, the national feeling of the Croats were already strongly aroused. The Serbs, as we have seen, had never for a moment lost their national consciousness or forgotten the glorious memories of a great past.

The stream of orthodox Serb immigration which had flowed into Croatia ever since the fourteenth century, when the Balkan provinces were occupied by the Turks, had greatly strengthened the national element, and by mingling with the Roman catholics had smoothed away the existing provincial differences between Serbs and Croats. By the bond of a common destiny, and the stress of much fighting side by side on countless European battlefields in brotherly union, these religious differences were sunk in a single national con-

sciousness and a strong feeling of national unity.

In 1839 Vienna, fearing outside complications, tried to reconcile the Magyars by granting the introduction of the Magyar language in all departments of the Hungarian administration excepting the army. Intoxicated by this national success, the Magyars attempted to detach from the kingdom of Croatia, Syrmia and Slavonia, and to incorporate them completely with Hungary, on the strength of the argument that these provinces were already occupied by Hungary when the union of Croatia and Hungary was effected in 1102; their assembly of 1843-44 abolished the old-established prerogative of the Serbian church autonomy, and decided upon the introduction of Magyar as the official language in the administration of the Serbian church. Painfully impressed and greatly alarmed the Serbs sent a deputation to try and effect an understanding between them and the Magyars, but the latter refused to listen to their grievances and Kossuth stated in the Magyar assembly at Pressburg in 1847 that in the crown-lands of St. Stephen he recognizes no other nation but the Magyars.

In the meantime conditions in Austria had been going rapidly from bad to worse. The Magyars threatened to break out in open revolt, and Radetzky from Milan was imploring for more troops, as he could not answer for Lombardy, where national feeling was running as high as ever, and Piedmont was preparing an attack upon Austria.

Zagreb in Croatia hailed the events of March, 1848, as the prelude to a constitution, and the fall of Metternich with rejoicing. A national committee was formed under Gaj and Kukulević, who drew up a petition to the king demanding constitutional rights for Croatia.

In this last turn of events, Vienna saw a possible road to peace and salvation. Somebody pointed out to the court that the office of the ban of Croatia might be a most important one, and that if it were in the right hands, Hungary might be kept in check by Croatia. The hint was at once accepted by the court, as Austrian diplomacy always prided itself on its skill in playing off one party against another.

To be able to rely absolutely upon Croatia, Vienna looked for a ban loyal to the Austrian crown and acceptable to the national party in Croatia, yet at the same time capable and trustworthy. The man who satisfied all these requirements was baron Joseph Jelačić, a soldier of high distinction in the Austrian army and colonel of the 1st frontier regiment.

Then came the fateful year of 1848. The French February revolution filled all the nationalities in Austria with new hopes and enthusiasm. Metternich and his system were swept aside and the "constitution" which was considered a panacea for all the evils and miseries under which the Austrian nationalities labored dawned upon them at last. The Serbs also firmly believed that a new and a happier era was setting in and they

at once attempted to come to a friendly understanding with the Magyars.

The Serbs, in acknowledging the unity and integrity of Hungary, demanded only the equality of civil and political rights with safeguards for their national individuality. But Kossuth, who since April, 1848, had already been a member of the Hungarian government, bluntly refused to consider their demands and said that the sword would decide their differences. Deeply offended by the haughty and overbearing behavior of the Magyars, the Serbs turned again to their old idea of a separate territory with national autonomy. Founding their claims on the legal enactments of king Matthew and king Vladislav, as well as upon the privileges of 1690 and 1691, they at their national assembly in 1848, at Karlovei, formulated the demand for a Serbian duchy which should include the Banat of Temesvar, Bačka, Baranya and Syrmia. Only now the Serbs worked in close agreement with the Croats and proposed that the Serbian vojvoda should be elected by the deputies of the Croatian diet at Zagreb, whose president should be the ban of Croatia and whose vice-president the Serbian vojvoda. In June, 1848, the Croatian diet approved and accepted all these demands of the Serbian national assembly, "as their own, and therefore they will support them before the crown and everywhere else and heartily work for their realization."

This unity of the Serbo-Croats was manifested outwardly on many important occasions. At the

installation of the new ban of Croatia, even the Serbo-Croats of Turkey sent an envoy asking for an invitation to the ceremony, which had not taken place for several centuries. Deputations arrived from Carniola, Styria and Carinthia—exemplifying the solidarity of the Slovenes—and also from other Southern Slav countries. To show the complete harmony which now existed between the orthodox Serbs and the catholic Croats it was decided that the Serbian patriarch, Joseph Rajačić, should install the ban and administer the oath. The ceremony of the installation took place in the Roman catholic cathedral at Zagreb, but the mass was read in old Slav tongue instead of in Latin, and afterwards all the dignitaries, with the ban and the patriarch, proceeded to the orthodox church, where a *Te Deum* was sung in token of national unity and rejoicing.¹

In the meantime war broke out in Italy, and Great Britain was ready with a scheme for a proposed reconciliation. The terms were not at all to Vienna's liking, but in the end Austria prepared to yield and marshal Radetzky received orders to open peace negotiations. He refused to comply, and threatened to resign, as he did not despair of victory, if only Vienna would give him time to win. But he privately exposed to prince Schwarzenberg the weak points of the military situation. He placed his chief reliance on the Serbo-Croatian troops, as all his best soldiers

¹ M. Hartley, *The Man who Saved Austria*, Mills & Boon, Ltd., London.

were drawn from the military frontier. But these troops were becoming nervous and restless on account of the tidings from home, as every hour might bring the news of the outbreak of hostilities between the Magyars and the Southern Slavs. It was necessary to reassure them as quickly as possible, as at any moment they might desert from the Italian battlefields and hasten back to South Hungary, for the protection of their homes and their country against a possible Magyar attack. Vienna, therefore, decided to exploit the loyalty and authority of the new ban of Croatia. Baron Jelačić was invited to Innsbruck, where the Austrian court was residing at the time. He was received with almost royal honors. But all his endeavors to secure some advantages for his people and country were in vain, although he pleaded before the court with all the passion of a soldier, and the conviction of an honest experienced man, true to his king and his people. Vienna pursued its own plan and never went further than empty marks of personal honor for Jelačić and evasive promises that the long standing grievances of the Serbo-Croats should be redressed. But Jelačić was asked a service, he being the only man who could reassure the Serbo-Croat troops in Italy and inspire them with unswerving fidelity to the Austrian crown. Straightforward and unsuspecting as a soldier, ban Jelačić without hesitation left his proclamation to the Serbo-Croat troops in Italy—which served the purpose and interest of the crown perfectly—in

the hands of the court officials at Innsbruck, on June 20th, 1848.

But as he rode back from Innsbruck to Zagreb, and while stopping at a wayside inn in Lientz, ban Jelačić was not a little amazed at finding at the inn, whilst changing the horses, that the official Vienna Gazette of the *19th of June* contained an imperial rescript in which the king gave orders from his town of Innsbruck and *dated on the 10th of June* that Croatia and Slavonia should return to their allegiance, repent of their illegal acts, acknowledge baron Habrovski, sent from Budapest as royal commissioner, and disavow Jelačić, who, for disobedience to the king's orders, was deprived of all his honors as ban and general.¹ Only the court and cabinet of Vienna were capable of such an act of mean treachery and vile bureaucratic plotting. The Vienna court deemed this insult to the Southern Slavs and their ban necessary to reconcile the Magyars; but nothing availed.

Events refused to be governed by the petty intrigues of Austrian courtiers. The Magyars revolted against Vienna and fell with special fury upon the prosperous Serbian villages in the Banat of Temesvar and Bačka. The ruins of thousands of their houses and the blood of their sons were a new price of their loyalty and fidelity to the Hapsburg throne.

In their struggle against the Magyar oligarchy

¹ M. Hartley, *The Man who Saved Austria*, Mills & Boon, Ltd., London.

the Serbs of south Hungary fought not only in brotherly union with the Croats, but a strong contingent of volunteers from Serbia under general Knićanin crossed the Danube and helped Austria to subdue the revolution. This aid from Serbia was prompted by the simple, unsophisticated feeling of a national unity so strong that, in spite of political estrangement, Serbia took part in the fight on the side of Austria, in order to save Serbian communities from ruin and devastation, though it was to her interest that Austria should be defeated and humiliated. But this is also a fresh and obvious proof that everywhere the Serbians hoped to find in Austria just protection and fair chance for national progress and development. Far from hatching aggressive designs they willingly shed their blood for her preservation and integrity and were in return repaid by sheer ingratitude and persecution.

The Magyar revolution was quenched in blood and the old Serbian privileges were confirmed once more, only to be again suspended when Vienna was not in urgent need of Serbian courage and loyalty. The Serbian metropolitan was raised to the old rank of patriarch and the election of colonel Stephen Šuplikac as Serbian vojvoda was confirmed. The Serbian Vojvodina was created out of the Banat of Temesvar, Bačka and Syrmia, but its administration was placed in the hands of Germans, and German was its official language. Vojvoda Šuplikac died in the same year and a new one was never nominated. The em-

peror of Austria assumed the title of the Serbian vojvoda, and of course the empty title could not satisfy the Serbians, who felt that they had been once more deceived by Vienna, and the demand for national autonomy was stifled by a new period of blind absolutism and exclusive German centralization.

When, in 1859, Austria lost Lombardy by the Italian war the path of absolutism and centralization was abandoned and the Austrian nationalities were promised more freedom. Always considering the Magyars more dangerous than the Serbs, the Austrian government in compliance with Magyar wishes cut short the life of the Serbian Vojvodina and its territory was partly incorporated with Croatia and partly with Hungary. As soon as this was accomplished the prime minister Schmerling sent an invitation to the patriarch Rajačić to come to Vienna with twenty deputies, to propose there the measures and guarantees for the preservation of the Serbian old privileges and legal exemptions, especially in regard of the Serbian language and nationality.

Conscious of the bitter irony of such a procedure the Serbian patriarch did not accept this invitation, but lodged an energetic and dignified protest against the abolition of the Serbian Vojvodina, and in an assembly of the national representatives formulated fresh demands for national autonomy in a narrower territory with an overwhelming Serbian population. But Vienna paid no attention to it.

Croatia likewise was passing under the same régime of German centralization and absolutism. Ban Jelačić exhausted himself in vain struggles against the introduction of the German speech in Croatia and the italianization of Fiume (Rieka). He died sadly disappointed; as his biographer, Mr. Hartley, says:

“It is painful to dwell on this picture of a strong man exhausting himself physically and mentally in a hopeless struggle against a bureaucracy. It seemed, as Anastasius Grün wrote, ‘that the result of the revolution with all its tragedy and heroism had been to fill the supper-pots of the officials, and that Herr Bach and Co. might have portfolios and gold-laced uniforms.’

“For Croatia the great effort had been made in vain. She loved and honored her ban so long as he lived, but she had to realize that neither his desire nor her services would reach fulfillment and reward.”¹

During the few years which elapsed between the war with France (1859) and the war with Prussia (1866) Austria’s policy was characterized by hesitation and temporization. The old path of centralization, germanization and absolutism, was abandoned, but no new and decisive policy was adopted. The Magyars continued in their passive resistance, all the time intriguing and plotting with Berlin, and the Slavs, utterly disappointed in their hope, having “received as a

¹ M. Hartley, *The Man who Saved Austria*, Mills & Boon, Ltd., London.

reward that which the Magyars received as a punishment," began to look to another quarter for freedom and self-government. Those years were characterized by a bright renaissance of national art and literature among the Southern Slavs, who now expressed strongly their identical ideals and aspirations in one and the same beautiful idiom. The best and most prominent men in Croatia, such as bishop Strossmayer and the historian Rački, cultivated cordial relations with the princes of Serbia and Montenegro and did everything in their power for the further promotion of a brotherly union of both branches of the Southern Slavs, the Roman catholics and the Greek orthodox.

In 1866, having lost Venetia and been ejected from Germany, Austria decided upon a new policy. The emperor Francis Joseph I, though beaten and humiliated by Germany, always felt and acted as a German. "Doch, ich bin ein Deutscher Fürst" ("Yes, I am still a German prince") he said to Napoleon III. After Sadowa it was impossible to govern with the Germans alone, but he never for a moment thought of depriving them of their position as the ruling people in Austria, and of recognizing the equal rights of the other nationalities. It was found that the best scheme which would suit both German and court interests was to reconcile the Magyars by making of them another ruling nation in Austria and giving over to their rule all the other nationalities in Hungary. Thus, in 1867, Austria-

Hungary appeared in the new form of the present dualism, in which the Germans and the Magyars combine in subjugating and exploiting all the other races. It is that policy which has brought about the conditions which are at the root of the present world-struggle and the direct causes of the war in so far as Austria-Hungary was a partner to it.

In summing up this short historical survey of Southern Slav relations with Austria-Hungary we may say that whatever were the failings, shortcomings and deficiencies of the Southern Slav heroes who fought the Turks at Kossovo, and of all their succeeding generations down to the present one, they have atoned for them by their valiant fight through centuries for the christian faith and national liberty. That ideal so strongly possessed the Serbian soul that they thought no sacrifice too great in its service. If they abandoned their fertile fields and old homes and exiled themselves in great numbers to the north it was always in the steadfast pursuit of the same old ideal preached by the church, sung by the bards and handed down from generation to generation. They fought and hoped to see that ideal realized in a loyal union with Austria and Hungary, but all their hopes were blighted by the greedy exploitation of a German dynasty and the brutal oppression of overbearing, haughty German and Magyar masters, having at their disposal all the resources of the state and all the services of a most pliant and wily bureaucracy.

But such was the source of that ideal and such the intensity of their national feeling that nothing could quench their yearning for freedom and due recognition. They were defeated many times but never subdued. The empire was lost; but thanks to the inner fire of their soul's ideal a nation was made, hardened by fighting and stronger after every temporary defeat. At first there was some danger that the national idea of the Southern Slavs would be narrowed and obscured by religious differences. But even in the most painful moments of religious dissension between the Greek orthodox and Roman catholic branches of the same people, powerful voices did not lack among them who exposed all the absurdity of a nation basing political issues on considerations of dogma and religion. The wonderful nineteenth century, by broadening men's views and by opening up new horizons brought about a radical change in that respect and finally reduced these religious differences to their proper proportion. In spite of the repeated intrigues of Vienna and Budapest to revive old dissensions and to raise new suspicions or to create new rifts in a homogeneous national body, the feeling of national unity and community of interests became more intense and fruitful from day to day among the Southern Slavs. All the wiles of the Vienna bureaucracy, all the brutality of the haughty Magyar nobility, all the disappointment of finding peace and freedom in Austria-Hungary as a just reward for so many noble sacrifices, only

strengthened that feeling of national unity, deepened the conviction of the Southern Slavs that their ideal can only be realized in unity and complete independence from both Germans and Magyars.¹

¹ A quotation from Dr. Friedrich Adler's speech in his own defense for the killing of count Stürgkh, the Austrian premier in October, 1916, is a fresh testimony how Austria-Hungary has driven to despair every one who loves freedom and possesses a feeling of human dignity. Dr. Adler said: "We are in a state which during the Counter Reformation was made Catholic again by fire and sword. We are in a state in which the convictions of man are despised, a state where it has never been recognised that the individual should act according to his conviction. It is a state of Metternich's spirit,—the state which has crushed freedom of speech in order to engender slavish sentiments among the population. It is this fall from conviction, this lack of principle, which has inspired me with deepest hatred, not towards Austria as a state organism, but towards Austria as an immoral formation, towards the Austrian spirit of falsehood. This Austrian spirit exists in every part and in every race-unit of the state: all have been degraded by it and in all it is bred by violation of the law."

V

THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAUSES OF THE WAR

MANY brilliant authors have written on the causes of the present war, and nearly a whole literature already exists examining the causes and secret reasons for this most terrible and bloody crisis ever known in human history. But however illuminating, rich in thoughts, and convincing in arguments, all those writings are incomplete in a way. Nearly all of them have lost sight of Austria-Hungary. The mighty and terrible figure of Germany has completely obliterated her weaker partner, so much so that Austria-Hungary is not considered as an independent being with its own interests and ambitions, its own will and power to act for good or evil, but is referred to as the slave and victim of German will and ambition. Such a view is both incomplete and erroneous. It is perfectly true that Germany desired and prepared in secret for the present war, but it is also true that she would never have entered upon that struggle had she not beforehand been sure of the whole-hearted support of Austria-Hungary. It was a great and very important part of German statecraft to attract Austria-Hungary and to bring the interests and ambitions of her ruling caste into complete

harmony with those of Germany. And it is equally true that the governing quarters in Austria-Hungary would never have embarked upon such a perilous enterprise, had they not been backed by the tremendous military organization of Germany and protected by her shining armor.

Germany, who prepared everything in a methodical and punctual way, left nothing to chance. During the Algeçiras crisis Europe was on the verge of war, and peace was only preserved thanks to the unpreparedness of Austria-Hungary and her reluctance to accept the Moroccan question as an issue for a European conflagration. Germany on that account swallowed the humiliation, but she resolved in deadly earnest to lie in ambush and to use the first Austrian incident to precipitate a crisis surpassing everything in the magnitude and weight of the interests involved. Of course she was sure that she would not have to wait long, and used the few succeeding years in supervising her own preparations and adding some last devices to her vast arsenal of deadly weapons. This is why the assassination of the archduke Ferdinand was used as the pretext for the war. And here we propose to dwell upon the part Austria-Hungary consciously and unconsciously played in that terrible plot against European liberties and world civilization.

Smarting under the heavy and humiliating blow received from the hand of Prussia in 1866, the first thought of the Habsburg dynasty was re-

venge against Prussia and the regaining of its lost status in Germany. With this object in view the reconciliation of the Magyars was effected and the long-desired constitution was granted to the nations in the Austrian part of the Dual monarchy. By the Dual Settlement, the unity of the empire was undermined by over-generosity towards the Magyars in a fit of feverish impatience on the part of the emperor and his premier Beust who embodied the policy of revenge. "Francis Joseph may indeed have accepted the Hungarian terms with a mental reservation that, when Prussia should have been overthrown, the inner constitution of the monarchy would once more be subject to revision. But Bismarck, whose military triumph over Austria enabled the Magyars to make so good a bargain, came once more to their aid. The alliance which Beust endeavored to form in 1869 with France and Italy against Prussia, was thwarted by the attitude of Russia, whose good will Bismarck had assiduously cultivated; and before other schemes could be laid, the German victories over France in 1870-71 saved the Dual Settlement by relegating the Austrian policy of revenge for Sadowa to the limbo of hopes unfulfilled."¹

Though the policy of revenge against Prussia was relegated, the wound in the heart of the Hapsburg dynasty was not healed. But Bismarck held a remedy in readiness. Allied with the Magyar oligarchy and German bureaucracy

¹ H. W. Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, pp. 16, 17.

in Austria-Hungary, he was able to remove the center of the Austro-Hungarian policy from Vienna to Budapest, and to suggest to the Austrian court and dynasty that compensation for the loss of Italy and the ejection from Germany lay in the Austro-Hungarian expansion in the Balkans. It may be said of Austria that she was in earlier times interested in the Balkans, just as a certain French prince who became king of Poland was interested in his new realm. He stayed in Warsaw so long as there was no vacancy in France, but as soon as the French throne became vacant he abandoned Poland, hurrying to Paris to secure the French crown for himself. Likewise so long as Austria's interests and position in central Europe were not jeopardized, she pursued her policy of conquest in the Balkans. But as soon as her position in Germany or her possessions in Italy were endangered she forsook the Balkans, hurrying to the defense of her central European interests and position. But now, whole-heartedly backed by Germany and able to rely absolutely upon the Magyars, the Hapsburg dynasty, finding the central European door completely closed, fixed its eyes on the Balkans, seeking there in new conquests the healing of its heart-wound and the satisfaction of its insatiable thirst for new titles and provinces.

As this new policy of the onrush to the East (Drang nach Osten) of Austria-Hungary, actively initiated after the German victories of 1870-71, was pursued only in the interests of the Hapsburg

dynasty and German nation, it was necessary to concentrate the whole power in their hands. Since the position of the Magyars, the master-nation in Hungary, did not rest upon their numerical or intellectual superiority, but upon the goodwill of the crown and upon the alliance with Germany, they were only too willing partners to such a policy. To the haughty and overbearing Magyar oligarchy which ruled in Hungary the thought never occurred that the prosperity and liberty of the Magyars could be better promoted by a just and fair understanding with other nationalities which also inhabited Hungary.

To the position of the *primus inter pares* they preferred the perilous height of isolated masters. But in order to maintain that position and to pursue their policy of brutal dominion and forcible magyarization towards all other nationalities in Hungary, they sold themselves body and soul to the Hapsburg dynasty and their allies in Berlin, becoming the most subservient pillar of the grandiose scheme of a German Central Europe from Ostend to Constantinople and far to Bagdad.

In order to realize that plan, it was in the first place necessary to completely subjugate and break up the resistance of the Southern Slavs, who were the first chosen victims to be immolated on the altar of German world grandeur and dominion. To that end the old motto of Austria, *divide et impera*, was used with unexampled thoroughness during the last fifty years of her rela-

tions with the Southern Slavs. All the old methods of subjugation were perfected, and new means for the division and breaking up of their resistance were invented and diabolically applied.

In the first instance the Southern Slavs were nearly equally divided between Austria and Hungary; but this main division had many subdivisions.

Thus the Serbs in south Hungary, in Banat of Temesvar, Bačka and Baranya, were unceremoniously handed over to the tender mercy of the Magyars, their previously granted privileges were abolished; their church and all educational and other national institutions put under the direct and absolute control of Budapest. The Serbo-Croats in Croatia, Slavonia and Syrmia were granted a sort of autonomy under the control of Budapest. The lands of the Southern Slavs in Austria were divided into so many crown lands and provinces with local autonomy of the true Austrian type depending on Vienna. In Carinthia and Styria they were outnumbered and overruled by the Germans; in Trieste, Goritzia and Istria by the Italians, and in Dalmatia and Carniola, where they possessed overwhelming national majorities, the Austrian bureaucracy used all the means in their power to revive old religious dissensions, maliciously estranging the Roman Catholics from the Greek orthodox, and by intimidation or corruption she contrived to keep the Southern Slavs from presenting a united front to her as long as possible.

Finally Bosnia and Hercegovina were administered by a joint ministry of finances depending both on Vienna and Budapest. Even that was not enough. The Serbian church, although deprived of its autonomy for any practical purposes, was split into three different and quite independent administrations. The Serbs of Hungary in religious matters were dependent on the patriarchate at Karlovci; those in Bosnia and Hercegovina had their own church organization whose head was the metropolitan at Sarajevo, while the head of the Serbian church in Dalmatia had its seat at Czernovitz, in Bukovina, a thousand miles away at the other end of the empire.

In order to enhance the above-mentioned idea of division and to be better able to deceive Europe, a separate Bosnian nation was created and a Bosnian language was invented. In its blindness of official zeal the Austrian bureaucracy surpassed even itself. When the late M. de Kállay as joint minister of finances stood at the head of the Bosnian administration, he put his own book, *The History of the Serbs*, on the index and prohibited its introduction into Bosnia-Hercegovina, because previous to the occupation he could not but say the truth that Bosnia and Hercegovina were purely Serbian provinces inhabited solely by Serbian people of the purest stock. But now it was dangerous that the Bosnian youths educated in the schools under Austrian administration should know the truth about their origin or the first elements of the his-

tory of their own nation. Of course Serbia proper was not lost sight of. Exploiting the vanity of an unbalanced prince, Vienna encouraged the anti-national and anti-democratic policy pursued by the unhappy king Milan and his son Alexander in return for the barren promise of ensuring the maintenance of their dynasty upon the Serbian throne. During their reign the Austro-Hungarian minister at Belgrade was not only a *persona grata* but wielded a power justifiable only if Serbia had been really a protectorate of Austria-Hungary, whilst the energy and resources of the country were exhausted in a fruitless struggle between the people and the dynasty. Thus the Vienna cabinet had sanguine hopes that one fine day Serbia like a ripe fruit would fall of her own accord into Austria's lap.

Thanks to German "organization" the Southern Slavs were methodically deprived of their natural leaders, and every little resistance was used as a pretext for condemning their nobles on a charge of high treason and for confiscating their goods for the profit of Germans or Magyar aristocrats. So it came about that the greatest land proprietors among the Serb population in Croatia and in south Hungary are alien families who rarely visit the country in which their immense properties are situated. The chief among them are the reigning prince of Schaumburg-Lippe, the Magyar count Báltthyany and the Roman prince Odescalchi. Thus the entire Southern Slav aristocracy has been ruined or the nobles

turned into renegades by intimidation and corruption. Even that did not stop the German spirit of "organization." The Turkish system of making janissaries of the christian children, so much deplored as being brutal and inhuman, has been until now used by Austria against the Southern Slavs. Not only did the Southern Slavs provide the greatest percentage of soldiers for all Austria's battles, but the children of the most prominent families were taken away and brought up in the military schools, where their education consisted mainly in instilling them with German ideals and fidelity to the Hapsburg dynasty.

With true German thoroughness public opinion was also organized in favor of German plans and objects. Germany had the monopoly of information concerning the Southern Slavs, and the world could see them only through German spectacles. Every protest against oppression was represented as a revolt of barbarians against the bliss of a higher civilization. Every attempt to obtain justice and due recognition was described as a maneuver of the agents of Pan-slavism, and the world was invited to assist German culture against Slav barbarism. This organization bore magnificent fruits. At the Berlin Congress in 1878 the "honest broker," as Bismarck styled himself, was able with the approval of Europe to make a present to Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and of Hercegovina, two purely Serbian provinces.

By that achievement Bismarck obtained a

really great victory. In soothing the pain of the Habsburg dynasty and healing the wound bleeding ever since Sadowa, he attached Austria-Hungary definitely to his cause, and the Austro-German alliance formed in the same year (1879) was but a conspicuous proof of his mastery. The Austro-Hungarian joint foreign minister, count Andrassy, could come in triumph from Berlin to Vienna, and in announcing the news to the emperor, could say solemnly, "Majesty, the door of the Balkans is now open to you!" But as an Italian author remarks: "From this very day, outside and inside the empire, was ushered in a policy anti-Slav and consequently anti-Balkanic. In occupying Bosnia-Hercegovina, Austria's first object was to prevent Serbia and Montenegro from raising there their flag and from uniting to form another important Slav state in the south. With that same object in view Vienna has always hatched intrigues to divide Belgrade and Cetinje, and has tried as long as possible to keep in her occupation the sandjak of Novi-Bazar. But with a persistent policy of denationalization and persecution she has ended by creating dissatisfaction, the spirit of rebellion, the South Slav Irredenta. We now know what has been done in Bosnia where the authority of the bayonet still reigns supreme; and the last transformations in the government have brought the whole civil administration under the control of the chief military commandant, general Potiorek."¹

¹ Virginio Gayda, *L'Austria di Francesco Giuseppe*. Milano. Roma. 1915.

If the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina was a solace to the Hapsburg crown after the loss of Venetia and Lombardy, the joy over the decision arrived at at the Congress of Berlin was not without its bitterness. Count Andrassy was never pardoned by the crown for having achieved only a half success, since it was merely an occupation with a European mandate of administration and not simple and outright annexation. Therefore the annexation of those provinces was prepared for secretly and carefully. But it provoked in 1908-9 a dangerous crisis. It was a prelude to the later invasion of Belgium and a key to the political psychology of the Central Empires. United in a common purpose, relying on their armed forces, Austria-Hungary and Germany showed to the world that solemn international treaties are to them mere scraps of paper, remorselessly thrown away whenever it suited their interests or ambitions. The readiness of Austria-Hungary and Germany to bring about a general European conflagration was demonstrated beyond any doubt. Fortunately the crisis subsided without an armed conflict.

Austria-Hungary achieved a brilliant diplomatic victory, quite to the taste of Berlin and Vienna, greatly enhancing her prestige; but even that victory was not everywhere received as a complete success, and the rejoicing over it was not without the shadow of a cloud. There remained Serbia, and whoever spent some weeks in Vienna during those memorable days full of ex-

citement and grave forebodings and had a key to the understanding of the psychology and resolutions of the high military and governing circles, would have felt and seen how deeply they regretted that the crisis subsided without giving them the long-sought opportunity to crush Serbia and to finish once and for all with that tiny state boldly obstructing their way. The annexation crisis was a kind of general mustering of forces, which proved to Vienna that Europe was not quite so ignorant concerning the importance of the position occupied by Serbia, and that the latter was not without European sympathy. But the crisis proved also that Serbia, at the risk of her own existence, was ready to fight for the independence and freedom of her race enslaved in Austria-Hungary, and that moreover in that fight she could fairly rely on the sympathies and possible assistance of all the Southern Slavs, in spite of their division into separate provinces. Their moral union and resoluteness no longer to allow themselves to be treated by Vienna and Budapest like slaves and third-class citizens, was an obvious fact, which could not but fill their masters with grave apprehensions and sinister forebodings. Looking through the spectacles of mediæval prejudices, the court circles in Austria-Hungary could never clearly realize whence arose that sentiment of freedom and human dignity in their Southern Slav people which inspired them with a spirit of restlessness and dissatisfaction. Of course Serbia appeared to them the unique source.

She must be crushed before that spirit could breed open insurrection. Hence the irrevocable resolution of Vienna to use the first opportunity to extirpate that spirit of incipient revolt among the Southern Slav subjects of the Dual monarchy, and to annihilate Serbia as an eternal source of anxiety to Vienna and the greatest obstacle to her triumphant march to the East.

The annexation crisis therefore marks a new and most acute phase of the Austro-Serbian relation, which led directly to the present war. Serbia was doomed, and only a propitious moment was awaited for the final performance. Meanwhile the Southern Slavs within the empire were subjected to special treatment at the hands of the Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy.

The whole Southern Slav population was now suspect in the eyes of the Viennese high circles, and a pliant bureaucracy set up against it its vast arsenal of oppressive measures. A whole nation was struck at through its leaders, and every prominent man became subject to strict vigilance or persecution. The system of "frightfulness" was applied by German agents and officials before the present war. In the midst of the annexation crisis, on the eve of war with Serbia, high state officials and accredited diplomats were not ashamed to hatch wily plots against the life and honor of their own citizens, hiring false witnesses and forging documents which should bring about their condemnation. Amongst various proceedings inaugurated against many prominent Serbs

in the monarchy, one that became world-famous was the monstrous trial of fifty-three Serbs, of all social conditions, who were accused of high treason in 1909 and brought up for trial at Zagreb, and with which were connected the proceedings of professor Fridjung at Vienna. The chief documents were forged at the Austrian legation in Serbia under the control of count Forgach, Austrian minister. The people and authorities of this country have now some experience of Austria's diplomatic methods and can easily imagine what the Austrians are able to do when they have nothing to fear and so much to win. Fortunately for the accused persons, after long months of imprisonment and weary trials the clumsy forgeries were so discredited that the trial threatened to become a world scandal, thanks to the presence of the representatives of many leading papers in Europe, and consequently the proceedings were abolished. Not one of the many compromised officials was ever reminded of his responsibility, and some were ostentatiously promoted to rank and honors. But this new persecution inaugurated mainly against the Serbs was intended not only to frighten the orthodox Serbs but also to create new dissensions between them and the Roman catholics, to whom were made overtures and flattering compliments on their loyalty to the crown and the state. But the intrigue failed miserably, as the Serbs were not frightened and the Roman catholics withstood all temptations, completely solidarizing themselves with the

Serbs, defending the latter during the trial, and openly denouncing the abominable methods of Vienna and Budapest, which though used in our days, were better suited to the time of the Spanish inquisition. The short-sighted Austrian bureaucracy achieved only negative results: the national unity of the Serbo-Croats was strengthened, their feeling of solidarity enhanced, their disgust at Austria-Hungary's governing methods increased, and the public opinion throughout the world at last awoke and began to be interested in the events of that corner, where the darkness of mediæval ages until then reigned supreme.

There was always a vacillation and fluctuation in the Habsburg's policy. The end remained always the same but the means of attaining it changed, engendering an ebb and flow of different systems under which the peoples in Austria-Hungary were constrained to live. The Dual Settlement was not intended to last for ever, and it outlived the term reasonably assigned to it. After fifty years of wear and tear it became shabby and obsolete. In some very important quarters in Vienna, whose leader was supposed to be the late archduke Francis Ferdinand, it was thought that the Dual Settlement had yielded its maximum of good, and the time had come for it to make room for another system. To archduke Ferdinand was attributed the idea of "the Trialism," as a new experiment in the life of the monarchy, which was to begin on his ascending the throne.

The idea of the Trialism consisted in this: the Dual Settlement was to be replaced by a new arrangement of the Hapsburg monarchy by which Galicia was to be united on a basis of equality with Hungary proper. The kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia was to be taken away from Hungary and to be united with Bosnia, Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Istria and Carniola in a new Southern Slav kingdom as a third main part of the empire. It may be, this scheme was the outcome of the mature thoughts of the late archduke Ferdinand, who deemed it necessary to give some satisfaction to the national feelings of the Southern Slavs, and by a piece of creative policy to extirpate the spirit of brooding revolt among them, to win their loyalty, and perhaps by peaceful methods to draw Serbia into the orbit of the monarchy. Or it may be, was conceived in a fit of anger with the Magyars, as a means to curb their arrogance. Or was it merely the result of his impatience and unwillingness to rule by a system half a century old put into force and maintained by his imperial uncle? To these questions it is now difficult to give an answer.

In every country with more or less pronounced despotic rule the accession of a new monarch is always preceded by a halo of hopes and expectations or a cloud of fears and anxieties. Every Hapsburg firmly believes in a special "mission" of his own. Whatever may be its foundation the idea of Trialism was a fact of Austro-Hungarian political psychology, provoking hopes and fears,

calling into play court intrigues and counterplots. Two facts were firmly established. The late archduke Ferdinand was not liked by his royal cousins and never felt any pleasure in their company. He avoided as much as possible the surroundings of the court, where he did not feel at home, and dwelt with much affection in the narrow circle of his morganatic family, for which the love of a husband and father was a compensation for the malicious pricks and constant slights of the Hapsburg house and their courtiers.

How much he disliked them is best proved by his last will and the dispositions concerning his funeral rites. He forbade their presence, and chose a resting-place far from their eyes and from their gossip. The second fact was his dislike of the Magyars, and he never spared actions or words to show how much he scorned Budapest and her governing circles.

Meanwhile the last Balkan war against Turkey broke out. The cabinet of Vienna became restless and pledged itself to neutrality during the struggle, with secret hopes that the Balkan states would be beaten and Serbia would come out exhausted and with a loss of prestige and attraction for her kinsmen in Austria-Hungary. Faithful to her preconceived idea, Vienna decided not to allow any increase of strength or independence to Serbia. And already in September, 1912, prince Schwarzenberg declared in the Austro-Hungarian delegations "a territorial increase of Serbia represents an immediate danger

to Austria-Hungary, and the monarchy must hinder it."

Her hopes in Turkey proved to be money put on the wrong horse, and everybody knows how Vienna during the Ambassadorial Conference in London remained constantly in a quarreling mood, using every means to deprive Serbia of prestige and territorial gains. She succeeded in debarring her from access to the sea, and prepared the situation for the Serbo-Bulgarian war. She not only encouraged Bulgaria to attack Serbia, but virtually pledged herself to Bulgaria that she should be rewarded, whatever might be the outcome of the struggle. In that again she was disappointed. From the second war Serbia came out aggrandized, and with such prestige in the eyes of the world, and especially among the Southern Slavs, that Vienna decided to act immediately lest it be too late. Exhausted in two strenuous wars, Serbia was to be attacked before she could recuperate, and it was firmly believed in Vienna and Budapest that Serbia would fall an easy prey to their onslaught. But immediate action was also necessary in order to redeem the pledge to Bulgaria, as the means of maintaining the agreement arrived at with her. As soon as the Treaty of Bukarest in 1913 was signed, the Vienna cabinet asked Italy to be a party to her attack upon Serbia; this we now know, thanks to the revelation made in October, 1914, by signor Giolitti, then the Italian prime minister. But

Italy refused, and the attack upon Serbia was delayed until the next good opportunity.

During all that time Serbia felt the pressure of Vienna and the threatening cloud did not disappear from her horizon. In June next year, 1914, a meeting took place at Konopisht between the Kaiser William II and the archduke Francis Ferdinand. At this fatal meeting a compact was entered into under which the map of central Europe was to be transformed and the peace of the world was doomed.

Three weeks later the archduke Ferdinand went to Sarajevo and the tragedy of his assassination took place. Although it was used as a pretext to begin hostilities, the whole truth about it is not yet divulged. The trial of Princip and Čabrinović was conducted in camera, and from previous experience of the Austrian law courts, which never did shrink from hiring false witnesses or forging documents to suit the political requirements of Vienna and Budapest, it would be a bold assumption to believe their statements about it. One thing is beyond doubt, Serbia had nothing to win and very much to lose by his assassination, and consequently the Serbian government was sincere in its condemnation of the crime and would have done everything in its power to prevent it. Budapest, on the contrary, feared much the accession of the archduke Francis Ferdinand, and was, to say nothing more, very careless about the measures protecting his life. Budapest and the Viennese court circles believed firmly in the

triumph of the Central Empires; they eagerly wished for the crushing of Serbia, but feared beyond everything the return of the late archduke Ferdinand from the battlefield crowned with the wreath of victory.

For all those who conspired against the world peace and liberties the tragedy of Sarajevo was the finest opportunity for letting loose their evil designs. In vain Serbia in her answer to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum submitted in nearly every point and went further than any independent state had ever gone before, in her wish to spare herself and the world from the awful ordeal of our days. In vain sir Edward Grey exerted himself in proposing means for a peaceful settlement; nothing was of avail. At the last moment when Vienna, appalled by the inevitable consequences, showed some signs of hesitation and wavering, Berlin and Budapest joined hands and forced upon the world the day for which they had yearned so long and so ardently.

Serbia was not the cause of the war, but she was *a* cause of the war, for Serbia and Austria-Hungary are two beings not only different but naturally antagonistic and representing two conflicting principles: that of democracy and nationality, and that of rule by divine right, so that war between them was only a question of time. The existence of Serbia meant for Austria the negation of her position as a great power and a stumbling block in the way of her expansion.

Serbia, however small and weak, had a great

mission to fulfill, i. e., to liberate and unite in a free community her nation enslaved in Austria-Hungary. That mission was the *raison d'être* of Serbia. She had either to fulfill it or to perish, and since the fulfillment of her task could only be achieved at the expense of Austria-Hungary, no wonder that there was no love lost between them. They were two beings mutually excluding each other. But it is necessary to keep in mind that Austria-Hungary played here the active and Serbia the passive part, as Serbia's mission to liberate her nation had devolved on her only after centuries-long experience, and repeated failures had proved to the Southern Slavs the impossibility of finding in Austria-Hungary freedom and just protection for national development.

VI

SERBIA IN THE WORLD WAR

I.—First and Second Austrian Invasions

ALREADY twice within the last three years Austria-Hungary had been on the verge of war with Serbia; and her political circles in Vienna and Budapest were regretting that they had not carried out their warlike plans, as they could not be sure of a new opportunity which would give them the same chances of success as the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina or the Albanian crisis. The Serbian government was well aware that Austria-Hungary was resolved and prepared to attack Serbia, and that she was only awaiting the first fresh opportunity as a pretext to open hostilities. Consequently the Serbian policy in regard to Austria-Hungary was most cautious and conciliatory, avoiding even a shadow of provocation or discourtesy. The murder of the archduke Ferdinand was received, therefore, with grave foreboding and deep regrets. But the general public remained to the last moment confident and unconscious of the gravity of the situation. The order for the mobilization of the Serbian army, issued on July 25th, came

as a great surprise, and was received everywhere with stupefaction and mute resignation, and even by some as a harmful and mischievous joke.

Austria's military action was in complete harmony with her diplomatic action. It is a new proof, if any is necessary, that the present war was "made in Germany," a genuine piece of Prussian statecraft. Austria-Hungary did not perceive the grim determination of Germany to impose war upon her ally, appearing at the same time in the guise of a faithful friend ready to fight in an Austrian quarrel. Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, as we now know positively from the published documents, hesitated at the last moment, reluctant to take the decisive step and willing to accept the proposal of sir Edward Grey. But Germany stepped in and rushed her into war, regardless of consequences.

Austria-Hungary declared war, but hesitated to open hostilities. She was unprepared or unable to imitate the example of Germany in her violent advance into Belgium, and thus she lost some precious moments which perhaps compromised her whole Serbian campaign. Blinded by their overwhelming conceit, the Austro-Hungarian generals could not imagine that Serbia would dare to resist. They planned to occupy Belgrade, to hang a few hundred influential citizens, and thus quench their thirst for revenge by inflicting upon Serbia a moral and material punishment. They expected vaguely that the war might end in this way. It was this that saved Serbia for the moment.

Had Austria-Hungary attempted to imitate the German onrush through Belgium, Serbia's position would have been seriously compromised, for her greatest danger would have been a quick, resolute advance of the Austro-Hungarian troops already massed on her frontiers.

Fortunately, nothing of the kind happened. During the first week, the Austro-Hungarian forces confined themselves to incessant but irresolute and feeble attempts to cross the Save and take Belgrade, but every time they were repulsed with great losses. This gave time and instilled new courage into the whole Serbian army. Within two weeks, the Serbian army was concentrated, full of confidence, ready to fight an army half a million strong.

The Serbian army consisted of troops of the first ban, men from 20 to 30 years of age, the second ban from 31 to 37 years, the third ban from 38 to 45, and, lastly, the troops of the national defense, men from 45 to 55 and from 17 to 20 years of age. The mobilizing being general, Serbia was able to meet Austria at once with an active army 350,000 strong. The number of available men was greater, but Serbia was short of rifles, and many thousands of troops were armed and included in the active army some weeks later after some 120,000 rifles had been sent from Russia.

The newly annexed provinces were represented by some thousands of young recruits who had only had about five months of military service

when war broke out, but who immediately gave proof of their valor and dashing bravery.

Two weeks later, exasperated by the Serbian stubbornness at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian generals quite abandoned the idea of taking Belgrade by costly frontal attacks, and so they concentrated large forces, 250,000 strong, in the north-west corner of Serbia. They crossed simultaneously the rivers Drina and Save, and spread their army over a front sixty miles long. They advanced proudly into Serbia, confident that the occupation of that country was a matter of two weeks. But already some serious and bitter fighting had taken place round Šabac with the troops who were defending that town and the passage of the Save. The Serbians withdrew, and, rallying their forces, met the enemy on the eastern slopes of the Cer mountain. The Austro-Hungarian left wing resting on the river Save and the right wing on the Drina could not be turned, but the Serbs made a fine coup in dashing with unexpected impetuosity against the center. In a very hot battle lasting two days (the 20th and the 21st of August) they beat the Austro-Hungarian center and occupied the ridge of the Cer mountain. A wedge was driven into the Austro-Hungarian forces cutting them into two parts, which were beaten one after another in engagements lasting ten days. This Serbian victory was the first serious defeat of the Teutonic armies, and marked the turning point in checking the tide of German militarism. This victory was won by

general Stepanović, who is known in the Serbian army as "one who never lost a battle."

The advantages of this victory were twofold. The Serbians were able to hold on their frontiers large forces which could have been employed more advantageously elsewhere, and the moral effect of this victory was enormous. This little Serbia, of whom Austro-Hungarians spoke with contempt, won the first general battle on a European front; and her success, thrilling through the hearts of the soldiers of the Allies, contributed to the Russian advance in Galicia, and set a fine example and was a good augury for the brave men who won the battle of the Marne.

But the district of Mačva, which was invaded by the resentful Austro-Hungarian troops, fell a victim to fearful and indescribable atrocities. The Serbians had just fought with Turks, Bulgars and Albanians. They could expect at least as much humanity from Austrians as they had experienced from their Balkan enemies. They firmly and naïvely believed that German "Kultur" had really some meaning, and that an army of a would-be civilized state, whose press daily upbraided the Balkan people for their barbarity and savagery, would not wage war upon defenseless children, women and old broken men. Neither age nor sex were spared, and their wanton destruction of private property could be equaled only by the action of a band of madmen. It is a sad story, and together with the atrocities committed by Teutonic hordes in Belgium, France and Poland,

bears a terrible testimony against the insufficiencies of the present materialistic civilization. A Swiss scientist, R. A. Reiss, D. Sc., in his book *The Austro-Hungarian Atrocities*, has published many of the documents concerning the atrocities committed in Serbia during this first invasion of Austro-Hungarian troops, but we prefer to spare the reader the harrowing details involved. Fortunately for humanity it was not all the Austro-Hungarian troops who behaved so disgustingly, and many of their men and officers were really disgusted and ashamed to belong to such an army. But it is necessary to say, as sir Oliver Lodge has pointed out in his book *The War and After*, that beastliness is the twin sister of cowardice. After the capture of Šabac the Austrian troops and officers proved their worth by killing and outraging girls and women, seeing in every one of them a disguised Serbian comitadji. An Austro-Hungarian official *communiqué* in referring to these atrocities tried to excuse them by the necessity felt by the troops to protect themselves against the "dastardly" attacks from the houses. Is this not the most authentic testimony to the dastardly nature of the Austrian troops and their masters?

In the beginning of September, after the fall of Lvov, notwithstanding the menace of the Russian advance in Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian generals could bear the shame of being defeated by little Serbia no longer, and sought a success at any cost. With that object in view they decided

on a new offensive against Serbia, taking all measures to secure victory.

The Austro-Hungarian army at that time was disposed along the Serbian frontier as follows:

One division and a half along the Danube, between Pančevo and Bela Cerква (White Church), the 9th army corps on the line Mitrovica-Jarak along the Save.

The 8th army corps on the front Bielina, Mitrovica.

The 13th army corps opposite the Serbian front Loznica-Lešnica.

Parts of the 15th and 16th army corps between Zvornik and Srebrenica.

A strong detachment, with the fortress of Višegrad as its base, pushed on in the direction of the sandjak of Novi Bazar, hoping to drive a wedge between the Serbian and Montenegrin armies, and if possible to stir up an insurrection in the mussulman population, among which the Austrian agents had been continuously active.

The offensive was begun simultaneously on the whole western front along the Drina, and at many points the fighting was of a most desperate character. The southern wing penetrated to a considerable distance between Serbia and Montenegro, but failed to achieve any lasting success. Not one mussulman came to the assistance of the invaders. Reinforced by troops from the third ban, the Serbians met the enemy on the Cerni Verh and inflicted such a sanguinary defeat on him that four weeks later thousands of bodies of

the enemy were discovered in the deep ravines or scattered among the trees of the forest.

The whole force of the enemy, from 200,000 strong to 250,000 men, pressed hard on the Serbians along the banks of the Save and Drina. Their main army crossed the Drina between Zvornik and Bielina, but instead of directing their principal blow against Mačva, as in August, they met here with complete failure, and the last remnants of the beaten troops were driven back across the Drina on September 10th.

On the front Lubovia-Loznica the Serbians had but a small force, for they hoped that the mountainous character of the country would help to check the enemy's advance. Anyhow, the Austro-Hungarians found here more favorable conditions for invading Serbia. They concentrated on this point large forces with troops especially trained for mountain fighting. For five days they advanced steadily, although they paid dearly for every success, as the Serbians contested hotly each step.

The enemy's blow was directed against Valevo, the Serbian headquarters and a very important center of communications. They advanced along the crests of the Goučevo, Boranja, Jagodnja, and Sokolica mountains. Had they captured Rožan hill on Sokolica their advance to Valevo would probably have been successful, for Rožan dominates all the surrounding positions which lead down gradually to Valevo. On September 14th only two very tired and exhausted Serbian

regiments were left to defend Rožan, and their resistance was broken before overwhelming numbers. The Austro-Hungarian troops advanced in close files, notwithstanding the fearful losses which they sustained at every advance. Their general had pledged his word to enter Valevo on September 20th, and he drew constantly upon fresh troops to fill the gaps in his lines.

It was a moment of tragic suspense. It seemed that the stubborn resistance of the valiant but sorely tried Serbian army was at an end, and that the fall of Rožan would not only entail the fall of Valevo, but also that of Belgrade, whose gallant defense was the pride of the army and nation. Happily a Serbian regiment, to which I was attached during this war, arrived in time, and by a bloody victory on the Rožan stopped the Austrian offensive.

Beaten at Rožan and driven from other positions in the second half of September, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian troops occupied the hills of the Jagodnja and the Goučevo mountains, where, indeed, their position seemed safe. The Serbians, after some vain and costly attempts to dislodge the enemy from these last positions, and always frustrated by the big guns from the other side of the Drina, abandoned the offensive, and during five weeks kept on the defensive on this front, whilst endeavoring by an offensive in Bosnia to oblige the enemy to withdraw from Serbia. This latter attempt failed because, fearing a new Austrian invasion, the Serbs dared not send any con-

siderable forces to Bosnia, where, moreover, the provisioning of large bodies of troops offered insuperable difficulties.

But simultaneously with the fighting on the front Zvornik Bielina, nearly every day engagements took place along the Drina and the Save. The Austro-Hungarian troops vainly attempted for some weeks to find a new base for the invasion of Serbia. They could not advance anywhere and were forced to keep to the banks of the frontier rivers, having lost thousands of their bravest troops in the passage of the larger streams.

The one success of the Austro-Hungarian penetration into Serbian territory was the stopping of the Serbian advance into Syrmia, for the Serbian headquarters, for strategical reasons, called back all the troops which had crossed the Save. Having retaken Zemlin, the Austro-Hungarians with increased fury, resumed the bombardment of Belgrade, and it seemed as if the city would be completely ruined.

II.—Austria's Third Invasion of Serbia

Six weeks after their second invasion was stopped, the Austro-Hungarians began their third and greatest offensive. They accumulated against Serbia five whole army corps, besides a division operating around Višegrad, and one division operating against Belgrade. The Austrian forces at the beginning of November exceeded 320,000

men. They pressed most vigorously against the Serbian troops entrenched opposite Gučevo, and at Mačva on the marshy plain between the Drina and the Save. At that moment the Serbian troops were in a most difficult position. They were far from their center, and, owing to bad roads, provisioning was nearly impossible. Secondly, after repelling for six weeks the constantly repeated attempts of the Austro-Hungarians, the Serbians were exhausted and overstrained, especially in Mačva, where, owing to the marshy ground, their trenches were full of water.

Moreover, they felt the lack of artillery ammunition, which had largely been expended in the two previous wars, and could not be easily replenished from France or Russia, and headquarters considered it an earnest necessity to withdraw these troops nearer to the center in order to shorten the front of the Serbian army and to give the enemy his turn of the bad conditions amongst which the Serbians had been fighting until then.

All these facts and considerations led the Serbian generals to propose the withdrawing of the army nearer to the base. This move, however, was postponed owing to political and moral reasons, as they feared the effect which would be produced by the occupation by the enemy of a large part of Serbia. But the Austrians, with overwhelming forces and powerful artillery, began the offensive along the whole front, compelling the Serbs to retreat at the beginning of November.

Even the most orderly retirement presents enormous difficulties. One of the gravest was the lack of good roads. Roads in Serbia had never been good, but during the three months of constant warfare they had become quite impassable. The troops which had taken part in the action at Mačva, and had retreated from Šabac to Lazarevac, were not attacked, and were able to occupy previously chosen positions on the right bank of the river Kolubara. The others, which had fought in the Gučevo and Jagodnja mountains during the retreat to Valevo, met with some resistance at Pecka, Zavlaka and Kamenica, but it was easy to see that the Austrian troops attacked reluctantly and rarely took full advantage of their successes, such as the loss by the Serbians of some twenty guns, which they were unable to get away owing to the bad roads.

The former suggestion that Rožan was the key to the position of Valevo proved quite accurate. Having abandoned Rožan, the Serbians evacuated Valevo without a fight, and took up a position on the right bank of the Kolubara. In the south, the second army, consisting of troops which had operated in Bosnia, retreated also in the direction of Višegrad and Užicé. When they approached their base, the Serbian armies halted on the front Užicé-Valevo-Lazarevac-Obrenovac, and here from the middle of November a series of most desperate battles was waged lasting almost uninterruptedly up to December 10th.

It was a real wrestle for life or death by two

embittered foes. The Austrians fought bravely, but without the real patriotism or enthusiasm with which the Serbian army was inspired. They were assisted by scientific leadership and stern discipline, and, compared with the Serbians, they were richly supplied with warm clothes, whilst they overwhelmed the Serbians by the quantity and weight of their artillery. Every Austro-Hungarian army corps operating in Serbia had about 100 pieces. Thus the whole army possessed over 600 guns. The Serbians opposed this force with a far smaller number of guns, but with very experienced gunners.

When the Austrians took Valevo, they imagined that the Serbian resistance was broken, and they rejoiced. Vienna was illuminated, and general Potiorek, the commander of the troops, was decorated with an Order specially created for that occasion. But their jubilation was premature, and the real fight had yet to be fought. On the Rudnik hills the Serbians disputed every inch of territory, and the Austrian army paid dearly for every tactical success. A hundred snow-white hills were stained crimson; a hundred streams ran with blood; but the Serbians could not be defeated. Dispersed over a front 250 kilomètres long, they avoided a fixed battle, but adopted tactics calculated to exhaust the enemy, retiring always before a direct engagement.

Such tactics had their drawbacks, for the Austrians penetrated farther and farther into the country, and soon they arrived at the watershed

of the Kolubara and Morava. Their goal now seemed to be at hand, and definite success, in the occupation of Kraguevac and the whole valley of Morava seemed certain.

But the greatest danger for Serbia was the loss of faith in the value of further resistance, and such doubts began to contaminate the rank and file of the Serbian army like a contagious disease. Happily, the contagion was not general, as the headquarters staff worked miracles, doing everything humanly possible to organize resistance and assure ultimate victory.

The Serbian headquarters were aware that the Austrian army, notwithstanding its apparent success, was beginning to show signs of disintegration and the utmost exhaustion. In every contest, whenever they met in equal numbers, the Austro-Hungarians were beaten, and surrendered very willingly. In climbing the Rudnik hills the enemy lost all his energy and vigor. The Serbian headquarters believed that the right moment for a decisive blow was at hand, but they recognized the great difficulty of doing anything with their small army, which was dispersed in a thin line over a very long front. After deep consideration they resolved to abandon the watershed of the Suvobor, Rayac, Prostruga and Golubac, and to concentrate the army further south, on the hills surrounding the village of Takovo, which formed the watershed between the Dičina and the Čemerica, a tributary of the Morava.

Some people were alarmed at the decision, as

the retreat was risky. It opened up the valley of the Morava, and formed a direct menace to Kraguevac. However, guided only by a sound principle of strategy, headquarters cast aside all other considerations, and advanced straight to victory.

At the same time headquarters carried out one still more important decision. In order to shorten the northern front, and to reinforce the first army which had to deliver the most decisive blow, they ordered the evacuation of Belgrade. This last decision was taken with heavy heart, because the gallant defense of Belgrade was the pride of the army and the nation. But it proved a most effective trap into which the enemy fell quite blindly.

The Austrians, like the Germans, have proved absolutely unable to understand the psychology of their adversaries. At the beginning they believed that the Serbians would not dare to resist, and the occupation of Belgrade would be a pleasant military walk. Impressed by the stubborn and effective defense of Belgrade, later on they believed that Belgrade was impregnable, as the Serbs defended it to their last man. Now, finding the gates of Belgrade thrown open before them, they at once imagined that the Serbian resistance was finally broken and waiting only for the last *coup de grace*. The Austrians wanted to complete their invasion of Serbia by a master stroke of strategy. They threw precaution to the winds and began, in full view of the enemy, a most dangerous enveloping movement. Before

making an advance from the west, they wished to strengthen their position in the valley of the lower Morava in order to cut the retreat of the Serbians to Nish by driving them up to the rocky fastnesses of the mountain of Kopaonick, or else to oblige them to surrender. In the execution of this plan they weakened their western front by transferring large forces through Belgrade down to the lower Morava. Serbian headquarters quickly took advantage of the enemy's mistake. General Mišić, who was second in command to field-marshal Putnik, was appointed commander of the First army, and was ordered to lead the attack as soon as the necessary ammunition should arrive from the allies.

The general offensive took place on the 3rd of December and met with brilliant results. The enemy was taken completely by surprise. The Austro-Hungarians never supposed that the Serbians, who had been retreating for a whole month, would recover sufficient energy and courage to attack them. They failed to take full advantage of their strong position in the hills, and their artillery played a very ineffective part. They were attacked both on the front and on the wings very vigorously, whilst the Serbian artillery, which shelled them simultaneously in the front and the rear, worked such terrible havoc that the enemy believed that the Serbian forces had been increased tenfold.

In spite of their superior numbers their lines were shaken, and after ten hours of most desper-

ate resistance, they began to retreat, hoping for better luck next day. But the Serbian army, fired by this long expected success, gave them no respite. The Serbian attack next day proved to be most vigorous. The troops surpassed themselves in courage and impetuosity. There was not a unit or an officer who did not distinguish himself. The Austrians, leaving 1000 dead and wounded, hastily retired to the line Suvobor-Rayac-Prostruga, where they had stationed some heavy guns. But their efforts were all in vain. The Serbian infantry, working in cooperation with their very effective artillery, proved irresistible, and the enemy was defeated after a few hours' fighting. The 15th and 16th Austrian army corps were badly beaten and completely demoralized. During these first three days the Serbians took over 5000 prisoners, and many thousands of the enemy remained on the battlefield dead or wounded.

This almost miraculous resuscitation poured new life into the Serbian army and revealed the extent of its latent strength. By the complete and harmonious cooperation of all their forces the Serbians dealt the enemy a crushing blow without much loss of life on their own side. The commanders of the different units expressed their thanks for the harmonious cooperation of the commanders on their wings. The infantry was full of praise of the artillery, and the gunners could not find words to express their admiration for the impetuosity and irresistible onset of the infantry.

The victory was complete, but general Mišić knew how to utilize it to the full. It was in vain that the Austrian rearguards, after the third day, attempted resistance, for before the enemy's infantry could deploy for fighting in a new position, the Serbian artillery began to shell their lines, and the Serbian infantry to creep beneath the enemy's batteries. The Austro-Hungarian resistance was broken before it had already begun. Fighting had turned into mere pursuit. The other Serbian armies to the north and the south advanced simultaneously, and the whole of the enemy's front, 250 kilomètres long, was smashed in and the center seized.

In a headlong retreat the Austro-Hungarians fled panic-stricken, abandoning their transport and wounded, throwing away their rifles and ammunition, killing their horses, and leaving motor-cars and guns. In some instances they had had time to burn the automobiles and to bury the guns, leaving only the empty limbers.

Valevo, whose capture was celebrated throughout the Dual monarchy, was abandoned after two hours' resistance by some Magyar regiments. The Austro-Hungarians fled towards the Save and Drina without the least attempt at resistance. Sometimes a Serbian company would chase whole regiments single-handed, mowing them down without any loss to themselves. The enemy was glad to escape or to surrender.

After several bloody encounters on the slopes of the Kosmay and Avala hills, the Austrians

were beaten also at Belgrade, and the Serbian capital was retaken on December 15th, after having remained thirteen days in possession of the enemy. This completed the rout of the enemy's forces and crowned the Serbian success. These operations on the Belgrade front were conducted personally by the old maker of victories—Vojvoda Putnik and his able assistant, colonel Pavlović. Following the victorious Serbs, I reached Save while the last cannons were still roaring round Belgrade. One would have to possess the pen of a Dickens or a Tolstoy to be able to describe adequately the awful scenes entailed by the Austro-Hungarian retreat. Wherever I passed, from Suvobor, all the way down to Valevo, and further on towards the Save, the roads were littered with the corpses and the pitiful débris of the Austro-Hungarian army.

In ten days the Serbian victory over five Austrian army corps was complete. Since the days when Scipio saved Rome from Hannibal, or when England destroyed the might of Spain, the world has never seen such a spectacle, and never has victory been more deserved. General Mišić was promoted to the rank of field-marshal, a title which has never been better merited, and never more modestly carried. His greatness consisted in that he preserved faith amid the general consternation. He remained cool-headed when many in the army lost their heads. Like all great soldiers, he possessed the gift of conquering the wills and hearts of his men, and of inspiring them with

new ardor and with the fullest confidence in his leadership. He chose the right moment for his blow, and having prepared it thoughtfully, he struck so masterfully that the huge Austrian army shook and cracked like an old building shaken by a mighty earthquake.

By a strange freak of destiny Serbia's misfortunes would not have been so great had not the Serbian victory been so vast and thorough. The enormous number of sick war prisoners for whom Serbia had no special accommodations were sent to different towns and villages. They brought contagious diseases into Serbia, which spread throughout the country and cost thousands and thousands of lives. Over 30 per cent of the Serbian doctors fell victims to the spotted fever and other diseases while fighting against them. Many foreign doctors and nurses died also, sacrificing their noble lives on Serbian soil for the sake of the unity of the Serbian race and for the liberties of nations.

The position of the Austro-Hungarian army corps during the last engagements with Serbia was as follows:

The 17th army corps recently composed, formed the right wing, and operated on the front Užić-Suvobor; the 16th army corps on the line Suvobor-Rayac-Prostruga; the 15th along the river Lig; the 13th and the 8th farther north, along the Kolubara, and parts of the 9th army corps and general Krauss's detachment, composed mostly of parts of the 4th army corps, operated along

the Save round Belgrade. All the units at the beginning of November were brought up to normal strength. Thus the 16th army corps had exactly seventy-two battalions—about 75,000 rifles—but the newly combined 17th army corps was considered to be the strongest. The others were somewhat smaller. The number of rifles exceeded 320,000, besides artillery and cavalry.

Taking into account the number of army corps employed against Serbia, together with the repeated reinforcements they received, it is evident that Austria-Hungary lost very heavily. Bringing all her resources into action, she employed in defensive and offensive action against Serbia at least 600,000 men, and straining her troops to the last limit of human endurance, she sustained appalling losses.

It has leaked out from Budapest¹ that before the middle of October, according to official reports, Austria-Hungary lost in the Serbian theater of war 148,000 men. The number was even greater during the operations in Serbia in November, 1914, when Austria-Hungary undoubtedly lost more than half her men. Her losses after the 1st of November, 1914, certainly reached 180,000 in sick, wounded, killed and prisoners, which makes a total loss of 330,000 men, of which 68,900 were prisoners.

Besides, Serbia captured 4 flags, 192 guns of different caliber, 31 limbers, whose guns were buried or destroyed, 491 carloads of ammunition,

¹ *The Morning Post*, November 18th, 1914.

86 machine-guns, 90,000 rifles, 4000 horses, and much other material.

The Serbs thus captured men and material sufficient to form two complete army corps. Of particular value to them were the mountain howitzers, which they lacked altogether, and machine-guns, of which they had not a sufficient quantity.

Austria-Hungary sustained these enormous losses without achieving any results. The Serbian army remained ready for a new struggle. If the Serbs were diminished in numbers, their morale was higher than ever. There was no Austro-Hungarian general who could undertake a new offensive in Serbia without an army 400,000 strong. But she could not send such an army without compromising her chance of success in Galicia.

She committed the grave fault of underestimating her enemy, attacking him with inadequate forces, thus losing more and achieving nothing. Serbia may, with legitimate pride, look back at her achievements and the service done for the common cause. She had riveted on her battlefields enormous forces of the common foe, and had already annihilated forces nearly equaling her total strength.

Of course, such results could only have been achieved by the intelligent and patriotic action of the self-sacrificing Serbian officers. The appalling list of dead and wounded officers is the best evidence of how they fulfilled their duty, and how

much they have deserved of the Fatherland. But the real and everlasting glory belongs to the Serbian peasant soldiers, who, after a war that had lasted for twenty-seven months, after trials and hardships unheard of among other European armies, after sustaining great losses of men and matériel, still found the strength to rise from the depths of despair and to shatter the overwhelming forces of a well-equipped and disciplined enemy. Only the passing of two or three centuries are needed to make the glorious heroism of the Serbian soldiers stand out as a legend to the generations that are to come. They will scarce be able to believe what we all have witnessed.

III.—The Crushing of Serbia

After the German success in Russia during the summer of 1915, Germany, realizing the full importance of the Balkan front, turned her attention to the south and decided upon an offensive against Serbia. Having no trust in Austrian forces or leadership and perfectly aware of the resistance Serbia would offer, this time the new army of invasion consisted mainly of German troops and its command was intrusted to Mackensen, decidedly one of the ablest German generals. On their part the Entente Powers were misguided in their Balkan policy and totally failed to grasp the situation. Instead of reinforcing the Serbian front as the best means of inducing Roumania and Greece to side with the Allies and of preventing Bulgaria from joining the Central Powers, their

diplomacy began the fruitless negotiations with Bulgaria which only accelerated the German offensive and the terrible disaster which befell Serbia.

In September, 1915, the Austro-German forces under the command of field-marshal Mackensen were massed on the Serbian front along the Save and the Danube. Meanwhile the negotiations undertaken by the diplomacy of the Entente Powers with Bulgaria were protracted without leading to any result. Bulgaria played her double game very adroitly. She could not move before the Austro-German forces were ready for cooperation with her. On the 19th of September the Germans opened the bombardment of the Serbian front. Four days later, on the 23rd of September, Bulgaria ordered the general mobilization. The Serbian headquarters entertained no doubt concerning the objective of the Bulgarian military action. With an enormous front some 320 miles in length towards Bulgaria, with her main line of communication Nish-Salonica within reach of the first successful Bulgarian raid, Serbia's military position was extremely dangerous. The only chance to improve it was quick, energetic action against Bulgaria. The Serbian headquarters did not expect by such a move to conquer Bulgaria or to annihilate her army completely, but they rightly judged that it would hinder the Bulgarian mobilization in the western districts, and by occupation of some important centers it might cripple her forces considerably and greatly hamper her action. In that way the enemy's

victory might be delayed, and by gaining some weeks the Allies might fulfill their promise of assisting Serbia. The Serbian population and army might have retreated to the south, using the railway line Nish-Salonica, which would have saved many thousands of lives and enormous quantities of war matériel. With this object in view the Serbian headquarters ordered a new concentration of the army along the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. But the diplomacy of the Entente Powers allowed itself to be the perfect dupe of Bulgaria. Fearing that the Serbian action might spoil its cherished play at Sofia, it brought strong pressure to bear upon the Serbian government, which prevented the Serbian military action against Bulgaria. Since that moment Serbia was doomed, the crushing of her army by the united Bulgaro-Austro-German forces was inevitable, and her population was exposed to fearful sufferings and privations unparalleled in modern times.

But to the eternal glory of Serbia, even in the moment of such supreme danger, she organized her small forces as best she could, and offered a resistance which, better than any victory could, speaks of the indomitable spirit of the Serbs.

At the end of September, 1915, the Austro-German forces were disposed along the Danube and the Save in the following way:

Opposite the Serbian front Ram-Smederevo-Grocka was the army of general Galwitz, consisting of nine German divisions. Against the front Grocka-Belgrade-Ostružnica were two German

and two Austrian divisions. From Obrenovac to the mouth of the Drina was the 19th Austrian army corps, with some detached brigades along the Drina. That whole army numbered 111 German and 53 Austrian battalions.

To oppose them the Serbians could concentrate on the northern front only 116 battalions, of which 40 battalions belonged to the third ban. The remaining troops were engaged on the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. Besides outnumbering the Serbs by three to two in the infantry, the Austro-German division disposed of two regiments of artillery, but especially in heavy artillery their advantage over the Serbian troops was enormous.

On October 6th the Austro-Germans, after heavy artillery preparation from pieces of every caliber, and without sparing ammunition, began the crossing of the Drina, the Save and the Danube. Bloody encounters took place at Obrenovac, Ostružnica, Belgrade, Smederevo and Ram. At all these places the first enemy's detachments, after having succeeded in crossing the rivers, were annihilated before being able to secure a footing or to develop their front. Only after seven days of incessant battle of the most stubborn character did the enemy succeed in forcing the rivers. The weight of his heavy guns was telling, the English, French and Russian batteries of heavy artillery defending Belgrade were silenced on the first day and their ramparts shattered to dust, thus leaving the whole burden of defense upon the Serbian infantry. Notwith-

standing all this, the defense was splendid and called forth the admiration of German correspondents in the enemy's army. The enemy suffered very heavy losses, and was only able to advance owing to his numbers, which outflanked the Serbian positions and pounded to pieces Serbian defensive works. But every new position was fully taken advantage of by the Serbians, who retreated contesting every inch and ceding only inch by inch their territory.

On the 14th of October the Bulgarians, repeating their treachery of 1913, attacked the Serbians on the entire front without previously declaring war. The Bulgars had concentrated against Serbia seven divisions, each consisting of six regiments and one brigade, of infantry, in all 176 battalions of infantry; whereas Serbia was only able to oppose them with 78 battalions. In spite of being so greatly outnumbered the Serbians offered stubborn resistance, and every retreat of the Serbs on the Bulgarian front was caused by the pressure of the Austro-Germans. Thus on the river Timok during twelve days from 13th to 24th October, the Bulgarians penetrated only one and a half miles into Serbian territory, all their attacks being bloodily repulsed. But when Austro-Germans penetrated deeper to the south, the Serbs ordered the evacuation of Negotin, Zaečar and Knaževac. In the direction of the valley of the Nishava the Serbians and the Bulgarians had nearly equal forces, therefore all Bulgarian attacks were very costly and fruitless. Nowhere

were the Bulgars able to dislodge the Serbs by their own forces; these were obliged to retreat before the Bulgars in view of the situation on the other fronts.

On the southern part of their front the Bulgars attacked the Serbs on the front of Vlassina, east of Vrana, with sixteen battalions, where the Serbs had only four or five battalions. They penetrated into the valley of the Morava, but their advance was stopped. Further south the Serbs had only two newly organized divisions, whose battalions had no more than 600 rifles with very small numbers of machine-guns and artillery pieces. The Bulgars had there four brigades belonging to the 5th and 7th divisions and parts of the 2nd and 11th divisions. Therefore their advance to Skoplje and Veles could not be prevented, and they occupied both towns after much sanguinary fighting. The Bulgars sent strong numbers to Kačanik Pass and to Karadag, but their advance was stopped there, until circumstances on the other front obliged the Serbs to abandon those positions also.

Always fighting and retreating until the end of October, the Serbians entertained the hope that the British and French troops would arrive in time, and in joining with the Serbian army would be able to frustrate all enemy schemes. Not only were the military operations influenced by this hope, but the Serbian population also remained calm until the last moment, and very few took any measures to protect their lives or to save

a portion of their property by escaping to Greece and allied countries.

In the first days of November the Serbian headquarters became aware that the Allied contingents would not be able to join the Serbian army north of Skoplje, therefore the higher command resolved to abandon the northern front altogether, and always fighting, to retreat to the south, in order to join the Allies and continue the resistance. The Serbian army, pressed by overwhelming enemy forces, had to execute the passage over the Western and Southern Morava, and these movements were executed by both armies without leaving either men or matériel in enemies' hands. Simultaneously the northern army took the front Čačak-Kralevo-Kruševac-Stalać on the south bank of the Western Morava. The divisions opposing the Bulgars took the front Stalać-Prokuplé-Leskovac on the western bank of the Southern Morava.

The Bulgars, by being in possession of the passes Končul and Kačanik, cut off the communication of the Serbian army with the Allies, who by now had reached Krivolak, on the railway line Skoplje-Salonica. In order to join the Allies and beat the Bulgarian forces occupying the passes, it was necessary to extricate the Serbian army from both the valleys of the Southern and Western Morava. This was executed in spite of enormous difficulties, having only two traversable roads for the retreat of the entire army. The roads, Kralevo-Raška-Mitrovica and Kruševac-

Blacé-Kursumlia-Priština. The second army in retreating from Prokuplé had to take the same road Kuršumlia-Priština, and was in great danger of being cut off by the advance of the Austro-Germans in the direction Kruševac-Blacé-Kuršumlia. The situation was saved by a bold attack of the Serbian 3rd army in the flank of the enemy, but the retreat was continued under the heaviest pressure of the enemy.

But still headquarters was able to concentrate five divisions and two brigades against the Bulgars for the battle for the possession of the passes. With these forces, the Serbs attacked the Bulgars on the front Novo Brdo-Kačanik. The main enemy positions were on the Velika Planina and Žegovac mountains. In fierce battles from 17th to 21st November, the Serbs took the Žegovac mountain, and their operations against Velika Planina were also very successful. The Bulgars were in a rather critical situation and began to give way on the northern portion of the front. Everything pointed to the complete success of the Kačanik operation, if the Serbs had had time to develop their advantage. But again the pressure of the Austro-Germans was brought to bear upon the whole military situation. On the 21st of November the Austro-Germans were already in the possession of the Prepolac, and were attacking the Serbs defending the Tenedol pass on the road to Priština. To be in safety, the Serbian army would have not only to beat the Bulgars at Kačanik, but also to drive them beyond Skoplje. Such

an operation would have required time, whereas the occupation of Priština by the enemy would have completely isolated the Serbian forces operating against the Bulgars. Therefore the whole operation was abandoned. But still the Serbian successes on the Kačanik front enabled them to retire on the left bank of the Sitnica river unmolested by the enemy, and without leaving in his hands either arms or ammunition.

Thus the Serbs definitely failed to join the Allies, who, being small in numbers, were unable to push further than Krivolack, and soon were obliged to beat a retreat. It was on the memorable Kossovo Polé that the Serbian army and nation realized that the great tragedy of her history was to be repeated once again. The curtain rose upon the last act of the Serbian tragedy. Fate had yet some fearful sufferings in store for them. In 1915, as in 1389, on the eve of the battle of Kossovo, the Serbian king and nation were forced to choose between the Kingdom of Heaven and Earth; to make peace with the hereditary foes and to betray the noble cause of European freedom and liberty for which they had fought so long. Now, as then, the Serbs did not hesitate. They preferred honor and martyrdom to shameful peace and treason. Like true heroes of Kossovo, without fear or reproach they had accepted battle on a front 800 miles long, and for two months they had kept in abeyance the overwhelming forces of three military states single-handed. An ally—Greece—betrayed them; the

others, through blunders, were unable to come in time to be of assistance. The struggle was in vain, and the Serbian state, which had resulted from so much fighting and noble self-sacrifice, was crushed by a shameful coalition of its old-time foes and by the treacherous connivance of an ally.

But there remained the Serbian nation, and its army. In leaving the fertile plains of Morava and the lovely hills of Šumadia, they saw before them, rising like an awful menace, the barren, inhospitable Albanian mountains, where unspeakable hardships awaited them, cold, starvation and death. Unflinchingly they drank the bitter cup of humiliation and disaster to the dregs. Their country is again invaded by the same haughty hereditary foe. Serbia's children are again scattered over the world, and their mothers and sisters outraged by brutal conquerors.

No words can depict the terrible physical pains and moral agony which the Serbs underwent in their retreat through Albania. It was not the retreat of an army, but the exodus of a nation. To the fearful sufferings and privation was added the bitter thought that all this was unnecessary, that the present tragedy was not so much, as in 1389, the result of inevitable circumstances as the result of some grave blunderings in the cabinets of the diplomats. Had the Allies, after a year of fighting, realized the importance of the Balkan theater of war, and had they reinforced the Serbian front with only 150,000 men, before beginning the fatal negotiations with Bulgaria, the Ser-

bian tragedy would never have taken place. Bulgaria would probably never have dared to side with the enemy. Greece would not have betrayed Serbia, and Roumania would have entered the war many months before. How many thousands of noble lives would have been spared, and how many millions of national wealth would not have been wasted in making good the mistakes of those who sometimes place personal prejudices before the greatest interest of the nations?

But still, in such a terrible situation the Serbian headquarters did not lose its head. When further resistance on the Serbian soil was impossible, they set up the task of withdrawing as many of the troops as possible. That task was accomplished, and only those who were in the retreat with the Serbian army through Albania can witness what a hell it was.

A painful operation was to be performed before climbing the black Montenegrin and bare Albanian mountains. Retiring always under the enemy's pressure, ceaselessly fighting on every advantageous position, the Serbian soldiers were terribly exhausted, and their ammunition was nearing its end. As it was impossible to take them over goat-tracks, the heavy cars and field-guns were destroyed in the sight of the soldiers, who regarded them as the real protectors of their lives and their only guarantee of any success against the enemy. The whole army train was arranged to be carried on horseback and made as light as possible. Everything that was not strictly necessary was thrown

away or destroyed. Only an army possessing superhuman endurance and unconquerable spirit could perform such things and not cease to exist altogether. But the time-honored ideal of a free and united country was living in those martyr soldiers, and it gave them strength to pass through the Albanian hell to new life and activity, which they are manifesting splendidly in the recent fighting on the Macedonian front.

For all those who took part in the retreat through Albania, the memory of those days will be as an evil dream that will haunt them to the end of their lives, an evil dream of human misery and pitiful helplessness against a merciless fate. Those who are more interested in it will find a better and fuller description in the stirring pages of some Americans who retreated with the Serbs, and tried to give a picture of their hardships, their endurance, their pitiless death from hunger, cold and exhaustion; of the roads, made practicable over countless corpses of oxen and horses sunk in the treacherous swamps along the sea-coasts; of the human corpses half buried in snow, their legs protruding gruesomely, with their calves cut off whilst they were still alive by some more miserable companion, driven mad by suffering, in order to satisfy his hunger.

But even these sufferings did a good service to the Allied cause. The Serbian army, having retired into the Albanian mountains, put the enemy, who were pressing on its heels, in the same disadvantageous position as it had been. The enemy

was able to conquer Serbia thanks only to its all-powerful artillery. In Albania it was of no use, therefore he slackened his pursuit and dared not attack. That gave the Allies time to reinforce the Salonica front, and by fortifying it to make their position impregnable. This fact has surely played a decisive part in creating a new situation in the Balkans favorable to the Allies. Had the Serbs, instead of retreating over Albania, taken the direction of Salonica, the situation for the Allies would be far worse. The Austro-Germans, reinforced by the Bulgars, would have quickly followed them with a force half a million strong, would have swept them from Greek territory. Salonica most probably would have passed into the Austro-German-Bulgarians' hands, and the Balkan situation would have been irretrievably lost for the Allies.

The royal family, also in this wholesale suffering, shared unreservedly the lot of the Serbian army and nation. Old king Peter, broken down by age and sickness, delayed his retreat to the last moment, and shared his bread and shelter with the common soldiers. The Prince Regent Alexander, exhausted by fatigue and mental effort, never parted from his troops. His noble courage and devotion to the nation did much for the rebirth of the Serbian army, whose deeds on the Monastir front speak better than any words of mine for its valor and devotion to the common cause.

VII

THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC

THE future peace conference will have to solve many difficult and complicated problems, and among them the problem of the Adriatic is the most delicate one, and pregnant with far-reaching consequences. Upon the just and fair solution of that problem depends the happiness of the next generation of two gifted nations, the Italians and the Southern Slavs, and the future peace between the Latin and the Slav worlds. Here, if anywhere, the factors which in the past have led to war must be eliminated, unless the bright hopes of humanity are to end in bitter disappointment, the vision of enduring peace vanish like a fairy dream, and Europe is again to be confronted with the ugly reality of ever-contending imperialism of different states and races.

Italy, by intervening in the present war on the side of the Allies, was able to promote and to secure the realizations of views upon the Adriatic which her statesmen claimed to be the guarantee and the safeguard of Italian interests in the Adriatic. I do not pretend to know what is the agreement concerning the Adriatic arrived at between the powers of the quadruple Entente, but I am

convinced that no decision of the cabinets can oppose for long the living forces which determine the political and economic life of the European nations. If the agreement concerning the future of the coasts of the Adriatic arrived at between the Allies be just, and in harmony with the vital interests of the parties primarily concerned, it will endure and be productive of beneficent consequences. If it be one-sided and prejudicial to the vital interests of the most-concerned parties, it will stand for some time, causing permanent irritation and friction, until it breaks out in new and sanguinary complications. But the Southern Slavs denounce such a procedure as being in evident contradiction with the principles of democracy—the bargain being accomplished without taking into account the wishes and aspirations of the people of those provinces. They rightly hope that the people and the government of the United States will use all their mighty influence to bring all former conventions arrived at between the European Allies into harmony with the lofty principles for which they entered the war. The new democracy in Russia is already raising its voice with that object in view.

Every student of the European situation knows perfectly well that Italy had nothing to gain and everything to fear from the German victory. For Italy, as for Great Britain and France, the present war ought to have a strictly defensive character; they are fighting not to increase their possessions, but to assure and defend their position,

and to be able to continue the peaceful evolution of their political, economic, and social institutions. We must give the credit to the Italian statesmen that from the very outset of the present crisis they clearly saw on which side the interest of Italy was to be found. To Italy's honor, it took the side of liberty and democracy in Europe. The Teutonic victory would have placed Italy in the same position towards Austria-Hungary as Serbia occupied before the present crisis arose. Italy would be constantly menaced and bullied by Austria-Hungary, besides being in danger of losing Venice, which is claimed by Germany as an outlet on the Mediterranean. Therefore it was to the paramount interest of Italy to frustrate the possibility of a Teutonic victory in Europe. The preservation and strengthening of the liberties of Europe was a sufficient inducement for Italy to intervene on the side of the Allies. But an equally strong, and perhaps more popular, inducement for Italy to intervene was the achievement of national unity, the liberation of kinsfolk from the Austrian domination, and the improvement of her strategic position in the Adriatic.

Every one must be in sympathy with the rightful aspiration of the Italians towards the achievement of their national unity, and with her securing such frontiers as to be protected from the everlasting threat of a foreign invasion, as was the case until now as regards her frontier in south Tyrol.

But the achievement of Italian national unity,

and the claims to obtain for Italy certain strategical frontiers, if pushed to extremes, will clash with the not less rightful claims and aspirations of the Southern Slavs for their national unity and the free development of their economic and commercial resources. Already the German papers have with joy announced the irreconcilable antagonism between Italian and Slavic interests on the shores of the Adriatic, and given their public to understand that in this quarter and direction lie the hopes of German expansion to the Mediterranean. Hence the fears of a possible misunderstanding between both nations, and the necessity of a mutual agreement for friendly coöperation in the Adriatic.

A fair compromise and a friendly agreement between Italy and her Slav neighbor is a necessity for both of them as well as for the future peace of Europe. Italy can achieve that if she is to follow her loftiest traditions and to listen to the advice and counsel of her best brains and patriots as to her real interests.

The American public can do much in this matter. The United States are the staunch and proved friend of Italy; they have also greeted with much sympathy the solution of the Southern Slav question on the basis of ethnographic unity and self-government. Nobody is better entitled to give to both nations the impartial counsel of moderation and wisdom, and nobody's advice, if so given, will be received more readily than that of this country. To be able to raise their mighty

voice, the American public must take some patience to grasp and understand all the necessary facts concerning the position of both nations in the Adriatic.

The Adriatic coast now belonging to Austria-Hungary, and where meet the interests of the Italians and the Serbo-Croats, are: Dalmatia, together with the Dalmatian archipelago, Istria, Trieste, and Goritzia, with the naval port of Pola. As regards the nationality of the population of these provinces the following numbers (see the official Austro-Hungarian statistics of 1910) will give the best illustration:

	Superficial Area, kms.	Italians	Slavs	Germans	Total
Dalmatia ..	12,840	18,028	612,669	3,081	633,778
Istria	4,956	145,517	224,400	12,735	382,652
Trieste	95	118,959	59,974	11,870	190,808
Goritzia ...	2,918	90,119	155,039	4,500	249,058
Total ...	20,809	372,623	1,052,082	32,186	1,456,891

Following up the fallacious and the most dangerous theory of strong strategic frontiers, a very considerable and influential part of Italian public opinion has formulated a vast programme for incorporation in the kingdom of Italy of nearly all the Adriatic provinces lying on the opposite shore of the Adriatic. Italian statesmen have for a long time past expressed the view that Italy having a paramount interest in the Adriatic, that sea ought to become a closed Italian lake. The present European crisis, coupled with permanent anarchy in Albania, offered a good opportunity

for Italy to realize that view, and already, in October, 1914, Italy occupied Valona, which port, with Brindisi on the Italian shore, completely commands the entrance into the Adriatic. Thus the idea has been propounded that the natural and strongly strategic frontier for Italy is formed by the ridge of the Julian Alps, which descends from the Tyrol to the Adriatic, forming the watershed between the Adriatic and the Danube. Thus, in obtaining that line for her eastern frontier, the kingdom of Italy would incorporate the following Austro-Hungarian provinces: Goritzia, Carniola, Trieste, Istria, the north-western districts of northern Dalmatia, with all the islands of the Dalmatian archipelago. In such a way Italy would have for her subjects a dense and homogeneous population of the Southern Slavs numbering about one million people.

In propounding such views, and striving to impose such a policy upon the Italian government, the Italian press writers argue as follows:

(1) The Adriatic is an Italian sea, and, accordingly, Italy must possess or control all its coasts.

(2) Italy possesses historical claims to those provinces, as some of them belonged for a time to the Venetian republic. The history of Venice forms one of the brightest pages of Italian history. Italy being the rightful heir to Venice must renew the glory of the Italian reign in the Adriatic.

(3) Italy also possesses ethnographic claims upon those provinces as they contain a large Italian population. Therefore, in order to achieve

her national unity, Italy must incorporate those provinces.

(4) Italy, for reasons of military efficiency, must have a strong natural frontier against her new Slavic neighbor.

(5) The last, but perhaps not the least, argument for the Italian occupation of the opposite coast of the Adriatic was the fear lest Russia should seize the future Serbian ports of the Adriatic, and thus threaten the security of Italy.

The issues involved in the just solution of the problem of the Adriatic are of such tremendous importance, not only for Italians and Serbians, but also for all neighboring nations, as well as for European peace in general, that I think no apology is necessary for going at some length into the above arguments.

The first contention that the Adriatic is an Italian sea, and must be militarily controlled by Italy, is a shallow piece of reasoning, whose kind is produced from time to time in every country by the heads of over-zealous patriots. In such a way the Germans may fairly pretend that the Baltic sea belongs to them, and the occupation of the Great and Little Belt would be a piece of justice, and only the assertion of lawful national rights. To-day it is hardly possible to find any sound-minded people who would deny that the seas and oceans are vast fields given by the Creator in common to all nations upon the earth for peaceful interchange of goods and friendly relations between them. They are to stimulate their

productive energies on the manifold field of human activity, artistic, economic, commercial, and social. It must sound like an attempt upon the sacred rights of all other nations if any single nation among them should try to appropriate a sea and to create of it a monopoly for her selfish interests.

The argument for Italian incorporation of those provinces based upon ethnography must fall at once when we look at the numbers of the racial statistics. In Dalmatia, against a pure Serbo-Croatian population numbering 630,000, the Italians number only 18,000, which represents less than 3 per cent. of the total population. Therefore to base the Italian rights of occupation upon ethnography would be sheer absurdity.

In Istria, Trieste, and Goritzia the Italian claims based upon ethnography are better founded, although they are not justified. In Istria the geographical line of ethnographical division can be easily drawn. The Italians are thickly grouped on the western coast, and the Croat population is found in the central and eastern parts of the peninsula. In Istria the Slavs (220,000) represent 60 per cent and Italians (145,500) 40 per cent of the entire population. In the town of Trieste the Italians (118,959), to the contrary, represent 66 per cent and the Slavs (59,974) 34 per cent of the total population. In Goritzia, again, as in Istria, the line of ethnographic division can be easily drawn. The Italians in this province extend in the north as far as Cor-

mons, and along the railway as far as the town of Goritza; in the east as far as the river Isonzo (Soča), and from Gradiška straight to Monfalcone; a dense and homogeneous Slav population inhabits the whole of the rest of the province. In the districts of Logatec and Pastojna, in the southwestern Carniola, with nearly a hundred thousand purely Slav inhabitants, there are no Italians, and these districts are claimed by the Italians only in virtue of strategic reasons.

Thus leaving Dalmatia and the districts of Carniola out of the question, the Italian counts upon Istria, Trieste, and Goritzia are untenable as a whole. Here some compromise is necessary, and it could be easily effected if both sides were equally animated by a sincere desire for a peaceful settlement.

With regard to the historical right of Italy to those provinces, I should say that there is scarcely any province in Europe belonging to any nation to which another nation would not have some historic right. The argument of historic right is rather an antiquated one, and better suits the mediæval and dynastic Europe with her people ruled by monarchs whose reigns are based upon divine right, than the modern European democracy in which rule is based upon popular consent. The historic rights have cost Europe so much bloodshed, suffering, and devastation that we may fairly suppose that this argument appeals but feebly to her nations. Even if it be true that the Venetian rule of the Adriatic represents a

bright page in the Italian history of warlike achievements, it is not less true that the memory of the Venetian rule of the Slav coasts of the Adriatic also recalls to their Slavic inhabitants the dire days of foreign subjugation and misery. Those were days when their economic and commercial resources were ruthlessly exploited for the profit of an alien ruler, and when their manhood was mercilessly employed to fight far-distant battles for no profit to their native land and kinsfolk. Those were days when, with all their services, they were paid by economic misery and moral contempt, the days when Slavs were "Schiavi"—most despicable slaves. The memories of those days, walking like pale ghosts on the other shore of the Adriatic, make, even to-day, the blood run quicker, fists clench themselves involuntarily, and account for so much animosity and misunderstanding between their mixed population. Let those ghosts of the past be buried for ever. To shine forth brightly the glory of the young Italy has no need of the humiliation and moral misery of her Slav neighbors. Against those historic rights of past states rises the incontestable and unquestionable right of a living nation striving for freedom, equality, and lawful recognition. The whole history of those provinces in the past has been a long struggle against a foreign yoke, and partly they have succeeded in shaking it off. The history of the free Serbo-Croatian republic of Dubrovnik-(Ragusa) is not only a bright page of their political liberty, but also a

glorious record of Serbo-Croatian achievement in literature, science, and civilization. Napoleon, when creating the kingdom of United Italy, did not think for one moment of burdening her with alien provinces, but taking into account the character of their population, united all these Adriatic provinces in the kingdom of Illyria, with the capital at Ljubljana (Laibach).

In modern Europe, where public opinion plays an important part in the policy of the states, the militarists of every country are walking hand in hand with stealthily creeping commercialism. In the Italy of later days, as in Germany forty years ago, in a comparatively short time commercialism as an entire new social class has sprung up, and with it an entire new public opinion. The combination of military and commercial interests in Italy, as was the case with Germany, will surely weave the web of Italian destiny, and lead to most dangerous complications. The closer study of the Italian claims on the Adriatic will convince us at once that those claims, though announced in the name of military efficiency and strategic frontiers, are calculated to serve the interests of Italian commercialism, and to secure for Italy a practical monopoly of the whole trade in the Adriatic. Not only the Serbo-Croatian ports would be placed in Italian territorial waters, and under the command of the Italian guns, but the Italian territorial claims in northern Dalmatia are carefully calculated to the effect to impede and hinder a possible new railway communication between Croatia and

her historical ports in Dalmatia. The projected railway line, before reaching Splet (Spalato), would have to pass through Italian territory, and its trade would be obliged to pass to an Italian port. Of course the commercial development of the Southern Slav country would be handicapped, which must be a new source of antagonism and friction between both nations.

Now we come to the supreme argument of the necessity of good strategic frontiers which urges Italy to occupy those provinces on the opposite shores of the Adriatic. The reason of strong strategic frontiers has always been a trump card in the hands of the militarists of every state and a constant source of friction among European nations.

Every state availing itself of a temporary victory imposed strategic frontiers upon the defeated or weaker nation, to the prejudice and humiliation of the latter. Strategic necessity and historic rights tore Alsace-Lorraine away from France, handing it over to the yoke of the Prussian militarists.

Strategic reasons also impeded the accomplishment of Italian unity, leaving south Tyrol in Austrian bondage. The direct results of such policy have been fear and hatred, and their lawful heir the military burdens under which the European nations have labored during the last sixty years. How can we expect or hope that an Italian occupation of the Serbo-Croatian provinces, and the

enslavement by her of a million of Southern Slavs, can give different results? It is an axiom in science that similar causes produce similar results. But if, in spite of all sincere warning, the naissant Italian imperialism, following blindly the teaching of German militarists, will try under the pretense of strategic frontiers to occupy the Balkan lands and to keep in subjection the Slavic population inhabiting them, Italy will inherit the weakness of Austria and, while greatly injuring her Slav neighbor, will endanger her own freedom and the peace of Europe. The Italian militarists wish to occupy these lands in the name of military efficiency. But the security of Italy, and the progress of the Italian democracy, will be brought into peril by that very worship of efficiency. From the adversity which, after this war, will fall upon the German people lies a lesson for the Italian imperialists. Sorely burdened by the occupation of an alien population, threatened by a warlike and united nation such as the Southern Slavs, the Italians would experience all the difficulties of the new position. It would be a burden which their nervous and easily excitable democracy could not, and would not, meekly endure. The Slavic menace would become a nightmare for them which could easily deteriorate the normal course of their economic, political, and social development. The in-born love of freedom which enabled the Serbo-Croats to shake off the Turkish yoke of five centuries, and so successfully to resist the German onrush to the East, would certainly enable them

to resist Italian dominion. The "Irredenta Slava" would become the greatest menace to the Italian nation and to the peace of Europe. Italy, for the sake of very doubtful advantages, must strain every nerve to cope with that danger threatening her from the East. What has been a difficulty for the militarists of Germany in Alsace and Lorraine certainly would be much more so for a democratic Italy in the coveted Slavic provinces.

In order to show Italy's friends in America that that danger would be no small one, and that my warning against it is no exaggeration, I shall show the principal results which must follow the Italian occupation.

First, Italy would occupy all islands of the Dalmatian archipelago. The Italian population numbers 1563, and the Serbo-Croats 116,227 souls. How strong the Slav sentiment is among them can best be illustrated by the fact that for centuries, although Roman catholics, they never suffered the mass to be read in Latin, but insisted on having it read in old Slav language, the so-called Glagolika. And the popes, meeting the wishes of the inhabitants by special bulls, authorized the use of the Glagolitza in the Roman catholic parishes on the islands of the Dalmatian archipelago. Those islands have contributed many popular names among the Serbo-Croatian writers, and played a prominent part in the national reawakening. The Italian occupation, besides hurting the national feeling of the inhabitants, would produce

disagreeable economic changes for them. They are sailors and olive and vine growers, and their agriculture would be quickly ruined by the competition with the cheap products of Italy. What the economic conditions in Dalmatia are can be seen clearly from the following consular report:

“Dalmatia is a narrow strip of rocky, treeless, mountainous country. For the last fifty years the emigration from Dalmatia has been very considerable, and some country districts have lost a large portion of their population. It was estimated that over 6000 persons left the province annually previous to the last crisis in the United States, and although there was some falling off in the numbers after the event, it is probable that the present annual number of emigrants does not fall short of that total. Unfortunately no emigration statistics are kept. An annual emigration of approximately 10 per 1000 would appear at first sight to be a serious misfortune for such a poor and sparsely populated country, but there are factors present which made it a source of wealth. The Dalmatian leaves his home with the intention of amassing a fortune and of returning as soon as he shall have accomplished his object, and even while he is in America or elsewhere he constantly remits money to his relatives at home. Yet in spite of this welcome assistance from emigrants the rural population of Dalmatia is extremely poor, especially on the mainland and in the towns, the taxes are heavy, while the cost of

living, which is already high, is steadily rising. Also from the point of view of the interests of Dalmatia this incessant stream of emigration possesses its disadvantages. There are districts in the province where the supply of farm labor is altogether inadequate, and in those parts and also in the ports where sufficient local labor is not obtainable, workmen from Hercegovina and Montenegro have to be imported. Although the emigrants return home bringing their savings, they are no longer available for agricultural or other labor. From long residence in the towns they are disinclined to return to their villages, and they prefer to settle in the larger towns along the coast.”¹

The same economic changes would be operating among the inhabitants of the coastland. The Dalmatian ports in Italian occupation would lie idle and abandoned, as Italian commerce would never come through them, and the Serbo-Croatian commerce would shun them. Italy, far from increasing her own political and economic power, would only add a fresh difficulty to the existing economic and social problems, having to deal with a discontented and impoverished population, alien in thoughts and sentiments, which could be kept in obedience only by strong garrisons, representing a new burden for her national resources.

But her occupation of the islands and of northern Dalmatia would inevitably create bitter

¹ *Report on Commerce, Industries and Navigation of Dalmatia for Years 1910-11*, by British Vice-Consul Lucas Shadwell.

antagonism between her and the Serbo-Croatian state and nation. The Serbo-Croatian ports in the Adriatic—Fiume (Rieka) and Splet (Spalato)—would be put under direct command of Italian guns. Both of them would be in Italian territorial waters. Everybody knows what terrible losses every belligerent nation has sustained, or will be sustaining, during the present crisis. The ruin and devastation all over Europe will be simply appalling. The Serbo-Croats, like all other nations in Europe, must hasten to make good the wastage and ruin caused by the war. The organization of commercial ports will be their first national care. They will be in need of foreign capital and enterprise. But will British, French, or American capital be forthcoming for the Serbo-Croatian ports when their wharves and docks would be at the mercy of Italian guns, and when all ships to enter them must pass through narrow Italian channels?

The Serbo-Croatian patriots will appeal to the Slavic world at large against Italian injustice. There will be at least one portion of the Slav nation ready to listen to their grievances. It is of no small concern to Italy and to the world which road the future Russian policy will take. Will she develop like a sincere, broad-minded, peaceful, and tolerant democracy, or be eaten by the cankerous desires of world-dominion? Much of that will depend on the issues and solution of the many problems which have arisen in connection with the present war. Chiefly it will depend

upon the spirit by which the Europe of to-morrow will be animated. Will it be the spirit taught by Junkers and state philosophers of the last fifty years in Germany? Or will it be the spirit preached by Franklin, Kant, Mazzini, Ruskin, and pope Leo XIII?

In vain Italians would say to-morrow that imperial Russia had consented to their occupation of those Slav lands. Russia has also consented to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina; nevertheless she was on the brink of war in 1908-9, owing to the annexation of those provinces, and is to-day fighting for the liberation of those provinces from the Austro-Hungarian rule. Unable to hinder the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by Austria, prince Gorchakov, at the congress of Berlin, is reported to have said to count Andrassy, "Well, go in; but Bosnia and Hercegovina will prove to be the tomb of Austria-Hungary." Are the words of prince Gorchakov to count Andrassy no warning to Italy?

There will be eager patriots who will try to represent the action of Italy as a policy of black-mailing. Some will say that the word pledged by the Allies when their armies stood exhausted after a first year of fighting, and that this pledge has no value whatever. Everybody who knows the ardent patriotism and the intensity of the national feeling among the Southern Slavs will at once recognize that the unjust solution of their national aspirations would leave a sore wound, which never could be healed until it brings a fresh terrible

crisis over Southern Europe. The European democracy has every interest not to give to the Southern Slav militarists that weapon. Thus the Italian militarists arguing for the occupation of the Dalmatian archipelago to insure Italy against imaginary Russian danger would play into the hands of a reaction against democracy, and bring that danger very near and make it very real.

But there remains Germany. One of the best acknowledged aims for which the Allies are fighting is the annihilation of German militarism. But how can Germany be cured of the canker of militarism when there would remain Italian and Serbian militarism? The German people cannot be annihilated. There will remain Germany's productive power; and German militarism, defeated and humiliated, would avail itself of any rift between the Allies in order to assert itself again. It is obvious to every student of the European situation that Germany will use every means and opportunity to obtain an outlet to the Adriatic. The Italians, having occupied Trieste and its hinterland, would have to resist not only the Southern Slavs' resentment, but also the German onrush to the south. It is a question primarily for Italy, whether she can, and for how long a time, successfully resist both pressures. And even if she could do so, would the advantages obtained by it be adequate to the sacrifices required? The Italian *risorgimento* has played a great part for the *risorgimento* of the Southern Slavs, and the words of Cavour, "With the devil, if necessary,

only to unite Italy," will surely be remembered by them.

The fallacy of strategic frontiers is the most dangerous snare for the nations, and Italy has every reason to avoid falling into it. The best strategic frontiers for every nation are the friendship of its neighbors, and in case of danger brave hearts and a good cause. The present world-struggle is the best illustration of this truth. The Serbians routed the Austrians when the latter had occupied all "impregnable" positions. The Germans took Namur, Liège, and Antwerp, but in spite of all their efforts, stupendous artillery and appalling sacrifices, they could not force the Yser canal, defended by the stout hearts of the avengers of Belgium and the defenders of the British empire. The best men and the highest authorities in Italy have warned their compatriots against that fallacy and the Southern Slav danger. The well-known Italian writer and patriot, Nicola Tomaseo, a native of Sebenico, in Dalmatia, whose noble heart sincerely loved both nations, did all in his power to promote friendly feelings and coöperation among them, said, with regard to the Dalmatian coast: "I don't believe that Dalmatia could ever be incorporated in Italy. Her destiny bids her to be in the future a free, non-subjugated friend of Italy."

With anxiety and dismay the nations are awaiting the answer to the question now on every lip: What will Europe be after the war? Surely for Europe only two ways are possible: the way of

liberty, peace, and respect among her nations; or the way of brutal militarism allied to narrow nationalism. Such a Europe will be ruled by secret-cabinet policy. The teaching of Machiavelli and the time of prince Metternich will be revived with new force, intrigue will follow intrigue, and plot will succeed plot. Italy, who, in the past, has suffered and so much and so long a time from such a political system in Europe, must be the first to oppose its revival.

VIII

THE SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

IN order to avoid blunders of the past, which had such fatal consequences in bleeding Serbia nearly to death, and by prolonging the war necessitated new sacrifices in lives and wealth, we must form some clear and definite idea about Bulgaria and make up our mind concerning the future arrangements in the Balkans. The Allies bid everything to win Bulgaria to their side, but she sneered in their faces, and in the most decisive hour betrayed her benefactors and the cause of European liberties. But the treachery of Bulgaria was quite natural and could be expected by every one who had some insight into Bulgarian character and psychology. The "Prussians of the Balkans" had more in common with Prussia than political sympathy of a moment, and in view of the importance of the subject, no excuse is necessary in treating to some length the Serbo-Bulgarian relations in the past, as they are the key to the understanding of the present, and the best warning how to avoid fatal mistakes in the future.

By the seventh century the Slav tribes had definitely occupied the whole northern part of the

Balkan peninsula and settled down in nearly all the provinces they now inhabit from the Alps to the shores of the *Ægean* and Black Seas. But lacking the higher administrative and military organization, being by nature and habit peaceful, agricultural communities, they readily acknowledged the suzerainty of the Byzantine empire and tried to continue in the new fatherland the life they had led in the old, on the immense plains of the South of Russia. But in the seventh century, a warlike Mongolian tribe, possessing a more effective military organization, penetrated from the Volga and, having crossed the Danube, conquered and subjugated to its rule the Slav tribes between the Lower Danube, the Balkan mountains, the river Isker and the Black Sea. Being unimportant in numbers, the new-comers soon mingled with and lost themselves in the subjugated Slav population, to which they bequeathed their name of Bulgars and to which they imparted some warlike qualities, forming a Slavo-Mongolian state in which they represented the military caste.

The new Bulgaro-Slav state grew very rapidly, spreading easily to the west, and soon included more and more provinces inhabited by Slavs. To them the Bulgarian state came as a reaction to the more alien Byzantine rule, and had the character of an almost national state. There was a time (in the tenth century) when it seemed that the Bulgarian state, which had then incorporated with itself the whole of Macedonia and present Serbia,

would unite all the Slav tribes in the Balkans and form a great and powerful Slav realm. But the military efficiency of the Mongolian ruling caste of the Volgars soon evaporated, and the Bulgarian state perished as rapidly as it had arisen. But in its place the first Serbian state emerged in the south-western corner of the peninsula near the Adriatic coast. By a natural evolution the Serbian state spread eastward, following steadily in the wake of the retreating Bulgarian wave or Byzantine rule. The Serbian state was a pure Slav reaction against both of them, and although the Serbian reign and ascendancy over the eastern provinces and Macedonia was only asserted later and by a slower process, it was nevertheless firmer and lasted longer—in fact until the Turkish invasion—leaving behind it a deeply-rooted historical and national tradition which survived the five centuries of Turkish oppression.

Thus owing to the natural sources from which sprang the Serbian and Bulgarian nations of to-day, it is most difficult to draw a clear and definite line of demarkation between them. Until this day they are as two neighboring colors in the spectrum. On the outer limits you clearly see the difference of the tint, but towards the middle they are so mingled that the line of demarkation simply does not exist. Thus the purer Bulgarian type, and most distinguishable from the Serbian, is to be found in the Bulgarian provinces on the Black Sea, where the predominance of the Mongolian blood in the population is clearly attested by the

larger lower jaws, broader skulls, jet black hair and dark complexion. Also the Slav language, as spoken in these districts, being more strongly influenced by alien elements, is hardly understood by the inhabitants of western Bulgaria of to-day. Going from the Black Sea towards the west, the Mongolian infusion becomes thinner and thinner, so that on the river Isker it is altogether lost and the Slavonic type appears in all its purity.

The same may be said in regard to Macedonia. The Bulgarians reigned only 125 years in all in Macedonia during the ninth and tenth centuries, and disappeared without leaving any historical monument or tradition. The Serbians, on the contrary, subsequently ruled over Macedonia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries for 140 years. All historical monuments in Macedonia—churches and castles, also the national songs and traditions—belong without a single exception to that later, Serbian, period.

In spite of all these influences and changes the process of differentiation between Serbs and Bulgars has not advanced very far, so that even to-day the difference between them—at least in language—is less than the difference between Bavarians and Prussians or between the Great and Little Russians or southern and northern Italians. Owing to that it is really difficult to draw a fixed line of demarkation between them, unless it be a line on a political or other non-ethnical basis. Thus the Slavs inhabiting Macedonia between Šar and the Rhodope mountains have

in their language and customs the characteristic traits belonging to both Serbians and Bulgarians. Therefore it is a very bold assertion on the part of some writers on Macedonia, to pretend on a would-be scientific basis to describe the Macedonian population as purely Bulgarian or purely Serbian.

The misfortune of the present situation of the Balkan Slavs consists in the fact that the Turkish invasion of the fourteenth century came prematurely, before the natural process operating among them was wholly evolved in forming a strong national state, as was the case in France, England and Germany. The breaking up of the Turkish empire in the nineteenth century found them, as to their mutual relations, in the state they were left in by the fourteenth century, when the natural political and national evolution in the Balkans was forcibly arrested. And when they awoke to the new life, the two great empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary were already formed on the frontiers of the Balkans, and the Serbo-Bulgarian countries were virtually divided among them. Austria-Hungary (see the agreement between emperor Joseph II and empress Catherine the Great) had ear-marked the western part, and Russia had booked Constantinople and the eastern part of the peninsula. As the Russian and Austro-Hungarian political influences remained paramount till this day in the Balkans, often changing rôles, but always pursuing the same preconceived scheme of the conquest of the Balkans,

plotting and intriguing, threatening and exhorting, they have done very much to divide the Balkan nations and, if possible, to establish an unbridgeable gulf between Serbia and Bulgaria. They have accentuated the existing differences, exaggerated opposing interests, and counteracted every spontaneous tendency towards unity and cooperation between them. For the sake of historical truth, we must say here that Russia was less persistent in such a policy, and that her more recent influence in fostering the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance of 1912 and the late Balkan League proves, that Russia was inspired by more sincere motives than Austria, and seemed to have quite abandoned any idea of the conquest of the Balkans.

Left alone without any foreign influence, it appeared at one time that the Serbians and Bulgarians would in brotherly union have formed a single state upon the inevitable ruins of the Turkish empire. Also the first steps towards such an end were taken in the sixties of last century during the reign of the prince Michael of Serbia. The Bulgarians received every assistance and protection in Serbia, whose government was instrumental in the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate, helped in the printing of Bulgarian books and opening of Bulgarian schools, and did all in its power for the re-awakening of the Bulgarian national consciousness. The Bulgarian patriots of those days dreamed only of a liberated Bulgaria united with Serbia under one crown.

The dream of the Serbo-Bulgarian union was shattered by the creation of the Bulgarian state in 1878.

After the Congress of Berlin both Serbia and Bulgaria were left in a bitter state of mind. Bulgaria was disappointed because the Treaty of San Stefano was not wholly carried out, and Serbia felt aggrieved in seeing Bosnia and Hercegovina handed over to Austria-Hungary. All her sacrifices sustained in two wars against Turkey as ally of Russia, brought her nothing but an unimportant aggrandizement in territory, and only served to create a Bulgaria twice as large as herself, while nearly all the remaining provinces of Old Serbia and Macedonia were ear-marked for Bulgaria by the Treaty of San Stefano. That treaty inspired by Russia's imperialistic policy of those days, was most prejudicial to Serbia, and although it was not carried out, it laid the foundation of the political programme of Bulgaria, and completely estranged her from Serbia.

But besides the nefarious political influences of Russia and Austria-Hungary which worked for the dividing and breaking-up of the strength of the Balkan Slavs and their states, Bulgaria could not escape the far more pernicious influence of the spirit of the age which prevailed in Europe during the last fifty years, and is even now dominating her political counsels and deliberations. The spirit of aggressive selfishness and cunning statecraft emanating from a victorious and powerful Germany, preached and extolled by her state

philosophers and theorists of Prussian Junkerdom, found an easy access in Sofia. That spirit, which contaminated the whole of Europe and proclaimed the doctrine that Might is going before Right, entirely infected the policy of Bulgaria.

Taking all into account, without fear of appearing partial to any one, we may say for the sake of historical accuracy that Serbia was infected in a far lesser degree than Bulgaria by that spirit of exaggerated national consciousness which sees nothing in the world beyond its national interests. We do not wish to say that Serbian politicians possessed in a higher degree than those of Bulgaria some stronger virtues, or that they were free from some national vices, but Serbia being hard pressed by Austria-Hungary, always felt the imperative necessity of an understanding with Bulgaria for coöperation and lasting friendship.

As to Bulgaria, things seemed quite different there. Turkey, ruled by Abdul Hamid, was with every day falling deeper and deeper into corruption and decrepitude—she was no danger. Russia, whatever her bureaucracy might have dreamt when Bulgaria was created, had completely banished from her mind any idea of conquering Bulgaria, and was rather a protector. The Austro-Hungarian danger was far off or was never taken seriously in Sofia. The Bulgarian throne was occupied by Ferdinand of Coburg, a German prince who received his whole political education in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest. Prussia was his model, Kaiser William II his idol, and he en-

deavored with some success to make Bulgaria the Prussia of the Balkans. The Bulgarian people, being obedient by nature and easily disciplined, were just the kind of people who suited his ambition. Being in any case debarred from building his authority upon the divine right and Providence working through his dynasty like his idol in Prussia, he ruled in Bulgaria by flattering the national ambitions and lower instincts and corrupting influential men in Bulgaria. He could temporize and await the propitious moment for the realization of his dream, which was a Bulgaria extending from the Adriatic to Constantinople and himself crowned with the crown of a Byzantine emperor.

The Young Turkish revolution, by promising a reorganization of Turkey as a strong military power, endangered his plans and prompted him to action. The annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1908 brought the German danger nearer to Serbia and embittered Austro-Serbian relations to the highest pitch. Ferdinand approached Serbia at the moment when she was most disposed for making the greatest concessions in Macedonia in exchange for the promise of some help and coöperation against Austria-Hungary. Thus the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of alliance was signed in 1912, and the Balkan League embracing Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro was formed in the same year.

The forming of the Balkan League, together with the triumphant march of the allied armies

through Macedonia and Thrace, was hailed with joy by all sincere friends of the Balkan nations, and called forth many sanguine expectations as to the future of the Balkans. But the Balkan League was dead on the very day upon which the treaty of alliance was signed. It was dead because upon it lay the curse of Prussian statecraft; because it was not animated by the living spirit, which is truth and sincerity.

The Balkan statesmen and governments of 1912 approached each other, negotiated and concluded the treaty of alliance, not in a pious spirit of brotherly union or christian love, animated by a sincere desire not only to fight the old mussulman oppressor and to divide the spoil, but also to further each other's political and economic development, to strengthen and insure each other's state independence and national freedom; but they negotiated the treaty of alliance against Turkey with the secret thoughts of using each other only as a ladder for ascending to the summit of political supremacy in the Balkans. No wonder that such a league could not continue, and that as soon as Turkey was defeated the mask was thrown off and the falsehood on which the first Balkan League was founded became evident to everybody.

The first rift in the lute occurred very soon. It happened in December, 1912. Macedonia was cleared from the Turkish forces; the Serbian army, in pursuit of some miserable remnants of the Turkish regiments defeated at Kumanovo and

Monastir, penetrated to and occupied Durazzo in Albania, and with jubilation celebrated the long-cherished dream of obtaining access to the sea. Adrianople was besieged by the united Serbo-Bulgarian forces, and after some bloody fighting the Bulgarian troops were stalemated before the Chataldja lines. The negotiations for peace were to open in London, whither all the Balkan states were sending their delegates. Austria-Hungary became restless, and already through her papers and diplomatic notes gave expression to her ill-humor and hostile disposition towards Serbia. As Serbia's military successes created a deep impression and called forth such an outburst of national enthusiasm among the Southern Slav population of the Dual monarchy by inspiring their already intense national feeling with new faith and power, the governments of Vienna and Budapest thought that the humiliation and spoliation of Serbia would be the best reaction against the national enthusiasm of the Southern Slavs. Their policy unflinchingly pursued only one end: Serbia even at the cost of new complications must be humiliated and shorn of any advantages she might expect to acquire from the war.

At that moment the Bulgarian delegate to the Peace Conference at London, M. Danev, on his way to London spent several days at Vienna. There he assiduously called upon all persons of high official standing, and gave many interviews to the Vienna and Budapest papers. With all his talents and power he courted the favor of the

Vienna cabinet and public opinion for Bulgaria and her aims. Serbia was left in the lurch. While professing his assurances of Bulgaria's friendship for the Dual monarchy and of her desire to meet the views of the Vienna cabinet, he said not one word in favor of Serbia or her strivings to obtain access to the Adriatic. It was evident that Bulgaria cared very little about the interests of her ally and neighbor; she was bent blindly on the achievement of her own aims, and ready to sacrifice Serbia to the wrath of Austria-Hungary, in order to facilitate the attainment of the object she had in view.

The differences between the Bulgarian views and interests and those pursued by Serbia and Greece were further emphasized during the Peace Conference in London.

The object of the liberation of the christians from Turkish rule was attained in November, 1912, when Turkey had lost the whole of Macedonia and a considerable portion of Thrace. The Greek inhabitants remaining in eastern Thrace and in the environs of Constantinople would surely not prefer the Bulgarian to the Turkish rule. Peace could be concluded, and the spoils be divided among the allies without much trouble; but the Bulgarian government insisted on the conquest of Adrianople and made the surrender of that city *sine qua non* condition of peace. The Turks preferred the continuation of the war to the surrendering of a fortress and a city dear to their national and religious sentiments. Thus Greece

and Serbia were obliged, by the dead letter of the treaty of alliance, to make further sacrifices in blood and money solely to satisfy the Bulgarian ambitions of conquest and pride.

The Bulgarians asked and obtained the Serbian military assistance for the besieging and subsequently for the storming of Adrianople. In meeting this Bulgarian demand for assistance the Serbian government stipulated that it could be given only on the condition of some territorial compensation in Macedonia and revision of the agreement concerning the division of the conquered territories. That assistance, together with the frustration of the Serbian hopes of obtaining access to the Adriatic, entitled Serbia to some kind of compensation on the part of her allies. And that compensation would have been given by any ally and neighbor who would have behaved towards Serbia with the least grain of sincere amity and friendship. But Bulgaria insisted on her own interpretation of the strict letter of the treaty of alliance, and refused to listen to any proposal of the kind. The Bulgarian government, blinded by greed, threw aside all counsels of wisdom and moderation. They considered that the alliance had already given them everything they expected to obtain from it. Since Turkey was beaten and reduced to impotence the alliance had in their view already served its purpose, and had for the future become rather a hindrance and nuisance. They appeared to rejoice at Serbia's obstinacy in insisting on the revision of the treaty and in claim-

ing some compensation, as it gave them the wished-for opportunity to rid themselves immediately of the fiction of an alliance with the very states they wanted to fight and dominate.

Bulgaria has been both condemned and pitied for her treacherous attack on the Serbian army at midnight on the 30th of June, 1913. The sentimental friends of the Balkan nations looked for some scapegoat upon whom to throw the responsibility for such a criminal and foolish ending of the first Balkan League. The persons responsible for it are many, but hardly have they been anything more than puppets in the service of the spirit of greed and statecraft which presided over the councils of the Bulgarians and inspired their actions. It is idle to complain of the end of an ill-begotten alliance. If Bulgaria had not attacked Serbia and Greece on that fatal day of June, 1913, yet war between them was inevitable, as also was its repetition in 1915; and the war between them will be repeated in the future as soon as Bulgaria judges the moment propitious for the realization of her dream of hegemony in the Balkans.

The late Bulgarian premier, M. Gešov, in his recently published volume *The Balkan Alliance*, has tried to exonerate himself and his colleagues in the cabinet, and to throw the whole responsibility for the treachery to his allies upon Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, czar of Bulgaria and a German prince. "In spite of the unanimous decision of the Bulgarian government," M. Gešov writes, "and unknown to the cabinet, the Bulga-

rian armies attacked their allies, the Serbians and Greeks, by order of the tzar of Bulgaria. . . . This was a criminal folly, for which the Bulgarian nation could not be held responsible, as its regular government had not decided to declare war on the allies." But M. Gešov, in attacking the principal actor in the ugly drama of the Balkans, is not attacking and denouncing the tzar of Bulgaria on account of the moral ugliness of his action, but because the open treachery failed to bring in such results as had been looked for in Sofia. To the statesmen around tzar Ferdinand, success is the only measure of the fairness of an enterprise. Had Ferdinand of Coburg succeeded in beating the Greeks and Serbians, and in snatching from them, as the price of victory, the whole of Macedonia together with Salonica, he would have been praised in 1913 as he is praised to-day as the greatest statesman and patriot in Bulgaria, and M. Gešov would never have said a word against his treachery to the alliance. Indeed we must recognize here that tzar Ferdinand acted under the strongest provocation. That provocation was not the obstinacy of Serbia, whose desire for revision of the treaty and some compensation are readily comprehensible and might have been met half way, but he was provoked by a unique opportunity of beating the Serbian and Greek armies and establishing the supremacy of his own troops beyond all doubt. His personal pride had suffered much at that moment because of the failure to conquer Constantinople and to enter that

imperial city in the state and pomp of a Byzantine emperor. He had already ordered everything necessary for such a ceremony on the eve of the failure of his troops to force the Chataldja lines at the very gates of Constantinople, and he needed some sort of solace in a new brilliant feat of arms. Flatterers throughout Europe had praised his talent and wisdom, his army was considered second to none but Prussian troops in efficiency, and how could he permit any lasting success and a portion of military glory to go to his Serbian and Greek neighbors? Had he hesitated, his hesitation would have merited only contempt in the eyes of his imperial idol in Berlin, who dared everything. If he had moral scruples, he would be laughed at by the highly extolled circles of Berlin and Vienna, who were just preparing the violation of peaceful, innocent Belgium, and the plunging of Europe into the most bloody and criminal of wars. Had he entertained fears and doubts as to the success of his enterprise, there was the support of the government of Vienna and Budapest to insure him against failure, promising him all kinds of help and protection. And we have seen how Serbia and the whole world were painfully surprised by the news of the attack of the Bulgarian army by the order of czar Ferdinand.

We have said earlier that it is difficult to fix and determine with any exactitude the nationality of the Macedonian Slavs. *Such was the view of both the Serbian and Bulgarian governments when they drafted and signed the treaty of alliance in*

1912. The second article of the secret appendix to that treaty said:

“Serbia recognizes Bulgaria’s right to the territories east of the Rhodope mountains and the river Struma; Bulgaria recognizes Serbia’s right to the territories situated to the north and west of the Šar mountain.”

It is obvious that the remaining territories could be divided between them, not on the basis of the ethnographical character of their inhabitants, but in virtue of some political and military agreement. And consequently it was done so. They planned an attack upon Turkey, but also an alliance against Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria being considered militarily stronger, was entitled for her greater exertion to the larger portion of the territory to be conquered. Thus a military convention was signed between them as an integral part of the treaty of alliance, by which convention the military duties of the contracting parties were strictly apportioned and determined. But it so happened that Bulgaria was for some reason or other unable to perform fully the duties assigned to her by the convention. Moreover Serbia, besides having taken upon herself part of Bulgaria’s military duty in Macedonia, was asked for and gave the necessary assistance to Bulgaria for the operations around Adrianople. Serbia consequently asserted that Bulgaria by not entirely fulfilling her duties had forfeited the right to part of the whole territory assigned to her by the treaty, and thought *she*, Serbia, having done more

than was provided by the convention, had acquired the right to some compensation. Bulgaria was adamant in her resolve to allow no compensation to Serbia, and stuck to her own interpretation that the line of division in Macedonia had nothing to do with the military convention. And in spite of the third article of the Secret Appendix to the treaty of alliance which runs: "Any dispute which would arise concerning the interpretation and execution of whatever article of the treaty and of the present Secret Appendix of the military convention will be submitted for definite decision to Russia, as soon as one of the contracting parties shall have declared that it considers it impossible to arrive at an agreement by direct negotiations," the czar of Bulgaria light-heartedly delivered his treacherous blow against Serbia and Greece on the eve of the arbitration of the czar of Russia.

The dispute over Macedonia, together with other disputes over the Dobrudja, was liquidated at Bucharest in August, 1913, but since the very date of the signature of the treaty of Bucharest the Bulgarian government has not ceased to protest against it, openly announcing its determination to amend it to its own interest. No doubt can be entertained to-day concerning the mischievous part Austria-Hungary played in the last dramas of the Balkans. Unable to help Bulgaria, her victim and accomplice, at the time, she promised her an early opportunity to wreak her vengeance upon Serbia, since war against the latter was already decided in Vienna, even at the cost

of a general conflagration, as we now know, thanks to signor Giolitti's revelations made in the Italian parliament. Bulgaria was the loser, but Austria-Hungary was the gainer, because the greatest danger which stood in the way of her aggressive designs—the Balkan Alliance—was annihilated; and instead of Serbia receiving a Bulgarian army 200,000 strong to assist her against Austria-Hungary, she only received Bulgarian threats, and was obliged to divide her small forces in order to use part of them for the protection of her lines of communication against bands coming across the Bulgarian frontier.

Some sentimental friends of Bulgaria in the western countries, over-eager to help her—and others wishing to see her as soon as possible actively engaged on the side of the Allies, readily accepted the Bulgarian point of view, that Bulgaria blundered in treacherously attacking in 1913 her allies, but that she had acted under the greatest provocation, and that the best course would be to at once satisfy her territorial claims and thus insure her coöperation with the Allies. It was with that object in view that the diplomacy of the Entente in 1915 undertook the negotiations in Sofia, Nish and Athens which ended in a complete failure.

This failure was foreseen by many who possessed a fair knowledge of the psychology and aims of the governing circles in Sofia. In 1915 as well as in 1913 Bulgaria pursued one and the same object. She had neither changed her feel-

ings of jealousy and animosity towards her neighbors nor abandoned her ambitious desire for supremacy in the Balkans. Therefore the Bulgarian government could not accept the proposals of the Entente powers, as they ran counter to the most cherished Bulgarian desires. The very existence of Serbia was a perpetual menace to her aspiration to supremacy. How could she be expected to contribute to the stability and strength of Serbia or to help the Russian conquest of Constantinople and thus frustrate her own cherished dreams? As long as Constantinople remains in Turkish hands the tzar of Bulgaria may hope to enter it. Moreover she believes in German victory, and as the Central Empires proposed the annihilation of Serbia and division of her territory between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, Sofia was only too eager to accept the bargain, leaving to the future the realization of her ambition in the direction of Constantinople.

Thus Bulgaria had thrown in her lot definitely and irrevocably with the German combination of powers. The words "liberty" and "humanity" had no charm for materialistic Bulgaria. She bid for a greater price, and sold herself to Germany not in rashness of passion but cool-headedly and deliberately. She cannot plead that she was unaware of German methods of warfare and of the full meaning of the "Kultur." Bulgaria made her choice after the atrocities of the Belgian invasion, after the crime of the *Lusitania*, and after the judicial murder of Miss Cavell, and justice

must be done to her according to the merits of her action.

The world has seen, indeed, many an instance of ingratitude of nations, but the ingratitude of Bulgaria towards Russia, who called her to life, and Great Britain and France, who carefully watched and assisted her progress, has surpassed everything of the kind, and is of so abject a character that it blackens human nature in general. But to make it more disgraceful, the brutal act of blind passion was accompanied by such vile cunning and double dealing that the governing circles in Sofia may pride themselves to have beaten every record in this respect also.

Thanks to Bulgaria's action Serbia has passed through a terrible agony such as no living nation has ever experienced in history. The Central Empires have won a very important strategic position, increasing their power of resistance and of evil doing. The war has been prolonged by so many months, and hundreds of thousands of lives must be sacrificed in the Balkans in order to make good the damage caused by the hate and ambition of the Coburg prince and his hirelings in Bulgaria.

Since the very day of the "happy" consummation of the Bulgaro-German alliance all political quarters in Sofia, without distinction of party and shade, have rejoiced over it as being the realization of their innermost desire. The idea of a union of free and independent Balkan states has been broken like an impotent idol and ridiculed like a stupid ideal of weak nations, but unworthy of Bul-

garia, the worthy ally of mighty Germany. We sincerely doubt that that ideal can be ever called to life again. The present struggle is a fearful crucible, and out of it will come a new world ruled by new ideals and a new grouping of nations.

What the ideal of Bulgaria is the cabinets of London, Paris and Petrograd have misunderstood to their own harm. To a certain degree they may be honored by having been the dupes of the Bulgarians' villainous hypocrisy, as in the straightforwardness and solicitude for the good of Bulgaria, they could never have suspected such depravity of human nature, and this not only in a single prince or his government, but in every political quarter of a whole nation. But they could never be excused if they were ever deceived again. The lesson has been paid for by such appalling sacrifices, with the most precious blood shed in the Balkans, and such fearful agony of Serbia, that this must be taken into account in any future dealings with Bulgaria.

Like criminals pursued by evil dreams, Bulgarian politicians after having crucified Serbia fear even her shadow and demand her complete annihilation. If it were the evil destiny of Europe to succumb to the German hegemony, the Serbian nation demands nothing from the future; and to be worthy of her past, she would proudly lie in the same shroud in which the liberty of the world would be laid to rest. Let Bulgaria and her German and Magyar accomplices gloat over the victim of her hate, and share the spoils, as it seems

good to them. But if outraged Right is to come out victorious, and if the wrongs of Europe are to be redressed, Serbia must be protected from any future outburst of Bulgarian hate and vengeance. Serbia does not demand the annihilation of Bulgaria, she may continue to exist, but she must be shorn of the power for evil doing. The future frontiers of Serbia and her railway lines running through the Timok and Vardar valleys being the arteries of Serbia, must be protected by a larger belt of territory. Such an arrangement would not be contrary to the principle of nationality, as the Slav population of a western Bulgaria, up to the river Isker, has very little or nothing of the Mongolian blood in it, and has always tended towards Serbia. During the Berlin Congress, many among them sent petitions to the powers to be incorporated with Serbia. Justice must be done to Serbia; this is demanded by the honor of her Allies, who have pledged their word to that effect.

But here as everywhere the principle of the rule by the consent of those governed must be upheld. We propose only that, after a period of neutral occupation, the Slavs of Bulgaria's western districts should be given the chance of freely expressing themselves whether they wish to remain independent or united with Serbia or Bulgaria.

IX

THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS

WE trust that in the preceding chapters the reader may find enough historico-political material to form a fair opinion as to what was the position of the Southern Slavs on the eve of the present world war, and why their country and people have been exposed to the first and most tremendous blow of the Germans and their allies: the Hapsburg dynasty, the Magyar oligarchy, and the predatory Bulgars. The strategic and economic importance of the provinces inhabited by the Serbo-Croats and the Slovenes has now become so obvious that we think it unnecessary to dwell further upon it. But it is necessary to remind the reader of one fact. In the course of the war, the Germans, convinced of the impossibility of realizing at present all their ambitions in Europe, have announced in the Reichstag, last October, that France can achieve without any further bloodshed the evacuation of her territory and of Belgium, provided, of course, that the Germans are left in the possession of Serbia and remain the indisputable masters of the Balkans. It is obvious, though her thrust against France and Belgium was stupendous, that the principal ambition of Germany lay in the east.

Her hold upon Austria-Hungary has become complete, and if she is left in the possession of the Southern Slav lands her dream of world dominion, far from being shattered, will receive a fresh impulse and indeed be half realized.

The Southern Slavs know all this by centuries of long experience, and their aspirations flow directly from that fact. They think that in accordance with the solemnly acknowledged principle of nationality they have the right to be united in a national state as the sole guarantee of their independence and progress.

Serbia in the present struggle is only the recognized champion of their freedom. She has no ambition of conquest, but only the noble mission and a sacred duty to come to the assistance of her brothers in distress. In view of the enormous sacrifices and recognized loyalty to the cause of the Allies, Serbia has the right to expect the full guarantees for her future independence and development. Fortunately enough, the Allies can give her those guarantees without revoking any principle acknowledged by them or infringing the lawful rights of any other nation.

The Southern Slavs demand only that justice so long denied to them: the riddance of the foreign yoke in whatever form, and to constitute an independent state of all the provinces inhabited by them. No half measures would avail or satisfy them, and any hybrid solution would only prolong their misery and the struggle of nations for the dominion over South-Eastern Europe. For cen-

turies the Southern Slavs have been the prey of the Germans and "the vampire state of the Magyars battenning upon the blood of the neighboring nations"—to use the fit expression of Mr. Seton Watson—but the last struggle has exhausted their energies to such a degree that only by offering a united front they can with success resist the German menace, which will remain real even after Germany's defeat in the present war. We beg the reader to think for a moment what will be the destiny of the Slovenes, numbering merely 1,300,000, in case they should not be united with the Serbo-Croats. Can they have any hope to resist with any chance of success the tremendous force of German expansion? Exhausted in the struggle, deceived in their hopes of freedom and unity, they must bow to the inevitable and accept the German dominion as a decree of fate. Will America, Great Britain, France, or Russia arm ever again all their forces in order to come to their rescue? Why should they create for themselves difficulties where they do not exist?

The same would happen in the case of an indecisive victory of the Allies and of a partial satisfaction of the Southern Slav aspirations. What value can the addition of one or two provinces inhabited by Serbs have for Serbia, while other provinces remain unredeemed and the Austro-Hungarian danger persists? What assistance and protection can Bosnia and Hercegovina find in a Serbia completely exhausted in men and finances? Poor and so sorely tried in the war, Bosnia and

Hercegovina would only be a new burden for Serbia. To find peace and prosperity, Serbia has need of every province inhabited by Serbs. But she cannot be separated from the Croats, as: firstly, it would be impossible to draw the line of division between them; and secondly, if they be constituted as two separate states, all their energies would be sapped by mutual jealousies. The division so cunningly fostered between them by Austria-Hungary would be sanctioned by Europe and made permanent. Instead of presenting a united front to the common enemy, they would enfeeble themselves in mutual strife, and fall an easy prey to a foreign conqueror. Only an arch enemy of both the Serbs and the Croats could propose to divide them into two independent states on the basis of religion. Such an independence would prove a dangerous gift and a diabolical snare for the freedom and very existence of both of them. The Slovenes and the Croats realize this perfectly, and many among them are the most eager advocates of unity pure and simple with Serbia.

The present war is also for the Serbo-Croats the last phase in the long struggle with the Magyars. It is self-evident that Serbia cannot leave any portion of her population under the dominion of the Magyars. The freedom and unity of the whole race remains Serbia's first and paramount duty. But without the Southern Slav provinces in South Hungary, Serbia would be unable to build her future prosperity on a sound basis.

Baranya, Bačka, and the western Banat represent the provinces which have suffered least from the war, and being the rich granary they are, they can economically and financially enable the future Southern Slav state to weather the fearful economic crisis which surely will rage in Europe, as an inevitable consequence of this prolonged war. Besides that, the Serbian provinces in South Hungary protect Serbia from an invasion from the north and cover Belgrade from a sudden and direct attack. As the geographical situation of Belgrade makes it the commanding position at the confluence of large rivers and at one of the most important cross-roads between the East and West, it is necessary that Belgrade as the capital of the state, as well as the commercial road passing through it, should be protected by a wide belt of territory, if this state is to prosper and the roads are to be rendered secure. Any considerable number of Serbs left under Magyar rule would mean the continuation of the unsettled conditions in South-Eastern Europe. The Southern Slavs have every reason to expect, that after the defeat of the Central Empires, their claims with regard to the Magyars will be fully satisfied.

But those claims of Serbia in respect of the Banat are complicated by the presence of large numbers of Roumanians inhabiting the eastern part of that province, for whose freedom and unity Roumania has gallantly entered into war on the side of the Allies.

The Serbs and Roumanians have lived for more

than a thousand years in close relations and neighborhood, and history has not yet chronicled a single instance of conflict between them. The sympathy for Roumania's national aspirations and rights can nowhere be felt more strongly than in Serbia. Their cases being identical, now as in the future, they ought always to be found side by side. We may fairly hope that the teaching of their past history, as well as hardships and glories of the present brotherhood in arms, will inspire them with a lofty determination for complete agreement. No petty quarrel over a few villages in the Banat should mar the good relations between them, nor obscure the clear vision of their mutual interests and need for cooperation in the future.

All the arguments that we have used in the "Problem of the Adriatic" concerning the relations between the Southern Slavs and Italy, can with equal force be applied to their relations with Roumania. In addition let us only state that Roumania neither economically nor strategically needs Banat as badly as Serbia does. Moreover, by incorporating Transylvania and many other counties in Hungary with a predominantly Roumanian population, Roumania will obtain within her future frontiers such large Magyar and German minorities, that she will have every incentive not to be burdened by Slav minorities also. We are fully confident that a fair compromise will be reached between them. But again we insist that all strategic, economic and other considerations

for the future delimitation of nations must be subordinated to the supreme principle of the free will of inhabitants of the districts with mixed population.

When in 1913 Albania was created, Serbia had good reasons to object to it, because the creation of Albania was promoted by Austria-Hungary not out of any friendly feelings towards the Albanians, but by enmity to Serbia, in order to prevent her from gaining access to the sea and to use Albania for creating fresh difficulties for Serbia. But with the disappearance of Austria-Hungary, and under the changed conditions of future Europe, Serbia will have nothing against a free, independent Albania; but will be ready to assist her in coping with the many and serious difficulties attending the making of a nation out of many unruly and independent clans which, for centuries, have recognized no higher authority than their chieftains and no other laws but their tribal customs.

For thirteen centuries the Serbs and Albanians have lived in the closest touch and neighborhood. They have mingled to such an extent that it is difficult to say where the Albanians begin and the Serbs end. They have fought each other, like the Scotch and the English; but they also have had centuries of friendship, good understanding, and mutual help; and they have possibilities of comprehending each other better than is presumed in many European capitals. The whole history of their mutual relations shows that Serbs and Al-

banians have always lived on friendly terms when left alone without foreign interference. Albania wants peace, organization, and true patriotism, which could never be introduced from abroad. Reconciled with Serbia, Albania may enjoy peace.

The Albanians have full right to organize themselves into a national self-governing community and the Southern Slavs must be the first to recognize and respect that right by proving a loyal and friendly neighbor to Albania. They expect that the other will do the same, and that the principle "Balkan to the Balkan nation" will be upheld with respect to Albania.

What are the aspirations of the Southern Slavs with respect to Bulgaria we have said in another chapter. But the aspirations of the Southern Slavs rightly go beyond the Southern Serbian frontier. The existing Serbo-Greek frontier was drawn in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest. But every one felt that this treaty settled nothing and was from the very outset considered as a makeshift and a temporary solution. Large numbers of Southern Slavs remained outside the Serbian Southern frontier, and were incorporated with Greece in 1913. Some rectification of the frontier appears here necessary. The development of the future Southern Slav State is not to be thought of without a free access to the *Ægean*. Salonica by its mixed population of Greeks, Turks, Jews and Slavs belongs to none of them ethnographically. But geographically and economically Salonica belongs to Serbia. The valleys of the

Morava and the Vardar constitute a geographical and economic unit extending naturally to the gulf of Salonica. The main commercial artery which unites West and East, passing by way of Ljubljana-Zagreb, Belgrade, Nish and Skoplje finds a natural outlet in Salonica. The prosperity of Salonica depends entirely upon the development of the future Southern Slav state. Greece has no need of it, she already has too much coast, and Salonica in her possession means only an unjust monopoly and a check upon the commercial development of Serbia. Greece ought not to prevent her from completing her unity and independence by obtaining free access to Salonica. Even if Greece had the will to do so would the effort be compensated by the advantages deriving from it?

It is in the best interest of Greece, that the Allies, in the future arrangement of South-Eastern Europe, should solve the question of Salonica, taking into account the real factors which dominate it. For the loss of Salonica Greece can be compensated by some other port and territories in Asia Minor. Salonica needs not to be inevitably incorporated with Serbia: it might be a free city whose freedom and neutrality would be guaranteed by some international arrangement. In this way justice, peace, and liberty would be best secured.

Thus united and constituted in one state with natural frontiers the Southern Slavs can prosper and be able to fulfill their functions of a bulwark against any idea of world dominion. But many

a reader will be naturally prompted to ask what will be the constitution of this future state.

We have an important document which defines, in this respect, the standpoint of the Southern Slavs. A conference was held at Corfu last summer, at which the members of preceding Serbian coalition-cabinet, the members of the present cabinet and the representatives of the Yugoslav Committee of London were present. These various factors, with the aid of the president of the Serbian parliament, discussed many questions which concern the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes, and as a result of their deliberations a resolution was adopted which we quote.

“As the authorized representatives of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, we declare that the desire of our whole race is to liberate itself from any foreign domination and to constitute a free, national and independent state—a desire, based on the principles that every people are free to dispose of themselves. We agree that this state must be founded on modern and democratic principles, which follows:

“1. The state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—who also are known by the name of Southern Slavs or Yugoslavs—shall be a free and independent kingdom, whose territory shall be indivisible and all these three-named co-nationals shall have a single allegiance. This state shall be a constitutional monarchy, democratic and parliamentary, having at its head the dynasty Karageorgević, which has always shared the national sentiments

and has put above all the liberty and the will of the people;

“2. The name of this state shall be ‘The kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’; and the sovereign shall bear the title of ‘King of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes’;

“3. This State shall have one coat of arms, one flag and one crown; these emblems shall be composed of the present national emblems and its unity shall be symbolized by the coat of arms and the flag of the Kingdom. The flag of the Kingdom, as the symbol of the unity, will be hoisted on all State buildings;

“4. The special Serbian, Croat and Slovene flags have equal right and shall be freely displayed on all occasions; the same applies to the special coats of arms;

“5. The three national denominations: Serb, Croat and Slovene, are legally on an equal footing in the kingdom and every one can use them freely at any occasion of public life and before all authorities;

“6. The two alphabets, Cirillic and Latin, have the same rights and shall be used freely on the territory of the kingdom; the royal authorities and the local autonomous authorities have the rights and the duty to employ the two alphabets, according to the wishes of the citizens;

“7. All recognized religions shall be freely and publicly professed; the religions: orthodox, Roman-catholic and mussulman, which are chiefly professed by our nation, shall be equal and shall

have equal rights from the state point of view. The legislative body shall carefully safeguard the confessional freedom according to the spirit and the traditions of the whole of our nation;

“8. The calendar shall be made uniform as soon as possible;

“9. The territory of the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes shall extend over the territory on which our nation—denominated under the above three names—is living in compact masses and without injury to the vital interests of the community. Our nation does not want anything that belongs to another and is only claiming what is justly due to it. The nation desires to liberate itself and constitute its unity. For this reason it firmly refuses any partial solution of the problem of its liberation from the Austro-Hungarian domination and desires a union with Serbia and Montenegro in one single state, constituting one indivisible unit;

“10. The Adriatic sea shall—in the interest of liberty and equal rights of all nations—be free and open to all;

“11. All citizens on the territory of the kingdom are equal and have the benefit of the same rights and privileges, according to laws;

“12. The elections of the representatives of the national parliament shall be by universal, equal, direct and secret vote; the same applies for the election in the municipalities and other administrative institutions. The vote will take place in each municipality;

“13. The constitution established after the con-

clusion of peace by the constituting assembly, elected by universal, direct and secret suffrage, will serve as a basis for the whole life of state; it will be the beginning and the end of all authority and all rights by which the whole national life will be regulated. The constitution will give the people the possibility of exercising its particular energies in the local autonomous districts delimited by the natural, social and economic conditions. The constitution must be adopted in its entirety by a certain majority, as ordered by the constituting assembly. The constituting assembly, as well as the laws voted by it, shall be valid only after the King's sanction."

This document was signed by Mr. N. Pasić, the prime minister of Serbia, and Dr. Trumbić, a member of the Austrian parliament, chief of the national Croat party at the diet of Dalmatia. It follows that the future Southern Slav state is to be a true fatherland with complete equality for all of them: Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. That state can only be a commonwealth based upon the broadest principles of democracy; a nation governed in the interests and by the full consent of the governed.

The Southern Slavs take Italy for their pattern. The existing differences between the Southern Slavs are less than those which existed between Piedmont, Tuscany, Naples, and Sicily. Nevertheless, the Italian statesmen of the *risorgimento* were able to create a united Italy. This unity has proved a success; and the Southern Slavs believe that their unity will be equally successful,



THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTHERN SLAVS

THE growth and marvelous development of the United States having exercised a mighty influence all over the world, could not but influence also the life of the Southern Slavs. Nearly a million of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from Austria-Hungary have migrated to this country, where they have found refuge, freedom and prosperity. Many of them, by remitting smaller or larger sums to their families at home, have helped the Southern Slav population in its hard struggle against political oppression and economic exploitation by their masters. Besides that American social and political institutions moulded their soul and imbued them with a spirit of freedom and human dignity that never more could they meekly endure the humiliating conditions at home. The returning emigrant imported into Austria-Hungary American ideals of Democracy. But unable to change the established order of things or to shake the oppressive dominance of Germans and Magyars, their restlessness and dissatisfaction engendered a spirit of brooding revolt. Their eyes and their hopes were more fre-

quently turned to Serbia. But this served only to increase the vigilance of their oppressors and to precipitate the present crisis in Europe.

Especially in the time of the Russo-British jealousies, Great Britain was prejudiced to the cause of the Southern Slavs, considering them as political cats-paws in the service of Russia. She preferred Turkish rule to Slav independence, and consequently at the Berlin Congress her diplomacy was instrumental in the prolongation of Turkish misrule in the Southern Slav provinces as well as in handing over to Austria-Hungary the Serbian provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

How the Southern Slavs suffered at the hands of the Great European powers can be well illustrated by the instructive story of the treacherous strangulation of freedom and independence of the old-time Serbo-Croatian republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik).

It was during the Napoleonic wars that Western Europe for the first time came into contact with Southern Slavs. The Frenchmen having occupied Ragusa, on January 6th, 1808, Marmont, General-in-Chief in Dalmatia, declared: "The Republic of Ragusa has ceased to exist." Her government, the senate, as well as the law courts were dissolved by the same order. But the British fleet ceaselessly cruised up and down, and prevented the French from maintaining secure communication between Italy and Dalmatia. In 1808 the Dalmatian island of Lissa was made the port of call for British ships, and after several successful en-

gagements between the British and French, Lissa was strongly fortified and formally taken possession of in 1812. The island prospered under British rule, and the population rose from 4000 to 11,000, and from Lissa the British extended their occupation of all the Ragusan islands and blockaded Ragusa itself. Upon the islands the British set up a provisional government under Ragusan nobles, and the old Ragusan laws were revived. Captain Lowen issued a proclamation to the Ragusans declaring that: "The English and Austrian forces were advancing towards this country to give it back its liberty. . . . Remember that you bear a glorious name, and fight as the Spaniards and the Russians have fought to restore your independence."

The Ragusan count Caboga and marchese Bona raised a force of 3000 men who coöperated with the British. The French were driven out from Canali, and when, on November 15th, 1813, captain Hoste arrived at Ragusavecchia, he at once had the Ragusan standard of St. Blaize hoisted, saluted it with twenty-one guns from his frigate, and proclaimed the independence of the Republic.

On January 3rd, 1814, the Austrian general Milutinović arrived before Ragusa at the head of two battalions, and acting upon the instructions of Vienna planned the occupation of Ragusa by the Austrians. When twenty-five days later the French garrison of Ragusa capitulated, the Anglo-Austrians were to enter town at midday on January 28th, 1814, but the insurgents who had co-

operated with them were not to be admitted until they had been disarmed. Count Caboga, who had been previously recognized as Commander-in-Chief of the Insurgent Forces besieging Ragusa, was most indignant, because Milutinović had promised only a few days before that on the surrender of the town 200 armed insurgents should enter it together with the British and Austrian troops, that the Ragusan flag should be raised on the forts together with those of Austria and Great Britain, and that the civil Government should be carried on by Caboga and a committee of nobles. Thus the Ragusans were betrayed and the independence of the Republic of Ragusa strangled by Austrian treachery, in which the British probably played an unwilling part.

On the following day the Austrian standard was raised on the Orlando column before the Rector's palace, and the British fleet set sail a few days later. The Powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 definitely handed over to Austria the state of Ragusa and the islands pertaining to it. But the Ragusan archipelago remained under British protection until July 16th, 1815, when it was handed over to the Austrians. The Ragusans fervently hope to-day that the injustice done to them a hundred years ago will be made good now, and foreign rule over them cease for ever.

The Slav movement in Austria-Hungary for autonomy or independence seldom found sympathy in Western countries. This was so, partly owing to mistrust of Russia and partly owing to

the strange ignorance of Slav things in general. All Western ideas about the Slavs have until quite recently been formed on the basis of the biased information from German sources. For a thousand years the Germans have been constantly encroaching upon the Slav territory, and they knew that the decisive battle between the German and Slav worlds was approaching, and it is a new proof of the German insight and magnificent organization that they understood how to suggest about the Slav prejudices useful to them. Moreover, owing to the fatal blunder of the Russian tsar Nicholas I, who saved Austria by defeating the Hungarian revolutionaries, the Magyars were until these last days considered as champions for freedom, and complaints against the fearful oppression of the Slav nations by the Magyar oligarchy were disregarded or decried as mere Panslavic agitation.

Happily the Western nations awoke before it was too late. Thanks to many independent and unprejudiced authors, who studied matters at the spot, a better knowledge was spread concerning Southern Slavs, and their just grievances against the Germano-Magyar rule in Austria-Hungary moved all sincere friends of European liberties. The annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, when a solemn international treaty was violated, gave an insight into the political moral of German statesmen and was a prelude to the violation of Belgium. The world at last realized that the complete subjugation of the Southern Slavs and the

crushing of Serbia was only a necessary step to the realization of the vast and ambitious scheme of German domination over the world.

The political opinion in the West suddenly perceived that the long neglected or simply ignored Southern Slav question had come into the foreground and could no longer be put off. But the importance of that question is even yet dimly conceived and hardly generally understood; although very able political men in Europe have clearly professed that the Southern Slav question is a big European problem, and requires to be treated according to its importance, independent of any temporary policy towards Russia or to any other state of Europe. It will be the key of the remaking of all Europe on a new and broader basis.

Meanwhile since the outbreak of the present war, the American pioneers and the American public have already done very much. The Southern Slav claims to freedom, unity and self-government have been met in the United States with warm and sincere sympathy.

Serbia in her heroic struggle receives to-day all assistance moral and material, not only from the American government, but from the public—which is rather more important, and a pledge of fruitful results beneficent to both nations.

First the correspondents of American papers, all of them independent and unprejudiced observers, have proved themselves without a single exception sincere and convinced champions of the Southern Slav cause, after having visited Serbia

with the Serbian nation and its aspirations. After them the Serbian Relief Committee, the Rockefeller's Medical Missions and others have done really a herculean work. With devotion and unsurpassed self-sacrifice they have organized a fight against epidemic disease, the most dreadful of Serbia's enemies, many members of them falling as victims of that campaign. It was a work of love and human pity, and has won the hearts of every Serbian for the noble sons and daughters of the United States. And as is always the case with sincerely loving men, those who have done most for Serbia, even imperiling their own lives, have been openly protesting how little they have done for Serbia, and how great a debt democracy owes to Serbia in this war. All of them, like the correspondents and independent writers on Serbia, have been the best eye-witnesses of the hardships, endurance and bravery of the Serbian soldiers, of the unspeakable sufferings, of the terrible losses sustained by the entire nation. But more than that. They have spread through America a better knowledge of Serbia and the character of her nation. They have brought the testimony that the Serbian peasant, who constituted 90 per cent of the Serbian population, is not only a brave soldier, but a gentle and lovable creature, very modest and endowed with a deep feeling of gratitude for the good done to him. They have bravely denied the poisonous calumnies about the Southern Slav nation, systematically fabricated in Vienna for reasons now obvious to every one. All

of them have gone to Serbia with rich presents for her wounded and suffering ones, and have returned home enriched by the love, sympathy and blessings of a grateful nation.

We sincerely desire and fervently hope that the relations between America and the Southern Slavs will not stop short with these noble beginnings of official and private help given to Southern Slavs during a world war. It would be a pity if the seeds so generously sown would be neglected, the field abandoned and the harvest never brought in. And the Southern Slav field is promising a very rich harvest in every respect. At last America by force of historical events has been brought in closer contact with the Southern Slav nation; she has already taken part in its destiny; but it is necessary now to enlarge and deepen the existing relations and to work purposely for the remaking of a nation in a powerful and free unity, and the beneficent results for world peace will appear at once.

The Southern Slavs, owing to their past history and to the present social organization, being without powerful commercial classes or an hereditary aristocracy, can develop, if unhampered by the encroachments of other aggressive nations, only as a peaceful democracy, devoid of any imperialistic tendency. The United States have every political interest in helping and strengthening the formation of such political organizations throughout Europe. The Southern Slavs, when all united in one national state, will number about 13,000,000.

They can be no danger to any neighbor, but *can* be a mighty wall against any state or coalition of states which should wish to use the Adriatic as a basis for a policy of domination and conquest. The intensity of their national feeling and the uncompromising desire for independence, together with the fighting qualities of the Southern Slavs, are the best guarantee for the freedom and independence of their neighbors, as the Southern Slavs, jealous of their own liberty, will be the first to fight any new attempt at a conquest of the Balkans, no matter from what quarter.

But there is a very grave question before the United States: to whom shall the islands of the Dalmatian archipelago in the Adriatic belong? Poor, without any world industry and commerce, the Southern Slavs will have neither the means nor the ambition to build a strong navy. The Dalmatian archipelago in the hands of the Southern Slav state would be the best guarantee for the world that these islands and channels will never be used against the freedom of the sea, as may easily be the case in the hands of a commercial and more powerful nation. A little more business-like policy and sound egotism can be useful to the United States in this case, if they think to assure the freedom of the sea in the Mediterranean. Fortunately both a business-like policy and sound egotism are in perfect harmony with the moral principles so solemnly proclaimed by the Entente Powers at the beginning of the war, viz., that the national rights of small nations will be at

last fully recognized. The Dalmatian islands ethnographically and commercially belong to the Southern Slavs, and what would be the results of the Italian occupation of them we have already dealt with in a previous chapter: "The Problem of the Adriatic" from the point of view of Italian and Southern Slav relations. But it is the duty of the United States politicians to think well over what would be the consequences of such an occupation for the freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean.

Humanity would be far more happy and progressive if the nations would keep alive the memory of the evils and miseries of which their history is full. It is the pious desire of every friend of humanity that the present war should be the last, and that the European nations should find out better means for settling their differences than by sword and fire. But let us have no illusions; however sweeping may be the changes of the political map of Europe, her nations cannot be cured at once from evil thoughts dictated by Fear and Hatred, inspired by ambitious desire for wealth and dominion under which they have suffered and worked until now. It would be foolish policy to demolish the natural locks and to open wide the sluices to the muddy tide of swollen ambitions. As the flood can never come from the small nations, the best means for stemming up that tide is to strengthen and fortify their position. Unsatisfied or weak, they can easily be ensnared by the wiles of insinuating diplomacy, or

simply trampled upon like Belgium and Serbia, and their dead body used by force or by consent to swell the forces of the conquering tide. The Southern Slav nation is the best example for the illustration of the above truth. If united and fortified in its ethnographical boundaries it would become satisfied and contented. The entire impetuosity of its temperament and the ardent intensity of its patriotism would be turned into a peaceful channel for the economic development of its vast territories, for the more noble achievements in the arts and sciences of its young and unfettered genius. The Southern Slavs would become a conservative power, jealously guarding their unity and independence. The interests and general line of policy of the Southern Slav state would be in complete harmony with the policy and interests of the United States.

The fighting qualities of the Southern Slavs have not only called forth the admiration of the world, but they constitute a force which has entered into the calculation of the statesmen and cabinets of Europe. It can be used for good or for evil. They can be most nobly employed if allied to the forces of world democracy. Eminently peaceful and the sincere friend of liberties in Europe, the United States would lose nothing of her civilizing value if they would surround themselves with smaller nations, who would look up to them for spiritual guidance and assistance, and be able to render them effective and valuable service in fighting on their side for the triumph

of those ideals and principles which make the *raison d'être* of the United States.

The United States have obtained the most noble and durable results in their history when their policy has been both just and bold. In promoting the constitution of the united Southern Slav nation in a strong and really independent state within its ethnographical frontiers, the policy of the United States would be both bold and noble. It would be in complete harmony with the openly proclaimed principle of nationality and self-government of each people for which they went to fight. Straightforward and dignified this country will never stoop to bargain with the ideals and just aspirations of smaller nations. In giving a friendly hand to the Southern Slavs in the critical hour of their history, when their longed-for dream of freedom and unity will be either realized or crippled, the United States would most beautifully crown the generous action of disinterested help given to Serbia during war.

In the remaking of the Southern Slav nation a fine opportunity for insight and true statesmanship is offered to the United States.

The strategic and military advantages which the United States might acquire by such a policy are obvious. The Serbo-Croats, united in their ethnographical frontiers, would be strong enough to resist for a long time any power which should try to incorporate their country in a world empire, or to use the Adriatic ports as a basis for a policy of conquest. The freedom of the sea which

should and must remain the paramount principle concerning the Mediterranean, can never be imperilled by the Southern Slav state, which possesses no navy and no means to build one in the future.

The United States can be proud of the fact that here, as in Belgium, their interests are in full harmony with the high principle of freedom and justice to small nations. Can they fail to act thus without doing wrong to her moral and material interests?

XI

COMMERCIAL POSSIBILITIES WITH THE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE

MANY signs are at hand that America will never return to her pre-war disinterestedness; her moral and commercial interests are in Europe, and she must pay greater attention than heretofore to European affairs. The Southern Slav state in South-Eastern Europe, like Belgium in the North-west, is a key country. Having from the American point of view the greatest analogy with Belgium, the Southern Slav state must be the object of America's special care. It will not be enough to help the unity and independence of the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes, but it will be necessary to assist them economically and politically in making their country a prosperous state, in order to be able to fulfill the function of a strong barrier against any design for conquest coming from the north or the east. In performing a similar function Belgium was an ideal country. But Belgium had a serious disadvantage, she was too weak and powerless to resist the German onslaught. This mistake must not be repeated in the Balkans.

This future state, inhabited by a homogeneous,

warlike nation of about fourteen millions, will be, from the military point of view, in a better position than Belgium to defend herself from any future attack. But unlike Belgium she will be for a prolonged period in great need of financial and economic assistance from abroad.

The present struggle has made obvious the truth that national and political interests must precede the purely commercial and economic ones. During the last generation France, because of her national interest, has financially assisted Russia, although economically and commercially Russia was in far greater dependence of Germany. The future Southern Slav state called to life by the superhuman endurance and sacrifices of its people, and by generous help and blood sacrifices also of its allies, is a most natural ally of democracy. America will have every political and moral interest to assist the progress and development of the Southern Slav state as of a wall protecting the world's peace and communications.

The question arises now what can this state, independently of any political consideration, offer to the United States, from a purely economic and commercial interest, in exchange for their financial and economic assistance? Fortunately for both of them their economic interests are in such complete agreement, that the harmony of their national interests can be greatly enhanced by them.

With its 13,000,000 inhabitants and a territory of some 260,000 square kilomètres (about 100,000

square miles), and an extensive sea-coast this new state will be by no means a negligible quantity. America will have every interest to prevent any other military and industrial country from subjugating it economically, as economic subjugation might easily lead to political and military enslavement. But besides that negative interest the United States must look to capture for their trade and industry the Southern Slav state, as its commercial and economic importance will greatly arise in the near future.

In 1912 Serbia's foreign trade amounted to about forty million dollars, representing less than 2% of the American trade and consequently arousing very little interest here; but it must be remembered that Serbia without access to the sea, shut up on every side, had the outlet for her commerce only in Austria and Germany. Both of them did everything in their power to handicap Serbia's economic development, since any increase of her strength meant an increase in the obstacles against their preconceived plan of the conquest of Serbia and Salonica. But the potential resources of Serbia are very great, and Austria-Hungary, whilst hampering Serbia's development, strove to exclude any other competitor from the Serbian market. The best proof of this may be seen in the fact that when in 1879 Serbia concluded her first commercial treaty with Great Britain, Austria-Hungary put her veto to it and caused the resignation of the Ristić's cabinet which had negotiated that treaty. Likewise when Serbia in

1905 negotiated a tariff union with Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary vetoed it and subsequently declared the tariff war with Serbia known as the pig war.

But in 1913 Serbia had nearly doubled her territory of 1912, and the future Southern Slav state will be quite a new and economically far more important country. In 1912 Serbia had a population of less than three millions and a territory of 48,000 kilomètres (18,650 square miles). The Southern Slav state, with her thirteen million inhabitants and a territory of about 260,000 square kilomètres (100,000 square miles), must after the war have a foreign trade at least five times greater than Serbia of 1912.

American commerce will have the best opportunity of capturing the greatest part of it. But the buying and selling power of Greater Serbia, liberated from Austro-German economic and political thralldom, will soon increase to unprecedented proportions. Owing to unsettled political conditions and hindrances artificially inspired by Austria-Hungary against Serbian development and the merciless exploitation of their natural resources in favor of alien German elements, all the Southern Slav provinces have remained backward, and are, after Albania, economically and commercially the least developed country in Europe. That such a state of things was not the result of the incapacity of the inhabitants, nor of the scarcity of its natural resources can be proved by historical records. During Roman conquest the

valleys of the Save and the Morava were considered as the richest granary of the empire. Large imperial cities—Sirmium (to-day Mitrovica), Singidunum (Belgrade), Naissos (Nish), Ulpiana (Liplian)—flourished there teeming with life and wealth. The unnatural diversion of trade to Vienna and Budapest has caused those cities to shrink to mere unimportant provincial towns. The Americans who retreated with the Serbian army through Montenegro and Scutari were shocked by the wilderness and poverty of the basin of the Boyana river. But professor Jiriček of the Vienna university tells us that:

“In Serbian times this region now so desolate was in a most flourishing condition and had a large population and numerous beautifully situated towns. Even in the sixteenth century Italian travelers who ascended the course of Boyana compared this green land with its many villages to their own fair country. Large Latin and Oriental monasteries stood peacefully side by side. These cities enjoyed important privileges granted by the Serbian kings, tsars and despots, and their citizens occupied important positions in the government service, the ruling princes themselves often visited these districts. The ports plied a busy trade,” etc.¹

The Serbo-Croat Republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), the secular rival of Venice, well known in Western Europe by her wealth and polity, made

¹ Villary, *The Republic of Ragusa*, p. 137.

all her riches by trade with mediæval Southern Slav states: Bosnia, Serbia, Zeta, and Macedonia. Dubrovnik had her colonies all over the Balkan peninsula, and her consuls visited and regularly reported on all important mining and commercial centers in the Southern Slav countries. Her colonies flourished in Great Britain, as proves the Ragusan cemetery in Southampton, and in the Low Countries, besides Spain and the Near East. Her vessels plied in all the European seas, bringing the western commodities to Southern Slav countries, and selling in the western markets the raw products of Balkan mining and agricultural industries. The Austrian occupation of Dalmatia has not only strangled the liberty of a commercial republic, independent for twelve centuries, but has killed also the commerce of her ports and obliged a population of the finest sailors in the world to emigrate to the United States, Argentina, and elsewhere.

The field for American capital and enterprise to develop the natural resources and to foster the commerce of the Southern Slav state will be enormous, and we can enumerate only some of the chief lines. First of all, this state must enlist foreign capital to enlarge or to build the ports that will come into her possession. If the ports of Fiume (Rieka) and Šibenik would be able to accommodate the future traffic, the Dalmatian ports of Spalato (Splet), Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and a port on the coast of Montenegro must be greatly enlarged and reconstructed. If Salonica

should become a free and neutral port many improvements must take place in it after the war, in order to make that port the finest in the Mediterranean, a real emporium of world commerce and enterprise. There is no need to appeal specially to the Americans in that matter, as the building and organization of commercial ports will best suit their skill, enterprise and experience.

Simultaneously with the building and improvements of the ports the Southern Slav state must pay their best attention to the speedy construction of a whole set of railway lines leading to the ports, and conveying the goods to be exported and imported from abroad. One of the main arteries of this state will still be the existing railway line Fiume-Zagreb-Belgrade and Belgrade-Nish-Salonica (about 800 miles). But that line has to be greatly improved. Some portions will have to be shortened, such as Karlovac-Sisak and Mitrovica-Zemlin. Many bridges if they are not destroyed must be replaced by stronger structures in order to enable the traffic to be done by locomotives of the heaviest types. We must expect that the rolling stock on all existing lines will be carried away or destroyed as a consequence of the war. Thus the rebuilding, improvements and re-equipment with rolling stock of all the existing railway lines in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Banat would be an enterprise appealing to American capital and attractive to American constructive talent. But besides the existing lines, new lines must be constructed as soon as possible. The lines already

projected and partly in construction are the following: Belgrade-Malakrsna-Požarevac-Negotin-Raduevac on the Lower Danube (about 140 miles), Kraguevac - Kralevo - Raška-Mitrovica (Kossovo field) (about 100 miles); Kruševac-Tulari-Kuršumlia-Priština (100 miles); Ferizović-Prizren along the river Drin to Skutari and the Adriatic (180 miles); Prizren-Dibra-Struga-Ohrid-Monastir (140 miles); Spalato-Konjica-Sarajevo-Donja Tuzla-Belgrade (250 miles); Spalato-Gospić-Karlovac (150 miles); Veles Monastir (70 miles); Kumanovo-Kriva Palanka (40 miles); Skoplje-Tetovo-Gostivar-Kičevo-Monastir (100 miles). Besides these, new lines recognized as of first necessity for economic development, some of the existing narrow gauge lines through Bosnia and Serbia should be rebuilt to standard gauge to conform to and link up with the established lines—viz., Bosna Brod-Sarajevo-Mostar-Ragusa (200 miles), Sarajevo-Višegrad-Užice (80 miles). Of course the extensive building of the new lines of standard gauge will require the construction of many new feeder lines of narrow gauge connecting the mountainous districts with the fertile plains and larger towns. Only this short survey of railway-building in Greater Serbia (more than a thousand miles), which must take place immediately after the war, is enough to excite the interest of American capitalists and railway men, and as the Serbian government will welcome any American action in this direction we hope that best results will follow.

If American capital, talent, and experience were

to be employed for the construction of the Southern Slav ports and railway lines, thus promoting the economic development of the Southern Slav state, many favorable results would be instantly forthcoming, besides the interest in payment for the invested capital and remuneration of skilled workers. With the development of the natural resources of the Southern Slav country the buying capacity of its inhabitants would be raised to a new unprecedented level. The products of American industries would thus find a market increasing in importance every day.

Independently but parallel with the construction of railway lines there is another project which has of late been broached in the governing circles of Serbia, and whose realization might greatly stimulate the economic development of New Serbia and of all neighboring countries. It is the project of building a navigable waterway through Serbia connecting the Danube with Salonica. As every student of Balkan geography knows, Nature has provided, in this otherwise mountainous country, the easiest passage from the basin of the Mediterranean into central Europe. The tributaries of the rivers Morava and Vardar running in two opposite directions have their head sources on a low plateau, forming the watershed between the Black Sea and the Ægean Sea, only 1500 feet above sea-level, quite indistinctly marked, thus affording the easiest passage for any road from Belgrade to Salonica naturally turning Serbia to the Ægean.

It is believed that the projected waterway

should, of course, follow these rivers, running parallel with railway lines Smederevo-Nish-Salonica. In the middle ages, before the arrival of the Turks, the Morava was navigable, and it can again be made so at relatively small cost. By merely regulating its course from Stalać to Smederevo on the Danube a navigable waterway can be obtained, and the cost can be paid out by making available many thousands of hectares of most valuable land now useless owing to the frequent inundations. The same applies to the Vardar in its lower reaches. The marshy ground on both its banks, where nothing grows but thistles, is a permanent source of malaria and other diseases. From Stalać upwards, the Morava, as well as the Vardar from Kumanovo to Gevgeli, should be canalized by means of locks on a length of some 300 miles.

When the Austro-Germans last year conquered Serbia their first thought was turned towards this project. By obtaining a cheaper route to Salonica the development of the mineral resources of Serbia would be enormously stimulated. But not only Serbia but the future national Magyar state, as well as Transylvania and Bohemia, would avail themselves of that route, as all their rivers flowing into the Danube would be naturally connected with the waterway Smederevo-Nish-Salonica. The agricultural and mineral products of Bohemia, Hungary and the central Balkan countries would find an easy access to the sea, and an outlet to the western European markets without being obliged

to pass through Germany, or by the Lower Danube and the Straits. The distance from Budapest to the nearest seaport, Rieka (Fiume), is about 440 miles, the same as from Belgrade. The distance by waterway to Salonica would be from Budapest 600 miles and from Belgrade 460 miles. The places in Hungary situated on the rivers Theiss and Maros are nearer to Salonica and further from Fiume than Budapest is.

The present waterway from Belgrade by the Danube, Black and Ægean seas, to Piræus is $600 + 255 + 357$, in all some 1200 nautical miles long; whereas the projected waterway through Serbia would be $350 + 265 = 615$ nautical miles—i. e., about 600 nautical miles shorter to any port on the Mediterranean or to western Europe. Goods imported or exported by all countries of the basin of the Middle Danube would shorten their way considerably and avoid the paying of the heavy taxes through the Straits, as well as at the Sulina and the Iron Gates. The projected waterway would tend to minimize the importance of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus for the rest of Europe with the exception of Russia, and this can only be in the interest of a durable peace. Here we have touched only the principal features of the project, hoping that the American banking and engineering houses will fully discuss its possibilities at the conclusion of the peace, when the opportunity for its realization would arise.

As Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia, together with all other Southern Slav provinces that will make up

the future Southern Slav state, have no manufacturing industries, they would be the natural customer of this country in exchange for their mining products. The leading place might easily be taken by American metallurgical industries. Of course, many industries will be created in New Serbia, especially those connected with agriculture and the exploitation of mines and forests. But all the machinery, tools and agricultural implements must be imported from abroad, and it depends wholly upon American initiative and enterprise to be first in the market for the import of those goods also.

With the exception of a narrow tract of land along the Dalmatian coast all Southern Slav provinces enjoy a mid-European climate. The winters are short, but rather cold. The snowfall is considerable. In Serbia frost may generally be expected on more than a hundred days per annum. Summers are hot, with abundant rains. The watery valleys of the Save, the Danube, and the Morava are best suited for the cultivation of maize, and the undulating hills of Serbia and the rich plains of Banat produce excellent wheat. But although Serbia was before the war a grain exporting country, after the war Greater Serbia must cease to be so. Bosnia, Montenegro, Dalmatia, Istria and Carniola are all grain importing countries, and Greater Serbia as a whole can produce grain only enough for the requirements of her home market. The same may be said for wines. Vines are grown in every South Slav prov-

ince, but with the exception of some special sorts of wines that might be exported on account of their dainty taste and flavor, the Serbian wines could hardly compete with Italian and French ones. But the famous "Shlivovitza" is distilled in great quantities in Serbia and Bosnia and ought to find a good market here.

Fine sorts of tobacco are grown in many districts of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Hercegovina, so much so that Greater Serbia probably will be one of the chief tobacco producing countries in the world, especially for cigarettes. The administration of the state monopoly is greatly fostering the cultivation of the finer sorts of tobacco. Serbian cigarettes have already a world-wide reputation, and the quantity and quality of Serbian tobacco output was increasing steadily before the war.

But the real wealth of the Southern Slav state will consist in its mineral wealth, cattle, sheep and pig breeding, poultry farming and fruit growing. The mines of Serbia and Bosnia were renowned and exploited during the Roman rule. Neglected during the invasion of the barbarians, the mining industries were greatly fostered by rulers of mediæval Serbia. Wonderful tales were told by mediæval travelers of the richness of the Balkan mines. As late as 1453 the Greek Kristoboulos asserted that gold and silver sprang from the earth like water, and "wherever you dug you found large deposits of the precious metals, in greater quantities than in the Indies."

Kratovo, where Serbian kings minted silver and gold coins, Novo Brdo, Kopaonik and Rudnik where flourished Saxon and Ragusan colonies in mediæval Serbia, were completely ruined by the Turks. With the independence of Serbia the mining industries are again called to life. Serbia is now the only European country where gold is extracted by a Franco-Belgian company at Neresnica. The copper mines of Bor are valued at a hundred million pounds, and are really among the richest in the world. The Serbian mines are already yielding gold, copper, silver, coal, antimony, zinc. Owing to the scarcity of capital this mineral wealth has just begun to be exploited. Before 1912 mineral ores within Serbian territory were discovered in six hundred areas, and were exploited at no more than fifty places. But the richest mining districts of mediæval Serbia—Novo Brdo and Kratovo—incorporated with Serbia after the Balkan wars in 1912, are still in that ruined state in which they were left by the Turks. Bosnia, too, is as rich as Serbia in mineral wealth, having in addition salt and iron mines already exploited. In this direction may be found the greatest scope for American enterprise and investment of capital. In connection with mine-working enterprises it is well to mention that Serbia, as well as Bosnia, abounds in waterfalls; and hydro-electrical power for labor-saving purposes could be easily and cheaply obtained in any mining or industrial area.

The fierce alternations of winter and summer,

with snow to moisten the land at the beginning of the growing season, and heavy summer rain to encourage the development of leaf and temperate fruit, is making the Southern Slav lands most adapted for the breeding of cattle and the cultivation of cereals and fruit-bearing trees. But instead of exporting cereals they, after having satisfied the needs of their population for bread, will turn the surplus of grain products for the poultry farming, breeding of cattle, and raising of swine. The winter frosts have another advantage of killing the germs of cattle and tree diseases. Here again American capital and enterprise might find a large field for action. The introduction of up-to-date farms, dairies and fruit factories has yet to be made in all these provinces. The plums of Serbia and Bosnia provide a considerable item of the peasants' income. But in later years the cultivation of finer sorts of apples, pears, and walnut trees is happily increased. These trees grow everywhere in a wild state, and until recently were not valued. There is no sort of fruit-bearing trees of the mid-European zone for which the Serbian provinces are not the best adapted home.

In connection with their mineral wealth, Serbia and Bosnia are equally rich in mineral waters of every kind and description. The healing properties of the Serbian watering-places have been greatly appreciated by every American visitor. Of course, they are lacking very much in meeting the requirements of American guests as regards

comfort and enjoyment. But the Serbian government will be glad to grant valuable concessions to any American companies that would undertake to make up-to-date improvements in order to attract American visitors, as the beauty of their scenery and their healing properties deserve more than recognition in full measure. As Americans must for a generation or longer shun the German watering-places the opportunity for Serbia is very great.

American capital and skill must be again appealed to for the building of towns and houses, as the Southern Slav state will want them badly. With the exception of Belgrade (ruined by bombardment), Zagreb, Laibach (Ljubljana) and Sarajevo there are no larger towns in Greater Serbia. All of them require many improvements: sanitation, construction of water supply, modern pavement, etc. Americans will be interested as contractors and capital providers and the necessary loans could be guaranteed by the state. But private enterprise for the building of town houses will be most welcome. There is no rented house in Belgrade that does not pay at least 6 per cent annual interest on the invested capital, and many yield 8 to 10 per cent. With that the value of house properties in Belgrade is increasing steadily, and the shortage of dwelling-houses is keenly felt by the inhabitants. After the war those conditions will be worse, and the opportunity for foreign enterprise far greater.

The forests in Serbia before the Balkan war

covered some 30 per cent of her total area. Montenegro, Croatia, and Slavonia were as rich as Serbia, whereas Bosnia and Carniola were even richer, and the exploitation of their forests enriched many a German enterprise. Only Dalmatia and the Serbian Banat are rather poorly provided in that respect. In all of them deciduous trees, especially oak and beech, but also ash, lime, willow, poplar and so forth are the chief trees. Coniferous woods are less important in Serbia and Slavonia, but not so in Bosnia, Carniola and western Croatia. With the improvements of roads and the construction of new railway lines the lumber industries in Serbia will become very important provided the foreign capital is forthcoming.

Together with the building of towns, watering-places and dwelling-houses, American capital may find a remunerative investment in hotel industry in Greater Serbia. There was no foreign visitor that did not highly appreciate the beauty of the natural scenery in Serbia. Bosnia and Croatia can fairly compete with her in that respect. But the Dalmatian coast, especially Ragusa (Dubrovnik), have called for the admiration of any one who by chance visited them. A walk from Dubrovnik to the deep fiord of Cattaro surpasses everything in beauty and loveliness. Besides that, Dubrovnik and other Dalmatian towns are full of archæological and artistic interest. They are the finest winter resorts. Dubrovnik has a mean January temperature of nearly 48°. The lakes of

Plitvica in Croatia, the Adelberg cave in Carniola, the lake of Ohrida in Old Serbia, the plateaus of Šar and Zlatibor in Serbia can vie in beauty with any other spot on the globe. They cannot but attract large numbers of foreign visitors, and the building of comfortable hotels is a first necessity. The Serbian government, in order to attract foreign capital and enterprise, is willing to grant land and liberal concessions: exemption from taxation, free import of all building material, etc.

Space does not allow us to enter into many other interesting details, but the above lines may suffice to show to every inhabitant of the United States that the Southern Slav state is, from every point of view, a most interesting country for them. Economically and commercially the United States and Greater Serbia are two complementary countries whose interests are nowhere opposed and could be most harmoniously dovetailed together. It would be a most unhappy blow of ill-fate if the leading quarters of America should fail to grasp the present opportunity for promoting the unity, independence and economic development of the Southern Slavs. By seizing it they would serve both the highest principles of liberty and humanity, ensure the durability of the peace and increase the prosperity of their own people.

XII

SOUTHERN SLAVS AND PANSLAVISM.¹

IN preparing the present war, Germany did everything in her power to promote the impression that the danger to European civilization lay in Panslavism. Also during the progress of the war the Germans have not ceased to work in the same direction, trying, notwithstanding all atrocities committed in Belgium and the violation of solemn treaties, to represent themselves as fighters for liberty and progress against "the Panslav danger" and "Russian barbarism." But the present World-War, in changing many ideas and dismissing many prejudices about the Slavs, has also among the Western nations effected a revision of the idea of Panslavism.

Panslavism, to trace it historically, is a direct outcome of the dismemberment of the Slav nations which brought in its train weakness and their oppression by more warlike neighbors. Slav authors like to connect the first dim idea of Panslavism with the Polish kingdom and its dynasty

¹ This chapter was written and published last year in England before the Russian Revolution. As it has lost nothing of its actuality we repeat it here without any alteration. The latest events in Russia have only put into stronger relief some views and ideas expressed here.

of the Jagellons. To them was attributed the tendency to unite all Slav nations in a mightier state in order to be able to cope successfully with the constant encroachments upon Slav territories of Germans and Swedes as well as with the Tartar menace from the East. But although the Jagellons aggrandized and strengthened the Polish kingdom, Panslavism did not progress from the initial success when Lithuania joined Poland in a brotherly union.

When the Southern Slav countries were conquered by the Turks, many of their nobility emigrated to Poland and Russia, bringing with them hatred for the invader, grief over the loss of their fatherland, and hopes that Poland or Russia would come to the rescue. Notwithstanding all the entreaties of these emigrants and the patriotic hymns to Polish kings sung by Serbo-Croat poets of the seventeenth century, the Poles never undertook an organized campaign for the liberation of the Southern Slavs, although, under Jan Sobieski, they saved Austria by defeating the Turks under the walls of Vienna in 1683.

In the writings of the Serbo-Croat philosopher Križanić¹ may be found a nearly complete and

¹ Križanić, a Serb Roman Catholic priest, was of noble but impoverished family; he was invited to Russia to assist in the revision of copies of the Scriptures. He was the first Slavophil or Panslavist, and hoped by means of a grammar and lexicon to unite the Slav peoples, with Russia as the elder brother. He was exiled to Tobolsk in 1660, notwithstanding that he was the teacher of Peter the Great: it is thought because he vigorously attacked the Greek Church in Russia. He was a sturdy champion of the Russians against German and Greek influence.

clear vision of Panslavism. He was an ardent and noble patriot, who wished to make Russia strong and prosperous, and see his fatherland, which was deeply submerged under the Turkish wave and totally forgotten by the world, recover some of its departed glories. His idea was to promote the free confederation of all Slav nations, where each of them would enjoy complete political autonomy based upon a democratic constitution. He hoped also through such a confederation to achieve the reunion of the Churches. In that Križanić never succeeded.

Anyhow, the idea of the Panslavism took more concrete shape in the past century, when in 1830 the first society of Slavophiles was formed in Russia, to be followed by two Panslav congresses, one held in Prague (1848) and the other in Moscow (1867).

The Russian Slavophiles, weighed down by the reaction of prince Metternich's system as well as by the excess of the revolutions in Europe, thought that the civilization of the Western nations had proved a complete failure. They were close students of German idealism, especially of Schelling and of the Hegelian philosophy of history. They accepted Hegel's dialectic method and his *a priori* concept of an Absolute Reason, which it was believed incarnated itself in the life of nations. But Hegel came to the conclusion that the spirit of Humanity (Weltgeist) born in Asia incarnated itself in an inadequate form in the Oriental world. In Greece it attained its child-

hood; the history of Greece constitutes the age of youth. In Rome it passed through the age of manhood. At last in the Germanic world the spirit of Humanity has made its last appearance, having come to its maturity and with it is completing the cycle of the mystic metempsychosis of the Absolute. Translated into action it meant that the world belongs to Germany, and all the other nations henceforward are left out of the historical process, with no other mission than slavishly to imitate their fortunate German neighbors and intellectual masters. The Slavophil movement took place in a moment when Russia and the whole Slav world was buoyant with fresh hopes. Russia prided herself in the valuable service just rendered to Europe in having freed it from the Napoleonic yoke. The national spirit and the literature of the Czechs and the Poles was wide awake. Even the Balkan Slavs appeared again on the historical scene. Serbia had formed the nucleus of the Southern Slav state and Europe received with rare enthusiasm the first publication of the Serbian epics. It is true that the magnificent chorus of the great Russian writers, artists and thinkers was still silent, but they were foretold by Pushkin and Lermontov, and the Russian language in their prose and verses attained all its beauty and might of expression. Napoleon from St. Helena has said the words that the future may belong to the Slavs. No wonder that the Slavs, especially the Russians, believed in a great and noble rôle of their race. They reacted against

Hegel's conclusion, but instead of going forward they turned their eyes to the past.

Their author Kireevski wrote that the progress of the state is nothing but the development of the inner principles upon which it is based. The European states, having begun by violence, must progress through revolutions. Owing to the rationalism upon which their civilization is based, the Western countries have developed the spirit of individualism instead of the spirit of social solidarity. Consequently the Slavophiles wanted to replace this principle of rationalism by a new one upon which they could establish the new type of civilization, which was to redeem humanity, and believed that they had found it in the teaching of the Orthodox church, Autocracy and Russian Mir—the Parish Land-Commune. They strongly criticised the reforms introduced by Peter the Great, regretted the westernization of Russia, and demanded the reversion to the condition of things anterior to the Mongolian invasion of Russia.

“For them the Orthodox church is a living organism of life and truth. It consists not in the number of believers, nor in the visible congregation, but in the spiritual tie which binds them together. Roman catholicism curtails individual liberty for the sake of unity. Protestantism takes the alternative and loses its unity in its individualism. Greek orthodoxy professes to be the only religion which remains true to the spirit of primitive christianity, having harmoniously wedded

unity and liberty by the principle of christian love.

“Autocracy, as its second peculiar institution, was not a product of conflict and brutal force, to which the present parliamentary rule is but a natural reaction, as are the governments of the West. Russian autocracy was created by the free-will of its citizens. The tradition of the call of Rurik,¹ the first dynast of Russia, may not be true historically, but it certainly is true temperamentally, reflecting the mind of the people. Thus autocracy is the ‘Holy Ark’ of the Russian nation. The sovereign wishes but the good of the people, and this makes the parliamentary rule superfluous.

“The Parish Land-Commune was called the corner-stone of all Russian institutions, and was highly prized as a realization of the utopian dreams of Western socialists, who hoped to attain to it by way of capitalization and a proletariat. The socialist ideal of communal ownership of land and of the tools of production, it was said, needed not to be attained in Russia by force. There it is a natural product having grown from the very heart of the people. The creation of a proletariat is hence unnecessary and impossible in Russia. The spirit of christian resignation and self-sacrifice has achieved there what selfish Western Europe is trying to get by a bitter class-struggle.

¹ According to tradition, the Russians in the ninth century sent a deputation to Rurik, Prince of the Varyags in Sweden, with the words: “Our land is vast and fertile, but there is no order in it. Come and rule over us!”

This shows that Russian society is based upon the principle of self-abasement and christian love—far higher than the principle of Western individualism.”¹

But the Russian government looked with a very suspicious eye at the movement and action of these “Slavophiles.” Their paper was suppressed, and it was only occasionally that they were allowed to publish any books or series of articles. Such a book, *Sbornik* (miscellany), appeared in 1852, and the Russian minister of education, prince Shirinski-Shakhmatov, in his report to the emperor, wrote about the said *Sbornik*: “Kireevski does not pay due respect to the immortal merits of the great Reformer of Russia and of his imperial successors.” And Aksakov asserts that “the old Russia was organized on the principle of democracy, and in general all authors use much vagueness and allusions, which could be wrongly interpreted by readers of the lower classes.” Thus, owing to the vagueness of their ideas, to their severance from the general course of European civilization, and to the suspicion they aroused in governmental circles, they failed to exercise any lasting or profound influence in Russia.

There was an irreconcilable dualism in the conception of Pan Slavism as formulated by the Slavophiles of the last century. Their failure was due to their turning their back upon Western Europe, thus encountering the bitter opposition

¹ Julius F. Hecker, *Russian Sociology*, New York.

of all the Western elements in the Russian and Slav society and character. They attempted to base civilization upon autocracy, which means rigid, unchangeable order, and also upon democracy, which means infinite progress and perpetual change. In the life of Western Europe, they saw only one tendency, that of extreme rationalism. "This tendency, by excluding every divine principle from the life of man, appears to be profoundly atheistic. It is the denial of religious faith and of mystic knowledge, the exclusive acceptance of science, belief in progress, positivism, and rationalism. According to it, religion is a prejudice; there is no mystic insight into the hidden things. From it we get the democratic principles of the sovereignty of the people and the ethics of utilitarianism, or the consecration of egotism. From it we also get the idea of class-war, the contempt of tradition and an exclusive tendency to a purely intellectual education."¹

In revolting against the West the Slavophiles took refuge in Christianity, but failed to recognize that Christianity is the religion of Aryan Europe. Even the Parish Land-Commune is an institution through which have passed nearly all European races in their social evolution. In Russia it is still kept alive, thanks to special geographical and historico-political conditions. But it has the tendency to disappear with the abolition of serfdom and the political emancipation of the Russian

¹ A. Yastchenko, *The Rôle of Russia . . . in Inter-Racial Problems.*

peasantry, just as the Southern Slav *Zadruga*—the family commune—has a tendency to break up under changed economic and social conditions.

The Panslav congress held at Prague, 1848, was attended only by the delegates of Slav nationalities living in Austria. The Czechs, who promoted and organized the congress, wished by the political cooperation of all Slavs of the Danubian monarchy to forge some weapon against the centralism and germanization of Austria. The work of the congress was organized on a practical basis; the discussions turned around the most urgent political and educational needs of the different Slav nationalities in Austria. It cannot be said that that congress left no impression or remained without any influence. The ideas and the feelings of Slav solidarity were strengthened, and, as far as it was compatible with political conditions in Austria, some coöperation of the Slav nationalities was achieved in the Vienna parliament. But it is very probable that the Germans, alarmed by this solidarity of the Slavs, and fearing to lose altogether their predominance in Austria, were induced more easily to grant not only autonomy to the Magyars, but further to deliver to them all other nationalities in Hungary, by the operation of Beust's Dual Settlement, thus fortifying and insuring their own predominance over the Slavs remaining in Cisleithania.

The same cannot be said of the Panslavic congress held at Moscow in 1867. All Slav nationalities from Austria-Hungary and the Balkans

were represented, with exception of the Poles. The absence of such an important member of the Slav family cast a certain gloom on the proceedings of the congress. Anyhow, some notable speeches about Slav solidarity were delivered, and measures were proposed for encouraging the independent development of different Slav nations. But a little incident at the end of the congress slightly marred the good impression created by the proceedings. At the final banquet to the delegates a Russian speaker proposed that a resolution should be passed to the effect that all delegates expressed the wish that the Russian language be accepted as the literary language of all Slav nations, and that henceforward they would all print their books in the Russian language. The Czech delegate, Dr. Rieger, declared that that was a large question, which could not be decided by a resolution, that it necessitated mature thought and a meeting of all the educated classes in different Slav nations. The Bulgarian delegate enthusiastically accepted the proposition, declaring, in the name of Bulgaria, that they would be delighted to accept Russian for their literary language. But the Serbian delegate, Mr. Vladan Georgević, stated categorically that he was sure Serbians would never accept that proposition, as they considered literature to be the means for the political, scientific, and moral progress of the people, a task which could only be achieved by writing books in the national idioms.

The old Slavophil movement in Russia died out

quietly, but a new movement, again springing from the small and oppressed Slav nations, was now started, aiming at the closer union of the Slavs, in order to further their economic and political independence. The Czech deputy, Kramarz, was recognized as its initiator and leader. This Neoslavism returned to the Križanić's ideas two centuries old. The movement acknowledged all Slav nations as independent and accomplished individual communities, every one of them having the right to full recognition and national development according to their own national and social ideal. Coöperation between them was necessary for the realization of their ideal of freedom and self-government. Besides and before Kramarz, the most prominent leaders of Panslavism were Vodnik (Slovene poet), Kollar (Slovak bard), and Shafarik (Slav antiquary), all belonging to small oppressed Slav nationalities of Austria-Hungary, and their teaching was the direct result of the intolerable conditions in which their kinsfolk lived. The movement remained barren of any practical results, and the last Serbo-Bulgarian war was a hard blow to those who dreamt of a general union among Slavs. It was shown once more that Slav nations were liable to put above all other considerations their own narrow national interests, and were not prepared to sacrifice everything for the ideal of harmony in the Slav world.

Better knowledge of the facts has now dispelled in every quarter the old representation of Panslavism as an aggressive Slav confederation bent

on the conquest of Europe, or even of the whole world. Such Panslavism has never really existed even as an idea, except in the heads of certain Germans who wanted to teach the Slavs what Panslavism ought to be. Germans unable to understand the Slav world, as they failed to understand Great Britain, France or America, judged the others after their own image. For more than a thousand years Germans encroached upon Slav countries. By fire and sword they have germanized millions of Slavs, and have incorporated in Germany hundreds of thousands of square miles of Slav territory. But their appetite grew in eating; they were not satiated, and considered the Slav countries and peoples as a lawful patrimony and an inevitable prey. Hence the Slav resistance exasperated and irritated them. Of the Slavs the Germans could say: *Cet animal est très méchant, quand on l'attaque, il se défend*. And quite sincerely the Germans complained of the Slavs, who did not understand the blessings of the German "Kultur," and seriously meant to put an end to German aggression. For not allowing the Germans to eat them up the Slavs were proclaimed to be aggressive barbarians, and the greatest danger to Europe. So Panslavism was described as the most dreadful thing in the world—as a tower of all imaginable evils and perils for European civilization. Panslavism has never been what Germans pretended to see in it. But if Panslavism were ever to mean a military coalition of Slav peoples against the liberties and ideals of

other nations, such Panslavism will never appeal to the Southern Slavs nor to any other Slav nations. Neither will the idea of Panslavism have any chance of success if it were the mere negation of the past and present European civilization. The Slavs are a European and Aryan race. As the youngest member of the family, they are lawful heirs to the vast treasury of moral and spiritual inheritance accumulated by European nations since the days of Homer. It would be a sacrilege not to love or to reject it. The Slavs are unable to commit such a crime. But if Panslavism means a holy desire, a lofty aspiration to aggrandize and to deepen the spiritual value of that inheritance by contributing to it some special achievements of the Slav genius, then such a conception of Panslavism has a charm and an attraction to which the Southern Slavs will be happy to contribute and willing to open all their heart. Panslavism, to have any chance of success, must be an absolute reaction against the Pan-Germanism which sought to impose its ideals on the world by blood and iron.

The positive character of Panslavism is revealed in the historic mission assigned to the Slav race by its geographical position. Destiny has placed it on the confines of two worlds: the East and the West. All its life has been a prolonged struggle between these two principles: the Aryan outlook with strong belief in progress and the intrinsic value of individual life and effort; and the Mongolian, or Buddhist, which denies prog-

ress and conceives society as a rigid and definite equilibrium of certain given relations. In politics the Aryan outlook means democracy, the Mongolian represents the doctrine of order at any cost. In Russia it finds its natural expression in autocracy, which shows a tendency to realize the Chinese theory of an unchangeable Celestial empire, in which the emperor is regarded as the Son of Heaven. But in Russia this tendency to deification of the actual is radically opposed by an irreconcilable hostile movement—though from the same source and, on the whole, of the same spirit—the Nihilist movement. It is the denial of all absolute values, the tendency to destroy everything and to reject all authority.

“But also the Western tendency—though starting from the opposite direction to that of Orientalism, Autocracy, and Nihilism—and making a complete circuit of evolution, has reached the same result: the denial of the meaning of life. The existence of the world is, when we exclude a divine purpose, absurd. The existence of man is equally absurd, because it has no foundation. Society itself is absurd, because it is doomed to disappear like an individual thing, and like everything else in the world, pre-destined to eternal destruction, and being destitute of any divine inspiration, it has no eternal and intrinsic value in itself. Thus the Western and Eastern tendencies meet in their final consequences, but the result is purely negative, or leads to the destruction of the meaning of

life, and we do not find in it the synthesis we seek.”¹

Neoslavism in the field of philosophy is characterized by attempting, nevertheless, to find that synthesis. The deepest among the Slavophiles, Vladimir Solov'ev, in his work, *The Crisis of Western Philosophy*, wrote: “The realization of the universal synthesis of science, philosophy, and religion must be the supreme aim and last result of the evolution of the thought.”² By following Solov'ev, Neoslavism in its main current rightly understands that the mission of the Slav world consists not in opposing East to West, but in reconciling the two contending principles whilst rejecting the extremes of both. Solov'ev found this great synthesis in regenerated Christianity. For him the universality of Christianity is positive, not negative. He did not believe in the essential supremacy of the Orthodox church, His cherished idea was the reunion of the Churches. He strongly opposed the national exclusiveness of the earlier Slavophiles and put as the first article of his social and political *credo*: “In accepting the essential unity of the human race, we must regard the humanity in entirety, as

¹ A. Yastchenko, *The Rôle of Russia . . . in Inter-Racial Problems*.

² Vladimir Sergeyevitch Solov'ev was son of an eminent Russian historian, S. M. Solov'ev; his mother was a Little Russian of a priestly family. During his life his works were admired, but he had no followers; his voice was a voice crying in the desert. Since his death (in 1900) his works have attained great popularity. He is much read, commented upon, and his followers are now numerous in Russia.

a great collective being, a social organism of which the different nations represent the living members. It is evident, from this point of view, that no people can live in itself, by itself, or for itself, but that the life of each one is merely an individual share in the general life of humanity."

All his work had the tendency to reconcile and to unite instead of to divide and separate. For him the dignity of philosophy is equal to that of religion. Without philosophy religion cannot find an issue outside itself. That which is revealed by the mystic insight, the philosophical reasoning elaborates and gives value. "That God *exists* we *believe*, what God *is* we make the experience and we *know*."

Following in the footprints of Solov'ev, the writers of Neoslavism find that Christianity, like Buddhism, recognizes no absolute value except in eternal life, and places the moral ideal in universal love; but in harmony with the Aryan spirit, it denies neither the material and temporal world nor the labor of man. Christianity teaches the means to obtain the eternal Good in this temporal life. Matter and mind are reconciled in its synthesis. The genius of the Slav race in its highest synthetic manifestations has always reconciled the East and the West: witness Jan Hus in religion, Peter the Great in politics, Leo Tolstoy in morals, Solov'ev in philosophy, and Ivan Meštrović in sculptural art.

In the light of these considerations the present struggle between the Slavs and the Teutons has

a deep and universal meaning. Is Germany not trying to realize the conclusion of Hegel in its crudest and most brutal conception, that the world belongs to the Germans? In the German mind the characteristics of Western rationalism have been developed to their extremes. Have they not declared war upon liberty as well as upon Christianity? Being exclusive to the extreme without power of assimilation, the German mind is unable to give to Europe a synthetic conception. Germany fights to exclude Russia and the Slavs from Europe, and to condemn them to become an Asiatic race, whilst the rest of Europe is to be her vassal materially, intellectually and morally. The enthusiasm with which the Slavs are pushing back the German hordes proves the mystic ardor with which they fight for their Aryan right and European inheritance. Like a mighty river they cannot allow Germany to divert their natural course. They are bent on reaching their destination and on fulfilling their mission. But there is a profound meaning also in the fact of who are the allies on both sides of this world struggle. Germany, whilst attempting to drive Russia from out of Europe, has excluded herself from the European family. Her allies are the Magyars, the Turks and the Bulgars, all three the defeated vanguard of Pan-Mongolism. They attack Russia and the Slavs with a truly Oriental hatred, mystic, somber, and subconscious. Russia and the Slavs have arrested their devastating march, they have subdued their mystic ardor of destruction

and compelled them to accept—however outwardly—the European way of life and thinking. Have they not joined with Germany because they have found in the present struggle the last opportunity for revenge and destruction? But for this fact it would be impossible to imagine that “idealistic” Germany could find allies only among the poor remnants of Asiatic races, who were never inspired by any other but the lowest materialistic tendencies.

Who are the allies of Russia and the Slavs? The true European nations, the best representatives of the Aryan genius. In fighting Germany and her Mongol allies they fight for the Slav place in Europe. They are helping Russia and the Slavs to shake off all still lingering traces of the Mongolian yoke. With their help the Slav world will realize its synthetic mission in becoming a bridge connecting West and East. But every evolution passes through different cycles. If Russia and the Slavs in general have this mission of bridging the gulf between Europe and Asia, the Southern Slavs are best fitted to form a first link binding the West to Russia. They are Slavs, but all their tendencies are European. They understand Russia, although Mongolism has left a lesser imprint upon their mind. They are both Roman catholic and Greek orthodox. If their art is mystic, it is also clear; their national epics contain little of the supernatural and are nearest to the Greek Homeric genius. If their sculptor Meštrović is deeply mystic as in his

christian art, and if his architecture betrays Babylonian or Egyptian characteristics as in the conception of his Temple of Kossovo, he has the keenest sense of form and the clearest vision of classical beauty as revealed in his torso of a hero, now in the Albert and Victoria Museum in London. Politically, the future Southern Slav state will be a result and embodiment of the successful alliance of Western nations with the Slav world.

When freedom and unity will reconcile the ever contending dualism in their character and history, which made up their tragedy, the Southern Slavs may look forward to a future quite different from their past. But in their future freedom and prosperity the Southern Slavs must keep alive the memory of the past misery, the hardships and the humiliations, which were imposed upon them through centuries by a haughty and proud oppressor. Against the German ideal of violence and pride they will set up their ideal of love and christian humility. They will not attempt to force other nations to accept their ideal, but with sympathy and loving curiosity will try to understand other nations' ideal, and to make it more perfect through love and sympathetic interpretation of it. The Southern Slavs will never forget the enormous sacrifices which Russia sustained for their freedom and happiness. They will always recognize in Russia the noble leading sister on the road to the attainment of a higher spiritual and moral ideal which they believe to be the Slav mission

to reveal to the world. They will be happy to pay their debt, not by attacking the frontiers of other nations, but by forming a mighty wall against some rejuvenated desire for conquest and domination in the world. The Southern Slavs will eagerly flock to Mother Moscow and Holy Russia. With feelings of profound gratitude they will kneel at the immense cemeteries which contain the hundreds of thousands of unknown heroes who sacrificed their lives for the dignity of Slavdom and the freedom of the world. The Kremlin and the Tower of Ivan the Great will not be the object of their pious pilgrimage, but with eager curiosity and admiration they will dwell in places like the Artists' Theater at Moscow or the picture gallery of the brothers Tretyakov. And with a deep feeling of devotion and reverence they will go in pilgrimage to Yasnaya Polyana, to breathe in the same atmosphere in which lived and worked the great prophet of Russia in order to be strengthened in his teaching of love and patient sufferings.

XIII

A GLANCE INTO THE FUTURE

GERMANY was not satisfied with her position. The ambitions of her ruling caste knew no limits. Instead of a Germany strong, united and prosperous, they wished to build a world empire which would have for its base a German Central Europe. The present war must settle this question definitely and irrevocably. Against German Central Europe, the Allies must set up a living wall of free, independent national states. In the preceding chapters we have dwelt upon the necessity of creating a strong Southern Slav state, and we trust we have shown not only the possibility of this, but also all the dangers of any other hybrid solution. The Southern Slav question, least known and so neglected by Europe, gave Germany the best opportunity of trying to solve it one-sidedly according to her own views and interests.

When the Southern Slavs will be united and their state constituted, then by applying the same principle of nationality, there will arise at once as if by magic upon the ruins of Austria-Hungary new national states: Bohemia, which will comprise all Czech and Slovak provinces; Hungary, which will become a truly Magyar state, her Slav and

Latin population going respectively to Bohemia, the Southern Slav state, and Roumania, who will unite within her frontiers her entire race still enslaved in Austria-Hungary. Italy will obtain her natural frontier in south Tyrol, and complete her national unity. Poland in the north will be constituted a self-governing kingdom, in which all Poles will be united. As every one of these new national states will of necessity incorporate some unimportant minorities of alien race, it would be in accordance with justice and the new spirit of mutual respect and tolerance which must prevail in future Europe, that guarantees should be provided ensuring the existence and the free national development of these minorities.

Then South-Eastern Europe will present the following picture: Bohemia with about twelve million inhabitants, Hungary with about nine million, Roumania with about fourteen million, the Southern Slav State with about thirteen million, Albania with about one and a half million, Greece with six million and Bulgaria with five million. Constantinople and the Straits must be placed at the discretion of the Allies, to organize that territory in an autonomous state and control the free passage through the Straits—a situation similar to that of the United States in Panama—Russia's economic interests should be fully protected, because she is the only European state, besides Roumania, for which the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles represent a vital interest. And it goes without saying that Roumania should be given

full guarantees safeguarding her interests. Salonica will be a free port under international control. In that way the strength of the new national states will be fairly balanced, and as each one will be constituted within its own ethnical frontiers, they will have no incentive for war and will be without any ambition for conquest.

Some years will necessarily elapse before this new South-Eastern Europe will evolve its own consciousness. But not a generation will pass before we shall see a great change in the feelings and relations of those nations which are now so bitterly and desperately fighting one another. From Julius Cæsar to William II many a conqueror has attempted to weld by force South-Eastern Europe into one state. But the living forces of her nationalities claiming freedom and self-government tore all those schemes to pieces, and every one had to begin anew. It is time that the game should be given up.

When the turmoil of the war has passed away and the passions which blinded them have subsided, the nations of South-Eastern Europe must be ashamed of their present actions and firmly resolve that the ugly drama of our days will never recur. A better understanding of their own interests and a higher conscience must dawn upon them. They will see that they have so much in common that their mutual conflicts and jealousies crippled their power and opened the door to the common enemy. Placed near Germany, they can successfully resist her pressure and safeguard

their own national freedom and existence only if they are united in one form or another. Bohemia, freed from the German grasp, will quickly develop the marvelous resources of her soil and, thanks to the brilliant gifts of her population, she will soon attain a high rank among European nations. Prague will again be what it was before the German conquest: a capital of science, art and the humanities. But a prosperous, strong and independent Hungary will be the natural and most desirable ally of Bohemia. The Magyars, once freed from their oligarchy and cured of their overwhelming desire to dominate others, whilst enthralled themselves to Germany, will understand that the small neighboring nations are the best guarantee of their own liberty. Notwithstanding national antagonisms and jealousies which estranged them, the social relations between the Southern Slavs and the Magyars always had a feature of cordiality and mutual respect. When after so much vain and purposeless fighting they will meet on a basis of equality, the better impulses of their nature will come forward and they will remember those glorious pages in their history when side by side they fought so gallantly for freedom and Christianity. The Magyars will understand that the vainglorious parading in the streets of Budapest with the flags and coats of arms of the conquered Southern Slav lands brought only misery to themselves and imperiled their own independence. Their foolish ambition to rule over the Adriatic or to have free access

to Salonica, and at the same time to treat the Southern Slavs, to whom those shores rightly belong, as third-class citizens, must be definitely abandoned. Then the shores of the Adriatic and the port of Salonica will be spontaneously open to them. Only in alliance and friendly coöperation with the Southern Slavs can the Magyars without sacrifice attain the goal which for a thousand years they were unable to reach or to fully enjoy. The Czechs, the Magyars, and the Southern Slavs are natural allies on the field of economic progress and national defense. The hope to see them before long coöperating together is not one whit exaggerated, and then a new South-Eastern Europe as a moral entity will be—however incompletely—constituted. Roumania would derive many advantages from joining in this fellowship of Bohemia, Hungary and the Southern Slav state. But Roumania will not feel the pressing need for it. Although Hungary and the Southern Slav state will offer her the shortest road to central and western Europe, she may prefer to keep aloof and to use the sea route through the Straits or Bulgaria. Much, indeed, will depend upon what will be the future relations between Hungary and Roumania. The Magyars cannot so soon forget the loss of Transylvania, and may hope that it would be more easy to recover it from Roumania than the Slav provinces torn away from Hungary. But here the Southern Slavs may play a noble part as friends of both Roumania and Hungary, and bring about reconciliation and

coöperation. South-Eastern Europe will not be completed until Roumania joins it. Thus constituted in a loose economic and defensive alliance, Bohemia, Hungary, Roumania and the Southern Slav state would possess in the talents of their population and the natural wealth of their soil everything necessary for progress and independence. Mutually depending upon each other more than any other nations in Europe, they ought sooner than other nations to develop new international sociability. Their future life must be the embodiment of the truth expressed by Solov'ev that "no nation can live in itself, by itself and for itself." They are to be the school of tolerance and mutual aid among nations, and the forerunners of the United States of Europe.

Their material progress, freedom and independence would in this way be amply guaranteed. But it would be a rather poor ideal if they were not to be animated by some higher moral idea. Materially, economically, and politically, South-Eastern Europe will be complete if it includes Bohemia, Hungary, Roumania and the Southern Slav state, but its moral entity will not be perfected unless all the other smaller neighbors join with them. Greece occupies a quite distinct geographical and economic position. Her ways of life and the psychology of her people differ widely from those of her neighbors. Greeks are a nation of sailors and traders. Economically Greece has little to offer and less to receive in joining the confederation of South-Eastern Europe. But her

freedom and independence would be better respected if she joins in the loose defensive community of her neighbors.

Albania has really little to offer; but it is a moral duty of the Southern Slavs to respect Albania's independence and to assist the Albanians in their way of progress and state life, to enable them to enter South-Eastern Europe as a rightful and desirable member.

Bulgaria has committed crimes which can be neither forgotten nor forgiven easily. It could hardly be expected that Roumania and Serbia, who know Bulgaria's character, should like to co-operate with her. Eleven centuries have already passed since the Bulgars settled in Europe, and even to-day they are not sure whether they are a European or an Asiatic race. The original Bulgars lost themselves in the Slav sea, of their language no traces are left, but their Mongolian character was never totally lost. The initial principle of their lifelust for conquest and devastation manifested itself through centuries like sudden gusts of wind. Until now they have retained in their character much of the nature of their Asiatic home. There is no continuity in the political life of Bulgaria. Their energies manifested themselves in sudden rises to might and power like the whirlwinds of central Asia, driving before them pillars of sand, devastating the fertile oasis and annihilating the labor of man. But, like the whirlwind, her rises were always of short duration, followed by long apathy and

inertia. Without a struggle she succumbed before the Turks, during five long centuries of abject slavery she never made any insurrection. When called to life by Russia's fight, she developed unexpected energy, but as she never knew the happy mean, she was carried away by swollen ambitions, by low passions, and lost her head. After this war it is possible that we may witness a fresh period of long prostration so familiar in Bulgaria's history. But this war, in shaking the world to its very foundations, may perhaps once and for all cure Bulgaria of the evil spirit of hatred and insane ambition which possessed her soul until now. The Allies can merely create the physical conditions, but the thorough healing must come by the operation of Bulgaria's own inner, moral energies. The question is, whether Bulgaria will be European or Asiatic, Slav or Mongol. Her choice must be freely made. If she chooses the latter, she may continue a life of sullen mood, of latent hate and creeping desire of revenge, breeding revolt and envy. But measures will be taken that she might do no great harm to anybody in the future. Or it may happen that she might repent of her foul action and wish to be received among the Slav and European nations she so recklessly betrayed. Let us hope that she might gather necessary energy to purge her conscience and come out with a chastised mind. Then it is quite logical that Bulgaria should enter the union of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, where is her natural place and whom she ought never to have

deserted. The political and economic advantages of such a union are too obvious. But this cannot be achieved by any compulsion, as the Serbs, devoid of any ambition for conquest or ill-founded greatness, prefer to live in a smaller community where all parts would be welded in harmony and sympathy, than to enter a union where that harmony would be lacking. But those who know Bulgaria do not believe the sincerity of her conversion. Dr. Dillon warns her neighbors in this respect, saying: "The Bulgars are at one with their monarch. Bulgarian sentiment, honor, humanity, are words which their descendants may one day invest with meaning. Their policy, however, takes full account of these qualities in their neighbors, and if fortune should play them false, the Bulgars will again touch the chord of Slav kinship, and endeavor to move their 'little brothers' to pity and indulgence."¹ Therefore, the first duty of her neighbors towards themselves and peace in the Balkans is to make Bulgaria harmless, and to obtain real guarantees of her sincerity before committing themselves to any co-operation with her in the future.

Those who believe in freedom and democracy must equally believe in the bright future of South-Eastern Europe constituted upon these principles. Liberty will achieve her unity, which ages of bloodshed and forcible conquest failed to do. In spite of the present horrors, in spite of Coburgs

¹ "Error about Bulgaria," *The Daily Telegraph*, August 16th, 1916.

and Kaiser Wilhelm II, the moral progress of the world cannot be stopped, as cannot be stopped the evolution of the stars in the sky. This world war has already proved, that the modern democracies are able to organize successfully resistance against the onslaught of the most terrible militarism. We firmly believe and ardently hope that the world democracies, after this war, will be able to lay down sure foundations for a new and brighter era of humanity.

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